At Zolotyi Kolodyaz', Russia 🇷🇺 had first contact with Ukraine 🇺🇦's New Donbas Line, and its DRGs broke through it for the first time, with the Ukrainians suffering from catastrophic manpower shortages.
In the long term, this might endanger all of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas.
A damage assessment and technical strategical overview of the situation.
🧵Thread🧵 1/⬇️
In the long term, this might endanger all of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas.
A damage assessment and technical strategical overview of the situation.
🧵Thread🧵 1/⬇️
2/🧵
The story starts on July 21th, when, according to DeepState, Russian DRGs were recorded east of Nove Shakhove.
Everything has been kept quiet since then, with neither side releasing any information whatsoever, and with my sources, too, fully respecting operational silence.
Despite this, in the "dark", the Russians kept creeping forward and continued to send more and more DRGs deeper, eventually rendering the situation similar to what we have in Pokrovsk, where Russian DRGs are constantly recorded and destroyed even in the center of the city. Progressively, the breakthrough was expanded on all sides.
As of the evening of August 6th, local channels finally reported shooting battles in Zolotyi Kolodyaz, 7km from the last known Russian position.
The story starts on July 21th, when, according to DeepState, Russian DRGs were recorded east of Nove Shakhove.
Everything has been kept quiet since then, with neither side releasing any information whatsoever, and with my sources, too, fully respecting operational silence.
Despite this, in the "dark", the Russians kept creeping forward and continued to send more and more DRGs deeper, eventually rendering the situation similar to what we have in Pokrovsk, where Russian DRGs are constantly recorded and destroyed even in the center of the city. Progressively, the breakthrough was expanded on all sides.
As of the evening of August 6th, local channels finally reported shooting battles in Zolotyi Kolodyaz, 7km from the last known Russian position.
3/🧵
Let's break down the confusion on what exactly causes these breakthroughs. I identified 4 reasons:
1. Catastrophic manpower shortage in the Ukrainian ranks in this sector, initiating a loop of disorganized retreat ---> Russian breakthroughs ---> lengthening of the front ---> manpower shortage ---> disorganized retreat.
In this specific case we can name Koptieve, settlement from which the Ukrainians retreated in terrible order in mid-June. From there, the Russians exploited a hole that formed in Razine behind the Kazenyi Torets river, and continued without much resistance all the way until the doors of Rodynske, where at the time of writing they have been effectively stopped.
Let's break down the confusion on what exactly causes these breakthroughs. I identified 4 reasons:
1. Catastrophic manpower shortage in the Ukrainian ranks in this sector, initiating a loop of disorganized retreat ---> Russian breakthroughs ---> lengthening of the front ---> manpower shortage ---> disorganized retreat.
In this specific case we can name Koptieve, settlement from which the Ukrainians retreated in terrible order in mid-June. From there, the Russians exploited a hole that formed in Razine behind the Kazenyi Torets river, and continued without much resistance all the way until the doors of Rodynske, where at the time of writing they have been effectively stopped.
4/🧵
2. Command incapacity. In this sector the Ukrainian command is reportedly "living on another world", and is very likely not giving orders, or sending Ukrainian forces into hopeless counterattacks with no planning whatsoever.
Being the Ukrainian and Russian military culture one where tasks given from your higher-ups are viewed as extremely important, this makes you more dependent from your command, and often exacerbates a bad leadership's effects, which is a phenomenon that is very common to see in both sides.
2. Command incapacity. In this sector the Ukrainian command is reportedly "living on another world", and is very likely not giving orders, or sending Ukrainian forces into hopeless counterattacks with no planning whatsoever.
Being the Ukrainian and Russian military culture one where tasks given from your higher-ups are viewed as extremely important, this makes you more dependent from your command, and often exacerbates a bad leadership's effects, which is a phenomenon that is very common to see in both sides.
5/🧵
3. Extremely large amount of Russian resources committed to this direction, with rumours talking of about 100,000 troops just on the Pokrovsk sector. Most of these resources are currently attacking 24/7, which eventually exhausts Ukrainian drone crews, forcing them to temporarily give in and give ground to the attacker.
Notice how I replaced "defendors" with "drone crews" specifically: there is simply nobody in the positions.
3. Extremely large amount of Russian resources committed to this direction, with rumours talking of about 100,000 troops just on the Pokrovsk sector. Most of these resources are currently attacking 24/7, which eventually exhausts Ukrainian drone crews, forcing them to temporarily give in and give ground to the attacker.
