A few more notes on Pokrovsk. Penetrations and developing envelopments rarely begin with a local commander’s decision. They stem from deeper problems on strategic level - starting with a shortage of manpower, itself the result of ineffective recruitment and a lack of trust:
2/ If units are only 25% manned but spread out as if they were fully staffed, and if there aren’t enough drones or trained pilots, then blaming a battalion or brigade commander is nothing more than scapegoating.
3/ Holding drills near the border or front lines under enemy drone surveillance, resulting in missile strikes, digging trenches in open fields, and similar acts of negligence all erode trust in leadership and, ultimately, weaken mobilization.
4/ Mr. President @ZelenskyyUa - you need people who lead real change, and, most importantly, restore trust in the command. Once the situation is stabilized, you must replace Commander-in-Chief Syrski, because this convinent yes-man will only push us closer to the abyss
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Desertions, AWOLs, manpower shortages, and recruitment struggles are often linked to the Ukrainian army. And rightly so - I’ve spoken about these issues at length. But the situation on the Russian side is also worsening. This issue deserves wider attention, so here’s a 🧵thread:
2/ First, while Russia continues to receive a steady flow of recruits, only a part of them can be considered true volunteers. What’s actually happening is a form of hidden mobilization that has not only persisted but accelerated in recent months. Let's talk about it in detail
3/ In the past, Russia resorted to recruiting prisoners to get more people. That approach has shifted. Now, individuals arrested on suspicion of various crimes are offered the chance to sign a contract with the MoD on the spot - often as a way to avoid criminal investigation.
As Moscow tries to spotlight Ukraine’s recruitment issues, the Kremlin is taking unprecedented steps to fill its own ranks. Here are key developments from the past two weeks:
1/ Russia’s electronic draft registry and Unified Military Register are now live and ramping up activity
2/ The Ministry of Defense has begun notifying residents of Perm of their inclusion in the Unified Military Register. Similar notices had previously been reported by residents of Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Chuvashia and the Kaluga region.
3/ According to the “Idite Lesom” project, a Tver region resident eligible for conscription received two notifications: a draft notice to show up at the military enlistment office, and message confirming a deadline and restrictions, including a travel ban.
A month ago, I wrote that the situation in Pokrovsk had become critical - for the second time since 2024. This time, however, our forces have been unable to stabilize the front. The loss of Pokrovsk is a matter of time, though claims that Russians have breakthrough are inaccurate
2/ The recent incursions by small Russian units deeper beyond Pokrovsk are largely the result of porous defenses, which allow limited infiltration but do not enable these forces to establish meaningful control over the area. At least for now
3/ The situation is developing unfavorably, but it is not unexpected. Russian forces have concentrated their largest grouping of troops along the Pokrovsk front and retain sufficient resources to sustain an intense offensive.
This map, created by analyst and mapper Clément Molin, shows a network of visible, (some are concealed and not mapped), fortifications stretching to the edges of Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine is unlikely to give this up without a fight, in exchange for promises broken in the past.
2/ I believe there is room for compromise from both sides that could lead to some form of agreement. However, any deal in which Ukraine gives up territory in exchange for promises would be one-sided, worsening Ukraine’s position while solely improving Russia’s
3/ A final peace deal would almost certainly leave both sides dissatisfied. As I have written before, the reality on the ground is that neither side can fully achieve its goals in the near term. Our Constitution prohibits the de jure cession of territory without a referendum
Sternenko’s fund regularly raises money for Shahed interceptor drones, costing about $2,100 each. With $50 million, over 23,800 drones could be delivered: a low-cost production with high potential impact. Yet EU bureaucracy and short-sightedness remain major obstacles:
2/ Whether it’s small-drone production, interceptors, or UGVs, Ukraine has the industrial capacity, expertise, and experience. The main bottleneck is funding. Often, Europe tries to help Ukraine while also addressing its own needs, such as building new factories on EU soil
3/ That’s not wrong in itself, but it takes time. Ukraine doesn’t have 3 - 5 years to wait for new production to reach the necessary scale under the “help Ukraine” banner. I’ve supported such projects because they should be mutually beneficial. But they can’t be exhaustive
Over the past two weeks, our team has been closely following battlefield advancements, troop movements, and other war data. Below is a summary of our latest assessment of the operational situation and the trends:
2/ Sumy Front: As of early August, Russian forces have failed to establish the proclaimed “buffer zone” along the border in Sumy Oblast, managing only to create small, isolated pockets. We see no signs that the situation will improve for Russia significantly in the coming weeks
3/ Mobilization: Russia continues to expand its concealed mobilization efforts, aiming not only to sustain but to increase numbers. This runs counter to recent Russian statements about interest in negotiations and points to an effort to maximize the pace of offensive operations