One of the biggest mistakes made by those who cover the topic of the tussian–Ukrainian war is the attempt to squeeze the issue into narrow content and time frames. Focusing exclusively on what preceded the full-scale war a few weeks or months before, and on what happened after the invasion, while refusing to examine deeper preconditions, leads to the oversimplification of any material.
Of course, limiting research to the period of Ukraine’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union creates a similar trap. Still, it allows one to broaden the perspective and demonstrate how primitive many theses are, and how easily people fall for russia’s semantic tricks. So, let me talk about how the russians tried to pressure Ukraine after it gained independence and up until they were ready to start the war.
Already in 1992, the president of the so-called russia, Yeltsin, signed a decree transferring the entire Black Sea Fleet under russian jurisdiction, including the part stationed in Ukraine and under Ukrainian jurisdiction.
Yeltsin’s vice president, Rutskoy, declared that Ukraine was a “temporarily lost territory.” Moreover, he visited Ukraine and publicly called for the annexation of Crimea back then. Regarding both events, the Ukrainian parliament issued a statement in April 1992:
zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2267…
1/
Of course, limiting research to the period of Ukraine’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union creates a similar trap. Still, it allows one to broaden the perspective and demonstrate how primitive many theses are, and how easily people fall for russia’s semantic tricks. So, let me talk about how the russians tried to pressure Ukraine after it gained independence and up until they were ready to start the war.
Already in 1992, the president of the so-called russia, Yeltsin, signed a decree transferring the entire Black Sea Fleet under russian jurisdiction, including the part stationed in Ukraine and under Ukrainian jurisdiction.
Yeltsin’s vice president, Rutskoy, declared that Ukraine was a “temporarily lost territory.” Moreover, he visited Ukraine and publicly called for the annexation of Crimea back then. Regarding both events, the Ukrainian parliament issued a statement in April 1992:
zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2267…
1/
Thus, practically right after the proclamation of independence, and also after the referendum on December 1, 1991, at which Ukrainians firmly chose to restore our statehood, the tussians actively began interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs and attacking its sovereignty, questioning territorial integrity and calling for the annexation of Ukrainian lands.
Of course, at that time there was no talk of NATO in Ukraine, which today the Kremlin cites as a pretext for its attack. Ukrainian statehood was still in its formative stage, with many issues that needed resolution.
By the way, Rutskoy – an honorary citizen of Kursk – supported russia’s attacks on Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022. Consistent, like the entire russian elite, in seeking Ukraine’s destruction. He threatened to revise Ukraine’s borders by force on August 28, 1991 – just days after the Act of Proclamation of Independence of Ukraine.
And to make it clear that this was not political freelancing by a former Su-25 pilot, two days earlier, on August 26, 1991 – just two days after Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Act of Proclamation of Independence – Voshchanov, the press secretary of President Yeltsin, announced russia’s official position regarding relations with “union republics”: “The RSFSR reserves the right to raise the issue of border revision.” 2/
Of course, at that time there was no talk of NATO in Ukraine, which today the Kremlin cites as a pretext for its attack. Ukrainian statehood was still in its formative stage, with many issues that needed resolution.
By the way, Rutskoy – an honorary citizen of Kursk – supported russia’s attacks on Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022. Consistent, like the entire russian elite, in seeking Ukraine’s destruction. He threatened to revise Ukraine’s borders by force on August 28, 1991 – just days after the Act of Proclamation of Independence of Ukraine.
And to make it clear that this was not political freelancing by a former Su-25 pilot, two days earlier, on August 26, 1991 – just two days after Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Act of Proclamation of Independence – Voshchanov, the press secretary of President Yeltsin, announced russia’s official position regarding relations with “union republics”: “The RSFSR reserves the right to raise the issue of border revision.” 2/
On May 21, 1992, the Supreme Council of the russian federation passed a resolution canceling the 1954 act of transferring Crimea to Ukraine and demanded that the “issue of Crimea be resolved through intergovernmental negotiations between russia and Ukraine, with the participation of Crimea and based on the will of its people.” The Soviet Union no longer existed, and legally this document was an example of interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs within its internationally recognized borders.
On July 9, 1993, the russian parliament adopted a resolution “On the Status of the City of Sevastopol,” recognizing it as part of russia. On August 23, deputies of the Sevastopol City Council voted for the city’s russian status. On December 5, 1996, the Federation Council declared that Ukraine “contrary to objective reality does not wish to discuss in negotiations the issue of the russian status of Sevastopol.”
Thus, legally, as early as 1993 russia had annexed part of Ukrainian territory within its own legislation – simply without carrying out a military occupation as it would in 2014. In 1992, an active “oath war” was underway in Crimea within the Black Sea Fleet. The russians did everything to push Ukrainians out of the fleet and gain de facto control over it. They forcefully seized ships and administrative buildings, expelling those who had sworn allegiance to Ukraine from the barracks.