Notice how I replaced "defendors" with "drone crews" specifically: there is simply nobody in the positions.
6/🧵
4. New Russian tactics. For about a month now, the Russians have been massively increasing DRG usage. These very small groups of 2-3 people are sent along very well planned routes with the hope of simply bypassing Ukrainian positions (which do not constitute a line, but rather "bubbles" on a map because of resource and personnel shortage), getting in their rear and sewing as much chaos as possible, harrassing logistics and, something that is very often overlooked but is the #1 reason of many Russian breakthroughs recently, distracting Ukrainian UAV crews from the front and Russian pilots, which in turn get total operational freedom and can suppress Ukrainian "bubbles" easily.
These small DRG groups are almost always noticed on approach to the PVD (accumulation point), and they're hit both in that phase and when moving from the PVD to their objective.
Even if these efforts render a DRG troop's survival chance very low, the sheer amount of forces committed that we just talked about give considerable results.
Photo from t.me/creamy_caprice…
4. New Russian tactics. For about a month now, the Russians have been massively increasing DRG usage. These very small groups of 2-3 people are sent along very well planned routes with the hope of simply bypassing Ukrainian positions (which do not constitute a line, but rather "bubbles" on a map because of resource and personnel shortage), getting in their rear and sewing as much chaos as possible, harrassing logistics and, something that is very often overlooked but is the #1 reason of many Russian breakthroughs recently, distracting Ukrainian UAV crews from the front and Russian pilots, which in turn get total operational freedom and can suppress Ukrainian "bubbles" easily.
These small DRG groups are almost always noticed on approach to the PVD (accumulation point), and they're hit both in that phase and when moving from the PVD to their objective.
Even if these efforts render a DRG troop's survival chance very low, the sheer amount of forces committed that we just talked about give considerable results.
Photo from t.me/creamy_caprice…
7/🧵
Now for the damage assessment.
1. Russian forces consolidated positions over Line 0.5 at Hektova Balka, consisting of 1 barbed wire line, 1 anti-tank ditch, and 1 dragon's teeth line.
2. The zone of combat activity was expanded much further around the salient because of DRG activity, which is not visible on a map. This will further worsen Ukrainian organization and logistics and distract resources
3. The Russians opened the Dobropillia front, with reports of DRGs at its doors.
4. Most importantly, the Russians are seriously attempting (and, according to DeepState, succeeded) to cross the obstacle part of the New Donbas Line. This not only means that the only defensive line before central Ukraine is being fought over already, but it also endangers all of Ukrainian controlled Donbas in the long term.
Now for the damage assessment.
1. Russian forces consolidated positions over Line 0.5 at Hektova Balka, consisting of 1 barbed wire line, 1 anti-tank ditch, and 1 dragon's teeth line.
2. The zone of combat activity was expanded much further around the salient because of DRG activity, which is not visible on a map. This will further worsen Ukrainian organization and logistics and distract resources
3. The Russians opened the Dobropillia front, with reports of DRGs at its doors.
4. Most importantly, the Russians are seriously attempting (and, according to DeepState, succeeded) to cross the obstacle part of the New Donbas Line. This not only means that the only defensive line before central Ukraine is being fought over already, but it also endangers all of Ukrainian controlled Donbas in the long term.
8/🧵
About point 4., which to me is the most worrying in the long term (a year +- 4 months, in my opinion, to reach what's in the picture), a possible breakthrough at Zolotyi Kolodyaz opens the opportunity you see down below.
In white, fortified areas and large urban agglomerations. In red, the possible course of actions that I think Russia will take to reach its #1 political goal: the capture of Donbas.
About point 4., which to me is the most worrying in the long term (a year +- 4 months, in my opinion, to reach what's in the picture), a possible breakthrough at Zolotyi Kolodyaz opens the opportunity you see down below.
In white, fortified areas and large urban agglomerations. In red, the possible course of actions that I think Russia will take to reach its #1 political goal: the capture of Donbas.
9/🧵
In fact, you have to remember that the Russians' first objective is not the hundreds of kilometers of fields in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, but the capture of the Donbas, which is constituted by the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
If the Luhansk Oblast is under their control for about 99%, the Russians still struggle with Donetsk Oblast (60%-ish) because of effective and organized Ukrainian units and command and adequate fortifications.
