(1/7) Comparative Assessment of Russian and Ukrainian Irreversible Losses in 2025 - Converging Toward Parity
Analytical synthesis based on public OSINT datasets and formal administrative records

Public open-source datasets covering declared fatalities, disappearances, and legally registered casualties indicate that irreversible losses suffered by Russia and Ukraine in 2025 are broadly comparable once categories are normalized.

The apparent asymmetry often observed in public debate largely reflects differences in recording practices, certification timelines, body-recovery capacity, and legal confirmation procedures, rather than substantial variation in overall losses.

The objective of this analysis is not to estimate total casualties, but to identify comparable trends by clarifying how available data are structured and recorded. Widely circulated falsified or unverifiable leaked documents discussed this year on both sides are therefore excluded. The focus is limited to by-name OSINT documented sources and official administrative records.

Scope and Definitions
Two tiers of irrecoverable personnel losses are examined:

- Irreversible combat losses
Confirmed KIA plus MIA assessed as likely KIA
- Irreversible force-availability losses
Combat losses plus desertion and long-term AWOL

As Clausewitz cautioned, analysis operates under unavoidable uncertainty:
“The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight.”
— On War, Book I

▶️ Confirmed Fatalities (KIA): The Direct Evidence
Named and confirmed fatalities constitute the most verifiable and least ambiguous category of wartime losses. These cases are typically documented through obituary notices, official registries, or published death certificates. Individuals in this category have undergone legal confirmation, and families have completed formal settlement procedures.

Publicly verifiable records for 2025 (as of early December):
◻️Russia (Mediazona)
- ~29,000 named soldiers with deaths dated to 2025

◻️Ukraine (UALosses)
- ~11,500 soldiers with publicly confirmed deaths dated to 2025
- ~11,000 additional individuals registered as deceased with unclear dates

Applying proportional temporal distribution yields an estimated ~15,000 confirmed fatalities attributable to 2025.
At this stage, Russian losses appear significantly higher. However, this discrepancy primarily reflects administrative timing differences, not underlying loss dynamics as we will see in the next parts.

Read it on Substack:
open.substack.com/pub/delwinstra…

#UkraineRussianWar #Analysis #Strategy

(2/7) Administrative Backlog and Russian MIA Conversion Into Casualty Records
Russian data for 2025 include a substantial volume of formal death-recognition procedures processed through legal institutions.

Mediazona identified ~80,000 new entries across monitored systems in 2025. This figure does not represent real-time disappearance events, but rather the legal formalization of cases previously known at unit or institutional level.

Mediazona’s breakdown indicates:
- ~8,000 non-war civilian deaths
- The majority represent delayed administrative processing of battlefield deaths accumulated over multiple years
- A high proportion of filings originate from military institutions, indicating state-initiated confirmation rather than attempt at concealing information
- Legal confirmation is required to activate inheritance, pensions, and dependent compensation

The net effect of this process is a delayed conversion of battlefield losses into legally recognized fatalities. Consequently, interpreting the full 2025 volume as deaths occurring in that year would be analytically misleading.

After excluding non-war cases and delayed confirmations from prior years, a realistic segmentation suggests ~30,000–40,000 deaths attributable to the 2025 calendar year.

(1/5) [ANALYSIS] Armored Loss Trends in Late 2025
Ukrainian armored losses have now surpassed Russian losses during the second half of 2025, with the previously diverging curves fully intersecting on the latest projection graph.
The result is clear: Russia is currently winning the attrition battle across most of the frontline as loss ratios converge. A Thread.

This trend was already visible in my pre-summer update, but the current data makes it undeniable. Russia’s industrial strategy, structured under Belousov to support operations through 2030 and potentially beyond, required stabilizing annual armored losses below ~3,000 units, enabling new production to compensate for the majority of losses.

As of late 2025, this target has been effectively achieved. For deeper context, refer to my separate assessment on Russian armored fleet forecasts.

Read it on Substack: open.substack.com/pub/delwinstra…

#UkraineRussiaWar️ #Analysis #Strategy
(2/5) Loss Levels as of December 2025
Both sides have now suffered roughly equivalent total armored losses this year (~2,350 units).
Even when isolating heavy armor, the difference is negligible: since May, the average loss rate has hovered around ~130 units/month for each side.

The critical point is that Ukrainian losses are increasing, despite a decrease in Russian attrition. Russia’s losses declined largely due to more restrictive application of armored units, concentrated primarily on local assaults against villages since April.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s losses are accelerating.
Notably, 2025 is the worst year for Ukrainian armored attrition since the war began, with losses rising approximately 59% compared to 2024.