On July 21, 1992, russians opened fire and tried to ram the SKR-112 ship, which was sailing under the Ukrainian flag toward Odesa. The agreement that the countries eventually signed merely formalized what russia had already seized by force. More than 80% of ships and assets remained in Russian hands. The russian fleet stayed in Sevastopol and always served as a tool of pressure on Ukraine. 3/
On July 9, 1993, the russian parliament adopted a resolution “On the Status of the City of Sevastopol,” recognizing it as part of russia. On August 23, deputies of the Sevastopol City Council voted for the city’s russian status. On December 5, 1996, the Federation Council declared that Ukraine “contrary to objective reality does not wish to discuss in negotiations the issue of the russian status of Sevastopol.”
Thus, legally, as early as 1993 russia had annexed part of Ukrainian territory within its own legislation – simply without carrying out a military occupation as it would in 2014. In 1992, an active “oath war” was underway in Crimea within the Black Sea Fleet. The russians did everything to push Ukrainians out of the fleet and gain de facto control over it. They forcefully seized ships and administrative buildings, expelling those who had sworn allegiance to Ukraine from the barracks.
On July 21, 1992, russians opened fire and tried to ram the SKR-112 ship, which was sailing under the Ukrainian flag toward Odesa. The agreement that the countries eventually signed merely formalized what russia had already seized by force. More than 80% of ships and assets remained in Russian hands. The russian fleet stayed in Sevastopol and always served as a tool of pressure on Ukraine. 3/
Alongside the military, local russian separatists and organized crime became involved. Pro-russian forces in Crimea openly advanced against Ukraine, and in 1993 they illegally created the post of “president.” Illegal elections were held, and the local radical separatist Meshkov reached the runoff and won. He openly advocated detaching the peninsula from Ukraine.
Meshkov began taking control of local security structures. He closely cooperated with Podanyev, the head of one of the most powerful local gangs. In general, the local criminal world took a pro-russian position and assisted the separatists, being part of them.
Naturally, Meshkov was supported by the russian FSB, whose officers arrived in Crimea and did not hide their presence. In the documentary “Crimea. Liberation”, one can see operational footage featuring FSB agents Yevdokimov and Gavrilenko.
Here I’ll leave two side notes. First, the recollections of one of my lecturers, who had long experience working in law enforcement. According to him, in the first years after the collapse of the USSR, russian police and FSB officers allowed themselves to carry out investigative and other actions on Ukrainian territory without any authorization. It often came to the point that they were simply caught in different regions of the country and expelled.
Second – in the first days of the invasion, when we were holding a defensive sector near Kyiv as a then legally undefined volunteer unit, there was an old man with us whom we affectionately called “Father.” When official mobilization came, he was sent home due to his age. But he had worked many years in law enforcement in Crimea, dedicating them to fighting local gangs. Such was his fate. 4/
Meshkov began taking control of local security structures. He closely cooperated with Podanyev, the head of one of the most powerful local gangs. In general, the local criminal world took a pro-russian position and assisted the separatists, being part of them.
Naturally, Meshkov was supported by the russian FSB, whose officers arrived in Crimea and did not hide their presence. In the documentary “Crimea. Liberation”, one can see operational footage featuring FSB agents Yevdokimov and Gavrilenko.
Here I’ll leave two side notes. First, the recollections of one of my lecturers, who had long experience working in law enforcement. According to him, in the first years after the collapse of the USSR, russian police and FSB officers allowed themselves to carry out investigative and other actions on Ukrainian territory without any authorization. It often came to the point that they were simply caught in different regions of the country and expelled.
Second – in the first days of the invasion, when we were holding a defensive sector near Kyiv as a then legally undefined volunteer unit, there was an old man with us whom we affectionately called “Father.” When official mobilization came, he was sent home due to his age. But he had worked many years in law enforcement in Crimea, dedicating them to fighting local gangs. Such was his fate. 4/
russia’s plans in Crimea were thwarted then thanks to the efforts of the SBU and the military, who carefully monitored the actions of the russian fleet and the 810th Marine Brigade, while russian “servicemen” infiltrated the peninsula by land, sea, and air… only later to quietly seize the local SBU office, from which separatists had already removed the state emblem.
When Meshkov arrived at the building, “Alpha” officers told him to get lost. His meteoric political career then began to collapse. In 1995, the illegal “presidency” of Crimea was abolished, and Meshkov left for russia.
In Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution, a direct prohibition was included against the deployment of foreign military bases on Ukrainian territory. Nevertheless, under pressure, russia managed less than a year later to secure an agreement allowing its fleet to remain in Crimea. They did everything to preserve a bridgehead for a future takeover of the peninsula.
In 1997, the treaty became the culmination of a difficult political game, with the Kremlin pressuring and blackmailing then-president Kuchma, who owed much of his electoral victory to rhetoric about partnership with russia. The high stakes are evident from the fact that Yeltsin only visited Kyiv three years after Kuchma’s election. Until then, the pressure – including regarding the fleet – continued.
