🧵 Ukraine at a Strategic Crossroad: Doctrine Shifts That May Define 2026
1. Introduction – Ukraine’s Last Strategic Options
In our previous Force Capability Index assessment, we projected a collapse of Ukraine’s military balance within 18 months without major doctrinal change.
In light of the slow pace of negociations, let us look at military scenario alternatives.
This thread examines 3 radical strategic models that could shape the outcome by the end of 2026. None offers a guarantee of victory, yet each provides a distinct framework for understanding the remaining operational possibilities. The projected FCI scores in 18 months are as follows:
- Elastic Defense = 45;
- Dnipro Line and Guerrilla War = 38;
- High Tech Active Defense= 52.
#UkraineRussiaWar️️ #StrategicScenarios #Military
2. Scenario One – Elastic Defense
Elastic Defense envisions a mobile, flexible posture, trading ground to stretch enemy lines, striking flanks, and using terrain to buy time. It recalls the Finnish Winter War of 1939/1940, where Finland delayed the Soviet advance through maneuver, ambush, and decentralised resistance.
However, just as Finland could not reverse territorial losses, Ukraine under this approach would merely postpone defeat without regaining ground. The concept demands over one 1000 operational armored fighting vehicles, veteran brigades to execute the complex manœuvres required, sustained fuel and repair cycles, and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and electronic warfare support.
Ukraine’s current equipment readiness stands below 45%, with insufficient mobility remaining for such an approach facing the rapidly expanding Russian drone capabilities.
3. Limits of Elastic Defense
In the Winter War, tactical victories slowed the Soviet advance but did not alter the strategic result once defensive lines were breached. Ukraine’s position mirrors this limitation.
Without a counteroffensive force since Elite brigades’ potential is severely eroded, the outcome of an elastic strategy would be at best a temporary delay and at worst an extended path to collapse.
Operational flexibility is meaningless without the reserves to exploit it.
This scenario’s feasibility is below 30% given current materiel and industrial conditions.
4. Scenario Two – Dnipro Line and Guerrilla War
This scenario calls for withdrawal behind the Dnipro River to consolidate defenses while initiating sustained irregular warfare in occupied areas. It is a strategy of survival rather than recovery.
Such a posture becomes probable when operational frontage exceeds sustainable density and casualty rates erode the ability to rotate brigades.
Once defensive sectors stretch beyond doctrinal limits, with gaps that ISR and drones cannot fully cover, the logic of shortening the line becomes unavoidable.
Clausewitz noted that defense is the stronger form of war, yet rarely delivers decision. Here, the defensive line would serve as a shield while the partisan network applies constant pressure behind enemy lines.
5. Conditions and Consequences of Guerrilla War
This path requires political acceptance of abandoning major cities such as Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, an expanded Territorial Defense and special operations structure, and sustained Western support for an irregular war economy. The outcome would likely preserve statehood but at the cost of reduced borders, a fractured population, and an indefinite insurgency reminiscent of mid-twentieth-century resistance movements.
The feasibility is approximately 65%, but it locks Ukraine into a protracted frozen conflict with limited prospects for reversal.
6. Scenario Three – High Tech Active Defense
This doctrine shifts Ukraine to a technology-led defense built around mass drone production, pervasive electronic warfare, and long-range precision strike autonomy. It is not designed to reconquer lost territory but to halt further collapse by inflicting disproportionate costs on the attacker.
As former Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi observed, technology favors a war of attrition where Ukraine can leverage asymmetric autonomous systems.
Yet, as he also warned, drones do not hold trenches. Infantry remains essential to secure and sustain the ground as increasingly seen recently.
7. Requirements for High Tech Active Defense
To be viable, this scenario demands increasing FPV drone production, tripling electronic warfare coverage at the brigade level, and implementing full national mobilization to maintain manned defenses. It also requires NATO-level ISR integration, decentralized strike authority, political approval for deep strike campaigns, and a wartime industrial posture for unmanned systems.
Central to this transformation is the acquisition of advanced AI capabilities for real-time targeting, signal processing, and electronic counter-countermeasures. These technologies cannot be developed domestically at the required scale or speed and would necessitate unprecedented tech transfer from Western defense industries.
High Tech Active Defense cannot coexist with a peacetime civilian economy. It would require abandoning economic normality and committing to a total war footing. This in turn demands a binding agreement with Western partners, effectively surrendering postwar economic autonomy to international financial institutions such as the IMF in exchange for wartime survival.
Currently, most of these prerequisites remain unmet.
This scenario’s feasibility is 25%, yet it is the only path with potential to stabilize the front.
8. Comparative Trade-offs
Elastic Defense requires moderate mobilization and significant rearmament of armored forces, but only buys time.
Guerrilla War demands minimal mobilization yet concedes extensive territory and infrastructure.
High Tech Active Defense requires total mobilization and a revolutionary industrial shift, but if achieved, could hold current lines.
Each path sacrifices something fundamental: territory, time, or national cohesion. Strategic choice here is not about how to win, but about what can still be preserved.
9. Strategic Reality and the Time Factor
Russia is pursuing a permanent war doctrine, underpinned by industrial depth and political continuity. Ukraine cannot outlast such a system through attrition alone; it must out-adapt it technologically, doctrinally, and operationally. There is no realistic military path to recapturing all lost territories with current manpower and materiel. The path to survival lies in scalable disruption.
As Musashi wrote, « one must perceive what cannot yet be seen ».
High Tech Active Defense remains invisible in practice, but it must be made real within 12 months or the window to act will close.
10. Conclusion – The Last Viable Doctrine
High Tech Active Defense is not the easy choice. It demands full mobilization, a national drone and EW industrial pivot including technology transfer from western countries, and political acceptance of a total war posture. Survival now depends on scale, AI, and speed rather than sentiment.
