Thread by @evacool_

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On August 5th, the Lebanese government approved the decision to withdraw Hezbollah's weapons, and on August 7th, the government approved the American paper, also known as the Barrack paper. After these two decisions, Lebanon enters its most dangerous and complex turning point since the end of the civil war in 1990. A detailed reading of the circumstances of the Lebanese scene and the viewpoints of the internal factions, while the Lebanese-Israeli border remains on high alert for any emergency.
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In his first speech after the Lebanese government's decisions, dedicated to developments in Lebanon, Naim Qassem, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, emphasized that the militia will not surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state and that they are ready for what he called a Karbala battle (named after the Iraqi city of Karbala) if necessary to confront the Lebanese government's decisions. Qassem also threatened that tampering with the militia's weapons threatens Lebanon's survival as a state. This escalatory speech by Hezbollah's leadership came one day after the visit of the Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Ali Larijani, to Beirut and his meeting with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament. Larijani's visit was part of a tour that included Iraq and came after he assumed his new position. Larijani is now responsible for the file of Iranian regional influence in light of the inability of the commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, to manage this file properly. Larijani conveyed Khamenei's position to Hezbollah and a diplomatic message to the Lebanese state. It is clear from Naim Qassem's statements that Iran is still firmly supports Hezbollah's weapons. Meanwhile, a US delegation headed by US Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut. The delegation came to emphasize the importance of implementing the Lebanese government's decisions and translating these decisions into action, stressing that Lebanon's international future is linked to the outcomes of these decisions. Between Iran's adherence to the Hezbollah card and its attempt to restore regional deterrence, which has been shattered over the past two years due to Israeli military actions on the one hand, and America's insistence on the need for Lebanon to break free cloak and not become a source of tension in the region on the other, the Lebanese today find themselves facing complex choices whose outcomes will determine Lebanon's near and distant future. To paint a clearer picture of the current Lebanese scene, it is necessary to examine the perspectives of the internal and external actors, each separately, starting with Hezbollah.
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Hezbollah
In a speech nearly nine years ago, former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said that the militia's budget, fighters' salaries, financial support, weapons, and missiles come from the Islamic Republic of Iran. This statement summarizes the reality of the militia, which represents a part of Lebanon's Shia community, a reality based on political, military, security, financial, and religious ties to the Iranian regime. Therefore, the militia's dealings within Lebanon have always taken into account Tehran's position before Beirut's. So, will Hezbollah accept the status quo and hand over weapons to the Lebanese state? To answer this question, we must first examine Tehran's position and strategy in the region. Today, after the 12-day war it fought with Israel, Iran has become fully convinced that the Israeli government would not have adopted the decision to go to war if Hezbollah had not been experiencing its weakest moments since its formation in 1982. Therefore, Iran, which is considered, through the words of a number of its officials, the most recent being yesterday’s statement by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s assistant for military affairs, Rahim Safavi, who affirmed that Tehran is not in truce with Israel, that nothing is written in this regard, and that Iran is still in a state of war. From this standpoint, the Iranian regime believes that the next round of war with Israel is only a matter of time, and therefore Hezbollah’s survival as a militia, a pressure card, the front line, and the restoration of its military capabilities are among Iran’s top strategic priorities at this stage and may be the very top priority. Therefore, Hezbollah’s leadership must defend its Iranian weapons at all costs because it is certain, in my view, that in any future war between Iran and Israel, Hezbollah will participate in the battle.
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Returning to Hezbollah’s position from a Lebanese perspective, some may question or doubt that the militia would risk engaging with the Lebanese interior to protect its weapons. Here, I find it necessary to remind what happened in Lebanon since the withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon the year 2000. Despite this withdrawal, the militia refused to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state. It even assassinated Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was pushing for this step. Then, it launched a wide-scale assassination campaign targeting journalists and politicians who opposed the militia’s continued possession of weapons. In 2008, Hezbollah fighters occupied the center of the Lebanese capital, Beirut, and some areas of Mount Lebanon. They burned the Lebanese Future TV channel, funded by former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, in a coup against the Lebanese state after the government issued two decisions: the first was to confiscate the militia’s landline communications network, and the second was to dismiss the security chief of Beirut International Airport. This was not the last time that Hezbollah directed its weapons towards the Lebanese interior, threatening any party attempting to challenge its weapons and influence, even if that party was the Lebanese state or other Lebanese political parties. Thus, the answer is yes: Hezbollah is ready for an internal confrontation. In fact, it can be said that the militia today is more prepared for an internal confrontation than a confrontation with Israel. Iranian orders are not the only reason for this stance. Hezbollah is not only a military militia. It also encompasses a network of corruption and financial beneficiaries within the Lebanese state, security, and judiciary. It provides cover and protection for the drug trafficking network, which was previously linked to the Assad regime in the Captagon trade. All these interests will be in danger if Hezbollah surrenders its weapons and becomes only a political party. It must also be emphasized that these weapons play a role in the popularity of this militia among Lebanon’s Shia community. Since the militia’s founding in 1982, religious cover has been the militia’s means to build its popular base in Lebanon. They managed to construct a narrative linking Hezbollah’s weapons to ideology above all else. Therefore, there is a conviction within Hezbollah’s leadership that relinquishing their weapons will mean losing a large part of their popularity and voters, which could lead to Hezbollah’s political demise as well. Thus, it can be said that Hezbollah’s weapons are an existential issue that Hezbollah's leadership cannot give up.
