Thread on the situation east of Dobropillia. It is important to start by acknowledging there is much we don't know, so it is difficult whether to call this a breach, breakthrough, or infiltration past Ukrainian lines. It is also difficult to predict how this will develop, but it demonstrates a Ukrainian vulnerability.
The front line is actually relatively porous, and there is often fewer than 10 soldiers defending every kilometer of the front depending on the terrain. Many Ukrainian brigades have adopted a different approach to defense where their infantry deliberately try to avoid engaging Russian infantry unless absolutely necessary. They instead rely on UAS to stop Russian infantry, both in front of or behind the front line. Most commanders we spoke to estimated that 80-90% of Russian infantry casualties are caused by UAS. 2/
They have adopted this approach in part because Russia has improved its targeting process at the tactical level. If Ukrainian infantry engage Russian infantry, their positions will then likely be destroyed by FPVs, Molniya, bomber UAS, artillery, or glide bombs. Any fixed position above ground can be destroyed with successive UAS strikes, so almost all defensive positions on the FLOT are in treelines, forests, or the basements of houses or buildings. In some cases, Russian forces would previously advance by using infantry to draw fire, and then destroy the front line positions with fires. 3/
Russian infantry tactics previously focused on assaulting forward Ukrainian positions--often by assembling in front of those positions--but they have now adopted infiltration tactics that seek to push as far as possible until stopped. These tactics are often not that sophisticated and the level of training required for the soldiers is not substantial. Individual soldiers will be given a rally point past the FLOT and several soldiers will be sent there individually or in pairs from different directions. This is designed to cause panic for Ukrainian infantry on the front and elsewhere. 4/
The infiltration of Pokrovsk last month by soldiers from Russia's 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade marked a change in Russian infiltration tactics. This was conducted at a greater depth, and the operation was more sophisticated and involved greater planning. I was told the preparation went on for at least 3 months. They selected particularly motivated soldiers, and they were resupplied by FPV once they passed the front line. Their movement was slow and deliberate, and they carefully picked routes that provided the best concealment and between the area of responsibility of two Ukrainian brigades. Approximately 30 soldiers made it into the city, and began conducting ambushes. 5/
Ultimately, the infiltration of Pokrovsk did not achieve Russia's goals primarily because the brigades holding the front line did not abandon their positions despite the infiltration. Other Ukrainian units were sent to clear out the groups in Pokrovsk. 6/
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1954503888532381949
But that still required the redeployment of other Ukrainian units, and demonstrated a vulnerability in Ukraine's defenses. UAS cannot locate or kill every Russian soldier when they employ these tactics, and Russia is having greater success targeting Ukrainian UAS teams. They often deploy Rubicon detachments a week prior to assaults, which can temporarily significantly degrade the defending brigade's UAS capabilities. Since UAS is responsible for most Russian casualties, this can be the difference between a failed or successful assault. 7/
Russia seems to have employed a similar approach in this direction. The infiltration was conducted by soldiers from the Russian DNR 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, which is composed of soldiers from the occupied areas who would better understand the area and potentially blend in. The extent of their movement isn't fully clear, but these groups infiltrated more than 10 kilometers past the FLOT, and possibly much further. I would assume this operation was planned well before the summit in Alaska as well. 8/
If the Ukrainian infantry continue to hold their positions, and other units can mop up these groups, then this would not be a breakthrough. These groups don't necessarily demonstrate an increase in Russian territorial control, but they could create problems in the rear. Deep infiltration will also force Ukrainian units to employ great force protection measures and they may have to push back certain supporting assets further from the FLOT, including UAS teams, making it more difficult to defend. More broadly, Ukraine will need to focus more on quick reaction forces that are trained to counter sabotage groups given the lack of infantry holding the front. 9/
Russia's employment of infiltration tactics and Ukrainian infantry who often don't engage Russian infantry also means it is increasingly difficult for maps to adequately explain the situation. It is a matter of judgment where the line of control is, and the front line is more of an enlarged gray area. 10/
It is unclear if Russia can capitalize on this development or if they can set the conditions to employ armor effectively again, but the infiltration of Pokrovsk and east of Dobropillia demonstrate that Russian continues to adapt to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities. They may try to conduct similar infiltration in Kharkiv, Sumy, or on other parts of the front line. It is still critical that Ukraine addresses its longstanding manpower issues. 11/
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