Thus, observers should not focus solely on Russia’s reduced deployment of armor when interpreting these figures, but rather on the heightened rate of fleet depletion on the Ukrainian side.

(1/4) Let us continue an academic demystification of modern siege warfare operations and attrition.
The situation of Ukrainian forces (AFU) in #Pokrovsk is critical: no secure supply routes, no freedom of movement, rear units engaged in small-arms combat, persistent Russian ISR and drone coverage, and multiple infiltrations and sniper positions that make movement effectively impossible.
These indicators reflect a late-stage siege nearing systemic collapse, where the defender suffers more heavily than the attacker.

1. Establishing the Siege Lines
The most difficult and costly stage of a siege is forming the siege lines around the defended city. During this phase, the attacking force is most vulnerable. Units must advance across open or partially covered terrain under enemy observation and fire to secure positions close enough to isolate the city.
- Exposure to fire: Movement and emplacement occur under observation and artillery threat, with limited cover for advancing troops.

- Risk of counterattacks: Defenders can launch flank or rear assaults to disrupt forming lines; such counterattacks have repeatedly complicated winter advances in recent conflicts.

- Logistical strain: Engineering assets, ammunition, and supply convoys must move forward under fire, slowing consolidation.

- Need for rapid entrenchment: Attackers must dig in quickly to establish stable firing positions and protect supply routes.

Attacker risk is higher during the siege-line establishment phase; initial losses tend to concentrate on the attacker unless terrain or external factors can mitigate it.

As seen on operational maps, Russian forces first closed the gap to position artillery and firepower within range of Pokrovsk’s city entrances around January 2025. This was followed by a second pincer advancing northeast toward Rodynske in August 2025: a process that took roughly 8 to 9 months.

2. Transition to Encirclement
Once siege lines join into a continuous front, the operational balance shifts. The attacker moves from exposure to a more secure and organized posture, while the defender’s freedom of movement rapidly declines.

- Attacker consolidation: The encircling force builds fortified positions, establishes artillery bases, and secures supply and command routes.

- Defender constraints: Inside the pocket, maneuvering becomes restricted, resupply routes are either cut or under constant fire, and ISR coverage makes concealment difficult.

- Fire-control dominance: The attacker coordinates overlapping artillery and pre-registered fires to deny the defender safe movement.

- Psychological pressure: Isolation, exhaustion, and logistical shortages degrade defensive cohesion.

By October 2025, the final gaps were closed, producing an operational encirclement and severe attrition for AFU forces. For over 2 months, Russian forces have maintained pressure through small assault-team infiltrations, a method intended to raise pressure while minimizing casualties.

Read the whole thread on Substack or see next part ⬇️: open.substack.com/pub/delwinstra…

#UkraineRussiaWar️️ #SiegeWarfare #Strategy

(2/4) 3. #Attrition and Collapse
After encirclement is complete, the pattern of losses typically reverses. The attacker’s logistics stabilize while the defender’s situation deteriorates under sustained pressure.

- #Supply degradation: Food, ammunition, and fuel stocks dwindle; medical evacuation and casualty care become increasingly limited.

- Reinforcement difficulty: Relief operations must fight through outer defensive belts and frequently fail to achieve a timely breakthrough.

- Increasing losses: The defender suffers disproportionately from sustained indirect fires and the inability to rotate or replace front-line troops.

The following article published by an independent Ukrainian media (Hromadske) tells of such realities in Pokrovsk today:
hromadske.ua/en/war/254005-…

Attrition generally shifts against the encircled defenders once the ring is closed, unless they can reopen supply or escape routes or receive external relief. All attempts to do so in Pokrovsk have so far failed.

Elastic Defense and the Limits of Ukrainian Capability.
Academic thoughts on the Ukrainian doctrine. 🧵

Modern doctrine, from both Western and Soviet traditions, holds that when an army faces a superior adversary in firepower and mass, the only rational defensive method is elastic defense : trading space for time, preserving combat power, and counterattacking once the offensive culminates.

In theory, Ukraine should be doing exactly this: withdrawing early from threatened salients, avoiding semi-encirclement, and restoring a new defensive line under better conditions. But as the current campaign shows, this logic has collapsed under material constraints.
Since spring 2022, if we exclude the counter offensive phases, Ukraine has never been able to establish elastic defense again and regain initiative.