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The Lebanese State
It was clear since Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire with Israel in late November last year that Lebanon had entered a new phase, completely different from what it was like since the signing of the Taif Agreement in 1989. This reality was reflected through the election of Joseph Aoun as President of the Lebanese Republic and then Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister. Both figures were not affiliated with any Lebanese political party, which is something unprecedented in Lebanon’s history. This gave the two leaders greater freedom in dealing with internal and external issues. However, despite the existence of many urgent files that the Lebanese state must deal with, such as depositors’ money, electricity, the Lebanese-Syrian border, the Syrian refugee issue, and the corruption, the future of Hezbollah as a militia and its weapons was, since the first day of this new era, the greatest concern and the most important test. Indeed, President Aoun began building contacts with Hezbollah to try to reach understandings to avoid any confrontational decisions for Lebanon. However, Hezbollah’s responses were always either negative or setting conditions before any talk about their weapons. With Lebanon exposed to international and regional pressures alongside a difficult internal economic reality, President Aoun and PM Salam had to make a difficult political decision by endorsing the withdrawal of Hezbollah's weapons and implement the Tom Barrack paper.
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Since 2019, Lebanon has entered a financial and economic collapse that continues to this day, in light of the devaluation of the Lebanese currency which has lost more than 80% of its value, with the presence of about one and a half million Syrian refugees within Lebanese territory, and a significant ongoing emigration of Lebanese youth, a large part of whom have lost hope in the future of the country. This difficult financial reality cannot be overcome or improved by the Lebanese state without external support. However, for this external support, whether from the Gulf countries, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, European, led by France, or the United States, has today become conditional on the Lebanese state controlling its territory and ending the Hezbollah state within the state of Lebanon. On the other hand, there is a majority within the Lebanese parties, whether Christian, Druze, or Sunni, all of whom are convinced that Hezbollah’s weapons no longer protect Lebanon but have become a source of danger to its stability and territorial integrity. Regionally, the Lebanese government is monitoring the major changes that have occurred in the region during the past two years, most notably for Lebanon the fall of the Assad regime. Lebanon should not be outside this change or against this change but rather keep pace with it so as not to be in the eye of the storm, as Lebanon has always been the mirror of the political and security balances in the Middle East. All these factors and influences prompted the Lebanese state to adopt the American paper, which presents a roadmap transform Lebanon from being a frontline state for Iran into an independent country that lives a democratic political life free from the threat and blackmail of weapons, and that moves from economic collapse towards development. Of course, this decision was difficult, but the alternative option before the Lebanese state was no less severe or dangerous. Rejecting the Barrack paper would have meant Lebanon facing Arab and international isolation, prompting Lebanese parties to politically reject this isolation and then demand federalism, which could lead to a violent civil war. Moreover, Israel may impose its control over southern Lebanon militarily, and the sectarian clash in Lebanon may lead to the expansion of the conflict in Syria, pushing Lebanon into an existential turning point worse than what occurred between 1975 and 1990.
