Thread by @MujammaHaraket

* Hamas, Iran, and the 1991 International Conference to Support the Palestinian People’s Islamic Revolution: A Short Thread on the Nascent Beginning of Iran-Hamas Relations*

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat had landed in Tehran in 1979 as the first official visitor to the capital

under the revolutionary government of Iran and was given a triumphal welcome befitting mujahidin. The visit resulted in the opening of a Palestine embassy in place of what used to be the Israeli mission under the Shah. The first few months witnessed the flowering of fraternal

sentiments, during which Palestine’s representatives in Tehran were hosted and feted. However, when tensions between Iraq and Iran developed after 1980, what Khaled Hroub calls Iran's "honeymoon with the PLO" began to dissipate.

Relations with Tehran entered a cold freeze as the PLO drifted away from Iran in order establish closer relations with Arab states. Iran was also apparently disappointed by the un-Islamic conduct of members of the Palestinian delegation (see the chapter 'The Palestinians between

Dream and Reality', in Fahmi Huwaidi, "Iran minal dakhil" [Iran from the Inside], 3rd ed., Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing, 1988, pp. 363-405). As is well known, Iran had developed an interest in Lebanon in 1982, particularly in Hizbu’llah, and coeval

contacts were established with prominent Palestinian Islamists in Lebanon. With the outbreak of the First Intifada at the end of 1987, a thaw in the freeze began, particularly in view of the participation of Islamists in the uprising against zionist entity's occupation.

A third phase in Iran’s relations with the Palestinians was thus inaugurated.
During this period, Iran galvanized its support of Palestinian opponents, both Islamic and secular, to the so-called “political settlement” and “peace process” with the zionist entity that the PLO had

undertaken. It accomplished this with a conference of forces opposed to a settlement with the zionist entity, which took place on 22 October 1991, eight days before the Madrid Conference. The opposition forces meeting in Tehran denounced the Madrid Conference and its

participants. (Relatedly, on 23 October 1991 Hamas published leaflets on the eve of the Madrid Conference entitled “A Historic Release: No to the Conference; No to Selling out Palestine and the Holy City of Jerusalem,” 23 October 1991. The release condemned the Madrid Conference;

It should be noted that, on 30 October 1991, the Madrid conference involved President George Bush and Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, who served as co-chairman; in attendance was the zionist entity, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

During the Madrid meetings, the Palestinian delegates consulted with PLO-Tunis, with the plenary sessions lasted for three days, ending on 1 November 1991, after which the delegations met in bilateral sessions until 4 November 1991. Thereafter, the various parties met

periodically in both bilateral and multilateral tracks, in December 1991 in Washington, in January 1992 in Moscow, and later in several European capitals. The multilateral meetings dealt with issues including arms control, water rights, and refugees, but no genuine progress was

achieved. Rather, as Palestinian spokeswoman, Hanan Ashrawi, noted, the Madrid negotiations were characterized by “paralysis and inertia”. In Hamas' communique denouncing the Madrid conference, it took to task the PLO, which it denounced explicitly for its willingness to

compromise.

This thus is the subtending context for the competitor-conference held in Tehran and comprised of Palestinian resistance organizations. These organizations convened on 19 October 1991 in a forum entitled “The International Conference to Support the Palestinian

People’s Islamic Revolution” at which they declared their determination to halt and abort the settlement. This forum later led to the formation of what became known as the ten “fasa’il” alliance.
In addition, the Iranian parliament passed a bill entitled “Law for the Support of

the Islamic Revolution of the Palestinian People”, which established an account that was funded by contributions collected from governmental and non-governmental organizations earmarked for support of the Palestinian people through their Islamic forces. A law establishing the

fund was enacted on 9 April 1990. Iran declared the last Friday of the fasting month of Ramadan to be International Jerusalem Day and has observed it annually. In addition, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor, Ali Khamenei, have issued letters to the effect that making

peace with Israel is unlawful [Haram]; Hamas welcomed and greatly appreciated these moves.
With the outbreak of the Gulf crisis at the end of 1990, Hamas chose an official spokesman and the movement organized official visits of its own, taking part in joint missions to states in

the region, including Iran. Hamas sent an official delegation to Iran in October 1991. This was followed by the formal opening of a Hamas office in Tehran in February 1992. Indeed, Hamas opened a formal office in Tehran, about four months after the convening of the conference of

groups opposed to a peaceful settlement; this office symbolized Iran’s acknowledgement of the central role Hamas plays in the Palestinian opposition.