So, focusing on Donetsk, what's still missing after 4 years of war are: Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
Especially, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, with Kramatorsk being de-facto capital of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas.
These cities are giant for this war's standards, and are absolutely impossible to take frontally and even from 2 sides.
In fact, you have to remember that the Russians' first objective is not the hundreds of kilometers of fields in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, but the capture of the Donbas, which is constituted by the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
If the Luhansk Oblast is under their control for about 99%, the Russians still struggle with Donetsk Oblast (60%-ish) because of effective and organized Ukrainian units and command and adequate fortifications.
So, focusing on Donetsk, what's still missing after 4 years of war are: Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
Especially, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, with Kramatorsk being de-facto capital of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas.
These cities are giant for this war's standards, and are absolutely impossible to take frontally and even from 2 sides.
10/🧵
If you remember, the Russians understood this problem extremely well since 2022, and tried to open the 3rd and 4th side in 2022, with Russian-controlled Lyman and Izyum being large logistical hubs that seriously threatened Slovyansk, but in September 2022 the Ukrainians thwarted this with their successful counter-offensive.
Obviously, the Lyman-Izyum pincer would've and would require crossing the Siversky-Donets river, which in a drone war is absolutely suicidal.
But this does not mean that the Russians won't turn Sviatohirsk and Studenok into large drone hubs to control the Izyum-Slovyansk highway, located only 5km from there, nothing for today's drone standards.
If you remember, the Russians understood this problem extremely well since 2022, and tried to open the 3rd and 4th side in 2022, with Russian-controlled Lyman and Izyum being large logistical hubs that seriously threatened Slovyansk, but in September 2022 the Ukrainians thwarted this with their successful counter-offensive.
Obviously, the Lyman-Izyum pincer would've and would require crossing the Siversky-Donets river, which in a drone war is absolutely suicidal.
But this does not mean that the Russians won't turn Sviatohirsk and Studenok into large drone hubs to control the Izyum-Slovyansk highway, located only 5km from there, nothing for today's drone standards.
11/🧵
As I always try to do in my threads, everything connects.
This effort is also a combined effort not only towards Ukrainian bastions in the Donbas, but also to control one of Lyman's two only supply routes, seriously threatening the city in the long term, too.
As I always try to do in my threads, everything connects.
This effort is also a combined effort not only towards Ukrainian bastions in the Donbas, but also to control one of Lyman's two only supply routes, seriously threatening the city in the long term, too.
12/🧵
Going back to Dobropillia, many people noticed a certain "hole" in the defenses in this area.
As you can see, it is, very conveniently for the Russians, situated not only right on the tactical heights between the city and Zolotyi Kolodyaz, but a railway line also runs right through it, which always served as an "infantry highway" for Russian forces (see Zhelanne - Novohrodivka in summer 2024).
That would mean, if this breakthrough were to be stopped, this threat still remains, and the front is already way too close for comfortable digging, meaning the Ukrainians have to close this gap fast.
At the moment there is progress, but at this pace of Russian advances it will not be fast enough.
If there will be consolidation near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, I expect construction here to halt completely because of safety reasons for the workers.
So, this adds another threat, as if there weren't enough already...
Going back to Dobropillia, many people noticed a certain "hole" in the defenses in this area.
As you can see, it is, very conveniently for the Russians, situated not only right on the tactical heights between the city and Zolotyi Kolodyaz, but a railway line also runs right through it, which always served as an "infantry highway" for Russian forces (see Zhelanne - Novohrodivka in summer 2024).
That would mean, if this breakthrough were to be stopped, this threat still remains, and the front is already way too close for comfortable digging, meaning the Ukrainians have to close this gap fast.
At the moment there is progress, but at this pace of Russian advances it will not be fast enough.
If there will be consolidation near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, I expect construction here to halt completely because of safety reasons for the workers.
So, this adds another threat, as if there weren't enough already...
13/🧵
But for now, OPSEC remains tight, and neither side wants to disclose any information whatsoever, so the only thing we can do is wait.
Please remember that the Zolotyi Kolodyaz breakthrough itself is a gray zone as of now. I use the word breakthrough because the Russian DRGs broke through this far, but there is no confirmation as of time of writing that assault groups followed to consolidate the positions that came in the gray zone.