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Israel
During his visit to the Lebanese-Israeli border, the commander of the Northern Command in the IDF, Rafi Milo, confirmed that the presence of his forces in the five points where the IDF is still stationed inside Lebanon is linked to Hezbollah stopping its activities south of the Litani River, and that the Israeli army is prepared to use force if necessary to dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons. He also stressed that the Lebanese government’s decision to withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons constitutes a very positive step. These statements reflect the Israeli officials’ perspective on Lebanon. The Netanyahu government, which agreed in late November to a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah mediated by the US, did not halt its movements and strikes against the militia, given Hezbollah’s slow implementation of it. Here, some may ask, what if the Assad regime had not fallen on December 8th? In fact, the Netanyahu government's decision to accept an agreement that did not clearly stipulate that Hezbollah hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state was a mistake. If the Assad regime had remained in Syria to this day, Hezbollah would have been able to significantly restore its military capabilities, and Israel would have had to fight a new, more difficult war. Today, however, it can be said that Hezbollah, despite its officials' assertions that it has been able to reorganize its ranks and restore its military capabilities, the truth is that Hezbollah is no longer what it was, but on the other hand, it has not ended and is capable of harming Israel and threatening its security. Therefore, the Israeli officials who made the mistake of accepting the ceasefire agreement will have to carefully monitor the internal scene in Lebanon. When Hezbollah faced internal pressure after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, it attacked Israel in the 2006 July war. Hezbollah may have a plan to strike northern Israel as a means of evading the decision to disarm. On the other hand, the Israeli government knows that ensuring Hezbollah does not remain a militia in Lebanon is directly linked to any military plan that is put in place to confront Iran in the next round of conflict.
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Now what's the next step? The Lebanese government has asked the army to develop a practical plan to confiscate illegal weapons in Lebanon, especially Hezbollah's arsenal. It is likely that the plan will be based on a geographical division of the operation, starting with the area south of the Litani River, which Hezbollah has agreed to evacuate, then the area between the Litani and Awali Rivers, then north of the Awali River, then the Bekaa, and finally Beirut. This plan is theoretical. What are the scenarios we might witness in the next phase?
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Scenario One: Hezbollah will continue to refuse to implement the decision and surrender its weapons, conditioning this on the prior disarmament of the Palestinian camps in order to buy time. This means that the Lebanese army will be forced to enter a military confrontation with the Palestinian militias in the camps, given their refusal to surrender their weapons. The army’s failure to take this step will mean that it will be unable to withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons.
Scenario Two: The Lebanese army rejects the decision to engage in a military confrontation with Hezbollah, considering that this step might lead to a civil war and cause divisions within the Lebanese army itself. Looking back at Lebanon’s civil war, a part of the Lebanese army split in 1975 under the leadership of First Lieutenant Ahmed Al-Khatib after the Shia in the Lebanese army refused orders to confront members of their own sect. This incident has recently been reminded to the Lebanese government by individuals close to Hezbollah. Thus, in order to avoid such an outcome, the Lebanese army leaders might reject the Lebanese government’s decision.
Scenario Three: The Lebanese army will begin implementing the decision, leading to a military confrontation with Hezbollah that will result in casualties on both sides, prompting the Lebanese government to back down from its decision in order to avoid civil war.
Scenario Four: The Lebanese army would launch a military attack on Hezbollah, leading to a Shia uprising in which the Amal Movement, led by Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, would participate, in a manner similar to the events of February 6, 1984. This would mean a confrontation between the Lebanese army and Lebanon's Shia, posing a threat to Lebanon's unity and forcing the Lebanese state to back down from its decision to confront Hezbollah.
Scenario Five: Hezbollah chooses to confront Israel by launching a surprise attack similar to the events of the July 2006 war, attempting to capture Israeli soldiers. By doing so, Hezbollah avoids confrontation with the Lebanese government and instead engages in a limited war with Israel that ends with an agreement.
Scenario Six: The Lebanese army rushes to withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons, and Hezbollah responds with military force, sparking a new civil war in Lebanon.
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The bottom line: Lebanon stands today at a crossroads walking on the brink of a civil war that will be more violent than any before. The Lebanese government has no choice but to move forward with the decision to rebuild the state by withdrawing illegal weapons. Backing down from this step will have a high price. In contrast, Hezbollah, for internal, religious, and Iranian reasons, has no room to give up its weapons, no matter the price. This reality means that one of the two parties will have to back down, with a high cost, or a clash is inevitable. Meanwhile, in Washington, the Lebanese file may become less important if the Lebanese government retreats, and the option of an economic sanctions and state isolation may be their pressure card. In Israel, officials are cautiously monitoring the Lebanese front, and the option of returning to war is still on Netanyahu's table. As for the Arab world, Saudi Arabia is pushing to end Hezbollah, which is the most important supporter of the Houthi militia in Yemen, while working to support the new Syrian administration in Damascus in preparation for the worst-case scenario in Lebanon. This fall will be as decisive for Hezbollah and Lebanon as the previous one. It will either mark the end of the Iranian project in Lebanon and then Iraq, or the beginning of a new civil war, or a new war along the Lebanese-Israeli border.
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