The agreement was supposed to last until 2017, but in 2010 (after russia’s war against Georgia in 2008), Yanukovych’s government – despite protests in Ukraine – signed the so-called “Kharkiv Accords,” which extended russia’s military presence on Ukrainian territory. 5/
When Meshkov arrived at the building, “Alpha” officers told him to get lost. His meteoric political career then began to collapse. In 1995, the illegal “presidency” of Crimea was abolished, and Meshkov left for russia.
In Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution, a direct prohibition was included against the deployment of foreign military bases on Ukrainian territory. Nevertheless, under pressure, russia managed less than a year later to secure an agreement allowing its fleet to remain in Crimea. They did everything to preserve a bridgehead for a future takeover of the peninsula.
In 1997, the treaty became the culmination of a difficult political game, with the Kremlin pressuring and blackmailing then-president Kuchma, who owed much of his electoral victory to rhetoric about partnership with russia. The high stakes are evident from the fact that Yeltsin only visited Kyiv three years after Kuchma’s election. Until then, the pressure – including regarding the fleet – continued.
The agreement was supposed to last until 2017, but in 2010 (after russia’s war against Georgia in 2008), Yanukovych’s government – despite protests in Ukraine – signed the so-called “Kharkiv Accords,” which extended russia’s military presence on Ukrainian territory. 5/
By the way, russia had already unambiguously confirmed its presence in Crimea as a threat to Ukraine. In April 2000, russians fired on a Ukrainian vessel sailing from the Bosporus to Skadovsk. Naturally, they blamed the Ukrainians for the incident.
Most likely, Ukraine was saved from armed conflict in the 1990s by russia’s internal problems: Yeltsin’s 1993 coup with the shelling of parliament, the bloodshed in Chechnya, and the 1998 default.
In 2003, putin made his first test move. russia laid claims to Ukraine’s Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait. At that time, they began building a dam to reach the island. The Ukrainian authorities reacted unambiguously: border guards were ordered to open fire if russians stepped onto Ukrainian soil.
Preparations for the provocation had begun in 2002. As in Soviet times, “at the request of the working people” – in fact, local crazies – letters were sent to putin demanding that Tuzla be “granted russian status.”
In 2003, after a series of propaganda and preparatory steps, russia began building the dam to reach Tuzla. Simultaneously, it organized provocations in Crimea, including rallies demanding that all of Crimea be transferred to russia.
The dam construction ended when it reached the Ukrainian border pontoon – just 100 meters from Ukrainian border guard positions. All this was accompanied by an aggressive propaganda campaign hostile to Ukraine.
By the way, during those events, the Ukrainian side let the Americans know it intended to initiate consultations under Article 6 of the Budapest Memorandum. Reportedly, the Americans even intervened and pushed for dialogue. Since then, the value of that document has clearly not been confirmed.
In 2004–2005, the Kremlin’s ambitions toward Ukraine suffered a political setback. Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the election results that declared Yanukovych the winner. The russians, of course, were offended and put all their efforts into revenge.
In 2007, in Munich, putin delivered his famous speech, which, as is now clear, became as much a confession of future crimes as a certain Austrian painter’s book. russia had stepped onto a systemic path aimed at trampling Ukraine – the same path it follows today. 6/
Most likely, Ukraine was saved from armed conflict in the 1990s by russia’s internal problems: Yeltsin’s 1993 coup with the shelling of parliament, the bloodshed in Chechnya, and the 1998 default.
In 2003, putin made his first test move. russia laid claims to Ukraine’s Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait. At that time, they began building a dam to reach the island. The Ukrainian authorities reacted unambiguously: border guards were ordered to open fire if russians stepped onto Ukrainian soil.
Preparations for the provocation had begun in 2002. As in Soviet times, “at the request of the working people” – in fact, local crazies – letters were sent to putin demanding that Tuzla be “granted russian status.”
In 2003, after a series of propaganda and preparatory steps, russia began building the dam to reach Tuzla. Simultaneously, it organized provocations in Crimea, including rallies demanding that all of Crimea be transferred to russia.
The dam construction ended when it reached the Ukrainian border pontoon – just 100 meters from Ukrainian border guard positions. All this was accompanied by an aggressive propaganda campaign hostile to Ukraine.
By the way, during those events, the Ukrainian side let the Americans know it intended to initiate consultations under Article 6 of the Budapest Memorandum. Reportedly, the Americans even intervened and pushed for dialogue. Since then, the value of that document has clearly not been confirmed.
In 2004–2005, the Kremlin’s ambitions toward Ukraine suffered a political setback. Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the election results that declared Yanukovych the winner. The russians, of course, were offended and put all their efforts into revenge.
In 2007, in Munich, putin delivered his famous speech, which, as is now clear, became as much a confession of future crimes as a certain Austrian painter’s book. russia had stepped onto a systemic path aimed at trampling Ukraine – the same path it follows today. 6/
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