There is a chance that this gray zone could reabsorb itself into the blue zone, but it is much, much more likely that it won't because of the problems discussed above.
But for now, OPSEC remains tight, and neither side wants to disclose any information whatsoever, so the only thing we can do is wait.
Please remember that the Zolotyi Kolodyaz breakthrough itself is a gray zone as of now. I use the word breakthrough because the Russian DRGs broke through this far, but there is no confirmation as of time of writing that assault groups followed to consolidate the positions that came in the gray zone.
There is a chance that this gray zone could reabsorb itself into the blue zone, but it is much, much more likely that it won't because of the problems discussed above.
14/🧵
In general, I think the Russians will make attempts to attack Dobropillia and Bilozerske from the east, if not to create a pincer from the northern side of these two cities, but if they will encounter resistence, they will have to stop, because taking on such a challenge is hard no matter what Army you have with such an exposed salient.
Rather, I think they will try to advance north and south of Dobropillia to wedge between it and Bilozerske, while also using the railway to their advantage to create the northern pincer of Bilozerske.
Further south it seems logical, since they encountered resistance at Rodynske, to attack Bilytske from the north, and then descend all the way to Hryshyne, last retreat route for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
About the northern part, my predictions are in the posts above.
In general, I think the Russians will make attempts to attack Dobropillia and Bilozerske from the east, if not to create a pincer from the northern side of these two cities, but if they will encounter resistence, they will have to stop, because taking on such a challenge is hard no matter what Army you have with such an exposed salient.
Rather, I think they will try to advance north and south of Dobropillia to wedge between it and Bilozerske, while also using the railway to their advantage to create the northern pincer of Bilozerske.
Further south it seems logical, since they encountered resistance at Rodynske, to attack Bilytske from the north, and then descend all the way to Hryshyne, last retreat route for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
About the northern part, my predictions are in the posts above.
15/🧵
In conclusion, dear viewers, please do not sugarcoat the situation. It is bad, very bad. This is one of the lowest places Ukraine has been since 2024 in terms of possible territorial loss and opportunities ceded to the Russians, after the Prohres catastrophe, which, though, did not menace whole cities.
Regarding the fact that infantry is needed to man the defenses, I would like to reiterate that these obstacles were built with manpower shortage in mind, and require drone operators to patrol, with the final aim of not letting the Russians over the obstacles and, as such, not needing infantry for contact battles. But don't get me wrong, infantry is still the king of the battlefield, no matter what anybody says. Control is not control if there is nobody there, it's as simple as that.
My personal opinion is that the Ukrainians will have to make a strong decision very soon, and of very large caliber, to patch up further holes: available resources are clearly not enough to cover all of the front effectively.
In conclusion, dear viewers, please do not sugarcoat the situation. It is bad, very bad. This is one of the lowest places Ukraine has been since 2024 in terms of possible territorial loss and opportunities ceded to the Russians, after the Prohres catastrophe, which, though, did not menace whole cities.
Regarding the fact that infantry is needed to man the defenses, I would like to reiterate that these obstacles were built with manpower shortage in mind, and require drone operators to patrol, with the final aim of not letting the Russians over the obstacles and, as such, not needing infantry for contact battles. But don't get me wrong, infantry is still the king of the battlefield, no matter what anybody says. Control is not control if there is nobody there, it's as simple as that.
My personal opinion is that the Ukrainians will have to make a strong decision very soon, and of very large caliber, to patch up further holes: available resources are clearly not enough to cover all of the front effectively.
16/🧵
Thank you so much for reading this thread!
I know, it was very boring and technical, but now you fully know the situation there and the risks that come from it.
If you still enjoyed it, a simple repost will be very appreciated.
This work takes huge amounts of efforts and time, so if you would like to support me, here's my BuyMeACoffee link: coff.ee/playfra
Any amount will be appreciated, the gesture counts!
And remember to join my Telegram channel: t.me/PlayfraOSINT
Have a nice day, everyone!
Thank you so much for reading this thread!
I know, it was very boring and technical, but now you fully know the situation there and the risks that come from it.
If you still enjoyed it, a simple repost will be very appreciated.
This work takes huge amounts of efforts and time, so if you would like to support me, here's my BuyMeACoffee link: coff.ee/playfra
Any amount will be appreciated, the gesture counts!
And remember to join my Telegram channel: t.me/PlayfraOSINT
Have a nice day, everyone!
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