Victory will not be measured in reconquest, but in the endurance of a functioning state. In modern war, courage is essential, yet insufficient, outcomes are engineered. Winning wars has never been only about bravery.
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Ukraine’s Armed Forces are exhibiting signs of structural degradation. Thread. 🧵
The Force Capability Index (FCI)—a strategic model for evaluating force sustainability—scores Ukraine at 53.0 as of June 2025. Russia stands at 68.2. Without doctrinal change, #collapse is projected within 12 to 18 months.
“War is not destruction—it is dislocation.” – A.A. #Svechin
1/13
#UkraineRussiaWar #MilitaryStrategy #MilitaryAnalysis #ForceCapabilityIndex
Note: this is a simplified, customized index
The FCI is a structural assessment used by general staffs to determine when a force is approaching operational exhaustion.
It evaluates five weighted domains:
- Manpower & Morale
- Equipment Readiness
- Firepower & ISR
- Operational Flexibility
- Frontline Sustainability
Ukraine’s composite FCI score of 53.0 sits squarely in the degraded zone. Without intervention, collapse is projected by Q3 2026:
- Q4 2025: 48.9
- Q1 2026: 45.6
- Q2 2026: 42.1
- Q3 2026: 38.6 → collapse threshold
Collapse: inability to reinforce 30–40% of the frontline.
2/13
Manpower and morale are severely pressured.
Ukraine loses approximately 4,000 soldiers KIA/month, with another 6,000 rendered combat-ineffective through injury.
Desertions exceeded 90,000 in early 2025.
Brigade rotations lag—fewer than 50% rotate within six months. Some remain deployed over a year.
“Manpower is not numbers. It is force multiplied by endurance.” – A.A. Svechin
3/13
🧵Modeling Russia’s 2025 Offensive: Sieges Before Snowfall
🇷🇺has gained 1,585 km² so far in 2025. Will it seize Donbas, or surround its key cities?
This thread models 3 advance scenarios for the summer-fall campaign and how the front may set for a winter of sieges and attritional warfare.
#UkraineWar #MilitaryOutlook 1/9 Maps @Pouletvolant3 & DeepstateUA
To realize the "supposed" plan unveiled by 🇺🇦 Presidential Office, 🇷🇺 would have to:
• Seize the remaining 7,540 km² of Donetsk
• Take the last 171 km² of Luhansk
• Establish a 20 km deep buffer from Sumy to Oskil (~9,819 km²)
➤ Total strategic requirement: 17,530 km²
#Donbass #Sumy
2/9
Let's model 3 scenarios for the summer–fall 2025 offensive:
• Minimum: July peak, total +5,550 km²
• Standard: August peak, total +8,783 km²
• Maximum: October peak, total +13,300 km²
Each begins with 800 km² in June and reflects realistic tempo progression.
#Offensive #CampaignForecast
3/9
Russia is managing attrition. Ukraine is not.
In 2022, Russia’s loss ratio was 3.2 to 1. In 2025, it is projected to fall to 1.4 to 1. Mechanized losses are approaching parity. This shift in battlefield attrition is reshaping the war’s trajectory, yet remains underdiscussed. A thread 🧵 1/8 #UkraineWar #OSINT #Attrition
🇺🇦is now taking its highest equipment losses per km2 defended. In 2024, losses averaged 0.75 per km² lost. In 2025, that figure has risen to 1.3. Logistics, rotations, reinforcements are increasingly exposed. This trend is cumulative and accelerating. 2/8 #OperationalRisk #ForceAttrition
Russia has adapted. It employs light infantry to expose/overtake positions, drones to target movements, and artillery and glide bombs to destroy strongholds/rear positions. This system affects the layered 🇺🇦 defense structure, not just frontline units. 3/8 #MilitaryDoctrine #DroneWarfare
The Telegraph’s article on Russia’s “triple chokehold” offers a polished tactical view but lacks strategic framing. It misrepresents Russian forces and doctrine. The chokeholds reflect the Gerasimov Doctrine evolution: permanent, industrial, attritional warfare.
A 🧵for context.
#UkraineWar #MilitaryStrategy
Russia’s approach is not brute force—it is an adaptive strategy I call "industrialized asymmetry":
leveraging mass-produced, low-cost systems (FPV drones, glide bombs, light mounted infantry) to disrupt and degrade conventional forces through sustained pressure. A doctrine evolution for scale ⬇️
Motorbike assaults demonstrate this clearly: under specific conditions, they achieve higher success rates and 3–5 times fewer casualties than conventional mechanized assaults.
They are not a workaround for lacking armor—they are a scalable extension of tactical capabilities for fast breakthroughs and rear disruption. (3/11) 🧵⬇️ x.com/Delwin655059/s…
This is not just Putin’s war. While he sets the aim, Gerasimov shaped the strategy—following a doctrine for enduring struggle.
This thread is an analytical breakdown, not endorsement—meant to decode how the #GerasimovDoctrine became Russia’s blueprint for a war without end.
#UkraineWar #Thread
1/16
Often overlooked, #Gerasimov is the strategic mastermind behind Russia’s conduct of war.
Since 2013, he has articulated a doctrine where modern conflict blurs the line between peace and war, combining military, political, cyber, economic, and informational tools. His framework rests on five ideas:
▶️War and peace are continuous
▶️All domains are battlefield
▶️Strike threats early
▶️Conflict is permanent
▶️Every war must adapt to its context #HybridWarfare #MilitaryDoctrine
2/16
Russia’s 2022 invasion was bold but overstretched. @Michel_Goya observed:
"The Russians dispersed all their forces without reserves."
The plan aimed high—but underestimated Ukraine’s resilience. The campaign faltered not from theory, but from mismatched capability. #UkraineInvasion
3/16