Let us look at what seems to hinder this doctrine from 3 military perspectives in this thread.
(map of #Pokrovsk @Playfra0 )

You can also read the thread on substack:
open.substack.com/pub/delwinstra…

#UkraineWar #Strategy #History
1/5
#Svechin warned about the positional warfare trap.
“It is easy to get involved in positional warfare, even against one’s own will, but it is not so easy to get out of it; no one managed to do it in the World War.”
— Alexander A. Svechin, Strategy (1927)

Svechin’s warning was written for precisely such circumstances. Once a defending army allows itself to become fixed in place, whether politically compelled or logistically bound, the transition to manoeuvre becomes almost impossible.

Ukraine’s Donbas defense illustrates this perfectly. The fortress-belt cities were meant to absorb the Russian blow, but instead became static traps: semi-encircled, under permanent fire control, and impossible to disengage without heavy loss, fueling the attritional nature of this war which does not favor Ukraine over time. A simple look at loss ratios says all. (See my dedicated analysis)
2/5

[STRATEGIC BRIEF] Russian Operational Plan in Zaporizhzhia Oblast - Huliailpole front

Russian forces are advancing rapidly along the elevated terrain and are expected to soon cut the main supply line between Huliaipole and Pokrovske.

What is unfolding is the result of a carefully planned and predictable operation, whose trajectory has been apparent since the fall of Velyka Novosilka. If you often read my posts you know I always come back to the geography to analyse plans.

Once Russian troops secured the “three-borders point” (marked by the purple cross on operational maps, village of Temyrivka), which also represents the key tactical heights, they gained full access to the zone between the Yanchur and Vovcha rivers.

The ongoing advance follows the ridgeline precisely and has now reached the commanding positions above Uspenivka (1). The next objectives are to consolidate control over the central portion of the area (2) and then sever the supply route (3).

In this terrain, the rivers actually favor the attacker: they fragment Ukrainian defensive sectors and restrict internal troop movements, while Russian units can concentrate forces freely along the high ground.

The fortifications map (courtesy of @Playfra0 ) further illustrates this vulnerability. The single defensive line was built along the heights but has now been flanked; it lacks solid anchoring points between the rivers, no true bastions exist. This allows Russian forces to advance with minimal manpower and resistance.

In the coming weeks, Russian troops are expected to:
- Secure the territory between the Yanchur and Vovka rivers.
- Cut the logistical connection between the two main regional hubs.
- Establish Uspenivka as a forward staging area across the Yanchur River for the development of siege lines around Huliaipole.

Although Huliaipole still retains a secondary supply route along the frontline toward Zaporizhzhia, this corridor is far more constrained than the Pokrovske axis, which remains linked to the N15 highway.

This situation was largely predictable and highlights a critical shortfall in Ukrainian defensive planning and force allocation. The risks were underestimated, particularly in light of limited available reserves and inadequate contingency preparation for an enemy exploiting the terrain effectively.

#UkraineWar #Zaporizhzhia #Geography


Latest geolocation

https://twitter.com/creamy_caprice/status/1980224375896093117

Russia’s Baltic gamble (1/15)
Could Moscow dare to invade Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? A Thread 🧵

On the map it looks deceptively simple. Capitals lie only hours from the border. The #Suwałki corridor is narrow and fragile and #NATO appears stretched.

The goal though would be nothing less than full conquest: a land bridge to Kaliningrad, securing Russia’s northwest flank, and shattering NATO credibility.

As Svechin warned: “Each war is an isolated case, requiring its own unique approach.”

The reality is far more complex. This gamble is only possible if:
- Russia emerges from the #Ukraine war holding Donbas
- Ukraine is weakened and in recovery
- Europe fails to rearm and reinforce forward deployments
- The US limits itself to logistics and prepositioned stocks, with combat power tied down in the Asia-Pacific against China
- NATO cohesion weakens; otherwise Article 5 ensures a coalition Russia cannot match over time

Full US combat entry would mean WW3 and would open a boulevard for China and North Korea in the Asia-Pacific theatre. That is why we exclude it from this analysis' scenario.

This series will be in 2 parts:
- Part One: we will analyze the strategic options, geography, operational parameters (logistics) -> This Thread
- Part Two: force analysis and requirements for success of both sides

#Baltics #Russia #Geopolitics

Note: sources of images and analysis in the last tweet. Many recommended reads there.
The operational map (2/15)
Any Russian plan rests on three Axis (see map):

1. Narva axis into Estonia toward Tallinn, 200 km of flat ground
2. Pskov axis into Latvia toward Riga, 210 km, with an option to cut western supply route at Daugavpils, turning it into a staging hub
3. Belarus axis into Vilnius, only 30 km, then Kaunas astride the Suwałki highway. Vilnius is decisive: its fall allows interdiction of Kaunas and cuts NATO’s reinforcement artery.

