Thread by @MuKappa

An extremely basic overview of the war as of today:

1. Russia's strategic objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged - the bare minimum is to capture in their entirety the four oblasts written into Russia's constitution (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk) plus Odesa,...

and install a puppet regime in unoccupied Ukraine. The latter part of the objective requires Ukraine to remain unaligned, i.e., no NATO or EU membership. The former cuts Ukraine's access to the Black Sea, severely damaging the nation's economy and limiting its strategic options.

2. Russia engages in diplomatic dialogue to win time - the hope in the Kremlin is in further sanctions delay, laxer sanctions enforcement, and reduced/delayed aid packages for Ukraine.

The Kremlin's refusal to engage in ceasefire talks, opting instead for "peace talks," was slightly surprising for me. The Russian economy and the military need an operational pause. However, Moscow likely expects Ukraine to reap greater benefits from a ceasefire.

3. Diplomacy for contemporary Russia is just a tool of nonkinetic warfare. It was also the case with the USSR, but to a lesser extent. Russia is not a global power. Hasn't been before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and even less so now.

However, the unrestricted power and continuous funding of Russia's "diplomatic" corps and other related services allow the country to project power and influence globally.

These services in Russia have had no oversight but the Kremlin's, and unlike their Western counterparts, are only restricted by expected repercussions at home and abroad for failure. As such, Russia's hybrid warfare against Europe and the US will continue.

4. Thus, any ceasefire or other types of treaties with Russia should be treated as a strategic pause before the next phase of overt aggression. This recommendation is Kremlin leadership agnostic. Popular support for the war in Russia remains stable.

An argument could be made that the ethnofascist zeal is a function of economic hardships. And to an extent, I would agree. However, most of Russia's population is poor and does not live in Moscow, the only city in the country that plays a role in domestic political matters.

The economic situation in Moscow remains stable, for now. And it should not be surprising, as we already have a precedent - the quality of life in Moscow was one of the utmost economic priorities for the CPSU as the rest of the USSR crumbled. /end