Thread by @gregbagwell

A stark appraisal of the state of the RN. But we must be wary of playing victim here and learn lessons as to what a Service must do to thrive . Because the underlying issues identified here are not unique to the RN. Let’s explore where and how it can and does go wrong: 🧵1/18

https://twitter.com/navylookout/status/1954801913226011075

2/ OVER- AMBITION: is a killer, it’s ok to have a vision or aspiration, but if your plans exceed your budget you have no margin of safety. And the first clue that it’s not going to work is when you start fitting “for and not with”, because you can only afford the former.

3/ IGNORING THE BASICS: Under investing in your core services and capabilities to afford more shiny kit has only one outcome, unless you have a recovery plan and can mitigate the additional costs of that recovery. But it’s a slippery slope that is hard to come back from.

4/ RUTHLESS PRIORITISATION: Knowing what you MUST do should be built into the plan from the outset. But recognising early what you CAN’T do is just as vital, and either has to be cancelled, re-profiled or wait for funding. Doing nothing will only do harm in the long run.

5/ UNDER-ESTIMATING: if something looks too good to be true it probably is. Suppressed or de-scoped estimates may create the illusion of affordability and allow a programme to survive for longer but will the outcome (and harm it will do elsewhere) be worth saving?

6/ OVER COMMITTING - If your plans are under funded, then get more money or change your plan - committing to things that are either impossible or difficult to reverse (politically and/or commercially) leaves you reliant on an intervention that might never come.

7/ OVER-COMPENSATING: working your smaller force harder to try and still deliver your ambition only compounds the errors. The right approach is to match your output to your resource and invest in the basics, otherwise you will have a retention problem too.

8/ JAM TOMORROW: Defence is unique in not knowing when it might have to operate at full scale. As such, it cannot afford to take too much risk on capability today for a better one in a decade. It requires a cautious conservative approach not a cavalier or revolutionary one.

9/ EXPECTING DIFFERENT OUTCOMES: Basing your plans on a new paradigm that is outside your direct control, and has no past evidence of delivering the scale of change necessary, is not really the fault of the system, but rather your misplaced or blind faith in its delivery.

10/ TRUE ACCOUNTABILITY: Attempts to use individual accountability to improve outcomes have failed. But ultimate responsibility always lies with the Service Leadership & its Main Board - it is a cop out to blame politicians, civil servants or commercial entities for everything.

11/ Yes they make mistakes & sometimes make harsh and/or contrary decisions, but it’s the job of the Service Executive to absorb & adapt to higher direction and the budget they get, whilst keeping the Service in balance. But that responsibility must be respected & supported….👇

12/ TRANSPARENCY & HONESTY: There has to be a clear and agreed understanding across Defence of what can and what can’t be done by a Service on its budget, and that has to be respected & supported by the Department. But there has to be transparency and honesty from both sides.

13/ None of the above delivers a bigger Navy, Air Force or Army - that needs better resourcing and clear & consistent political direction. So responsibility for a too small military lies with Government, but the blame for a failing or unbalanced one lies with its Executive.

14/ That may result in a Service with a lower standing; but at least one that consistently delivers its agreed core tasks/priorities, is resilient & balanced, with a sound foundation, has invested in its people, and is ready to grow if & when the political decision & money comes.

15/ Of course a Service should continue to make its case for what it needs, and, just as importantly, what more it thinks it needs to meet the likely threats. But that is an intellectual battle you might not win, not an opportunity to experiment or proceed regardless.

16/ All 3 Services have been through the same challenges and context, but of all 3, the Navy was the one most at risk for getting its strategy wrong. Large platforms with long lead times and big ambition mean that you have to make hard choices sooner and with bigger consequences.

17/ It would be unfair to lay all the blame at the Navy’s feet. There have been well documented failures and inconsistencies everywhere in Defence, and often political ambition was way beyond the one it paid for. But it’s how you react to that context that you should be judged.

18/ Who knows if the new changes in MoD improve things quickly. But in any event, they do not abrogate a Service’s responsibility for safe guarding itself. Turning a blind eye may work occasionally in battle, but it’s no way to run a Service.