Thread by @samagreene

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built.

A quick thread

/1

First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody.

Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous.

/2

The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing.

/3

Trump has once again shown himself to be malleable, putting some kind of security guarantees, and even a return to discussion of a cease-fire back on the table. Who knows what will happen when he gets off the phone with Putin later today.

/4

If Zelenskyy and his European allies all go home and leave the ball in the Trump/Putin side of the court, the best outcome they can hope for is more confusion.

/5

There is no inherent reason why a cease-fire cannot be reached in Ukraine, and Trump may be even deserves some credit for creating a process that brings that forward. But if Europe wants a cease-fire that delivers genuine security, it may have to run the process from here.

/6

A cease-fire or any other agreement, whether it involves a land swap or not, requires scrupulous attention to detail. In other words, it requires someone other than the current American top team to do the negotiating. But that’s only half the problem.

/7

Europe and Ukraine will also need to decide what genuine security looks like. They will not trust assurances from Moscow, and they may be learning that they can’t trust assurances from Washington either.

/8

Meanwhile, even as everyone is talking about security guarantees and “land swaps”, note what we’re not talking about: reparations, accountability for war, crimes, and dealing with the fact that Russia is bent on military dominion in its neighborhood.

/9

The Trump-led process is predicated on the notion that security can be had without accountability. That may be true for America across the ocean, so that is doubtful. If Europeans are to own their own security, however, they will have to draw their own conclusions.

/10

A genuinely productive negotiating process will be a complicated and protracted one. But if Trump doesn’t have the patience for that kind of process, or if Putin is able to maneuver him into impatience, Europe will have to push back.

/END

*though, not so.