According to an interview Mohammad Nazzal gave with Khaled Hroub on 23 April 1995 (cited in Khaled Hroub, “Hamas: Political

Thought and Practice”, Beirut, Institute of Palestine Studies, 2000, p. 178), “[t]he most intense media campaign against Hams for maintaining relations with Iran came from the PLO”. Nazzal highlights two specific incidents:
1) A charge by Arafat in late 1992 that Hamas was

receiving 30 million USD annually in support from Iran, which Hamas categorically denied as being alarmist and exaggerated; however, the sum that Arafat mentioned was cited by the Arab and Western press, quoted extensively when discussing Hamas’s relationship with Iran (see,

for example, Al-Sharg al-Awsat (London), 18 October 1992).
2) An incident concerning a “leak” to the media by “a Palestinian source in Tunis with the purported text of a signed agreement between Iran and Hamas in which Iran recognized Hamas as the sole and legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people” (Hroub, “Hamas: Political Thought and Practice”, 2000, p. 179). News agencies reported the agreement on 6 May 1993. The Egyptian daily, “Al-Ahram”, published the full text the same day in an article entitled “Read the full details of the

Iranian conspiracy against the Palestinian cause.” Hamas denied the report, saying that it had been fabricated in Tunis, the site of the PLO headquarters, and denounced the PLO for resorting to such cheap tricks (see Hamas leaflet, “A Statement to Set the Record Straight

Concerning Fabricated Reports,” dated 7 May 1993). Hamas emphasized that it is a strategic partner with Iran; According to ‘Imad al-‘Alami, Hamas’s former representative in Tehran and a member of the movement’s Political Bureau, Iran and Hamas are strategic allies because of

“the coincidence of the Islamic dimension of their strategic viewpoints [….] the relationship Hamas maintains with Iran is clear and above board and is based on the mobilization of maximal support for the Palestinian cause, considering that it is an Islamic cause” (see Reuters

interview with ‘Imad al-‘Alami, a former member of Hamas’s Political Bureau and at that time its representative in Tehran, in Al-Destour (Amman), 1 March 1993). Al-‘Alami denied that Hamas received direct support from the Iranian government, although he noted that “there are

certain ways in which the Iranian people support the Palestinian people so as to foster their steadfastness in the Occupied Territories” (ibid.).

Sheikh Yassin underlined Hamas’ appreciation for Iran’s position and the movement’s support for Iran after his release from jail in June 1998. Hamas also expressed verbal and moral support to Iran in its leaflets (see, for example, the Hamas leaflet titled, “Statement on the

Iranian-German Crisis,” dated 16 April 1997, in which Hamas denounced German charges of Iranian involvement in political assassinations).

Hamas wished to strengthen its relations with Iran, emphasizing that its relationship would be “based on mutual respect, the alignment of positions, and political and strategic perspectives on the settlement, without anyone dictating to anyone else” (Nazzal interview with Hroub,

23 April 1995, op. cit.). This is evinced by, for example, how Hamas navigated a minor though nonetheless telling diplomatic issue that transpired when 413 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad supporters were deported to Marj al-Zouhour, South Lebanon, in December 1992.

(After the kidnapping and annihilation of the zionist occupation army's Sargent Nissin Toledano by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Israel expelled 413 Palestinian Islamic leaders to South Lebanon in Marj al-Zouhour. Following the Winter of 1992, the large majority of what

Hamas obtained in terms of finances and military backing began to come from Tehran. This episode had a crucial influence on the rapprochement between the movement, Iran, and Hizbu’llah.) When Quds Day, the annual occasion on which Iran expresses its solidarity with the

Palestinian people, came around, the deportees split into two positions. One group, comprised mostly of Palestinian Islamic Jihad deportees, favored holding extensive observances in response to the Iranian holiday. A second group, mostly comprised of Hamas supporters, thought it

would be preferable to hold symbolic observances and to send a letter to Iran expressing deep support for its position and solidarity; Hamas figured that in so navigating its observance, it would balance its nationalist vim and independence with its increasing kinship with Iran.

Furthermore, the deportees’ observances would, therein, not appear to be mimicking those in Tehran (therein refuting the PLO’s increasingly vituperative claims during a time when Hamas was under close scrutiny by the West).

In adopting this middle-ground position, which eventually won out, Hamas was able to balance its independence and alliance.