Meanwhile Kaliningrad serves as a bastion:
- Sabotage raids into Lithuania (notable toward the strategic port of Klaipeda)
- FPV drones hitting convoys 50 km deep
- Coastal missiles and naval drones harassing sea resupply
- A risky but possible sortie directly at Suwałki itself, aiming to sever the corridor at Marijampole. Ambitious from our point of view, but it would cut the artery in one stroke.

The logic is simple: seize Vilnius, neutralise Suwałki, and choke NATO’s north. If Kaunas falls, reinforcement options collapse before NATO can react.

#Kaliningrad #MilitaryStrategy

🧵 Ukraine at a Strategic Crossroad: Doctrine Shifts That May Define 2026

1. Introduction – Ukraine’s Last Strategic Options
In our previous Force Capability Index assessment, we projected a collapse of Ukraine’s military balance within 18 months without major doctrinal change.
In light of the slow pace of negociations, let us look at military scenario alternatives.

This thread examines 3 radical strategic models that could shape the outcome by the end of 2026. None offers a guarantee of victory, yet each provides a distinct framework for understanding the remaining operational possibilities. The projected FCI scores in 18 months are as follows:

- Elastic Defense = 45;
- Dnipro Line and Guerrilla War = 38;
- High Tech Active Defense=  52.

#UkraineRussiaWar️️ #StrategicScenarios #Military

2. Scenario One – Elastic Defense

Elastic Defense envisions a mobile, flexible posture, trading ground to stretch enemy lines, striking flanks, and using terrain to buy time. It recalls the Finnish Winter War of 1939/1940, where Finland delayed the Soviet advance through maneuver, ambush, and decentralised resistance.

However, just as Finland could not reverse territorial losses, Ukraine under this approach would merely postpone defeat without regaining ground. The concept demands over one 1000 operational armored fighting vehicles, veteran brigades to execute the complex manœuvres required, sustained fuel and repair cycles, and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and electronic warfare support.

Ukraine’s current equipment readiness stands below 45%,  with insufficient mobility remaining for such an approach facing the rapidly expanding Russian drone capabilities.

Ukraine’s Armed Forces are exhibiting signs of structural degradation. Thread. 🧵
The Force Capability Index (FCI)—a strategic model for evaluating force sustainability—scores Ukraine at 53.0 as of June 2025. Russia stands at 68.2. Without doctrinal change, #collapse is projected within 12 to 18 months.
“War is not destruction—it is dislocation.” – A.A. #Svechin
1/13
#UkraineRussiaWar #MilitaryStrategy #MilitaryAnalysis #ForceCapabilityIndex
Note: this is a simplified, customized index
The FCI is a structural assessment used by general staffs to determine when a force is approaching operational exhaustion.
It evaluates five weighted domains:
- Manpower & Morale
- Equipment Readiness
- Firepower & ISR
- Operational Flexibility
- Frontline Sustainability

Scoring bands:
- 80–100: Sustainable
- 60–79: Strained
- 40–59: Degraded
- 20–39: Unstable
- <20: Collapsing

Ukraine’s composite FCI score of 53.0 sits squarely in the degraded zone. Without intervention, collapse is projected by Q3 2026:
- Q4 2025: 48.9
- Q1 2026: 45.6
- Q2 2026: 42.1
- Q3 2026: 38.6 → collapse threshold
Collapse: inability to reinforce 30–40% of the frontline.
2/13

🧵Modeling Russia’s 2025 Offensive: Sieges Before Snowfall
🇷🇺has gained 1,585 km² so far in 2025. Will it seize Donbas, or surround its key cities?
This thread models 3 advance scenarios for the summer-fall campaign and how the front may set for a winter of sieges and attritional warfare.
#UkraineWar #MilitaryOutlook
1/9
Maps @Pouletvolant3 & DeepstateUA To realize the "supposed" plan unveiled by 🇺🇦 Presidential Office, 🇷🇺 would have to:
• Seize the remaining 7,540 km² of Donetsk
• Take the last 171 km² of Luhansk
• Establish a 20 km deep buffer from Sumy to Oskil (~9,819 km²)
➤ Total strategic requirement: 17,530 km²
#Donbass #Sumy
2/9

Russia is managing attrition. Ukraine is not.
In 2022, Russia’s loss ratio was 3.2 to 1. In 2025, it is projected to fall to 1.4 to 1. Mechanized losses are approaching parity. This shift in battlefield attrition is reshaping the war’s trajectory, yet remains underdiscussed. A thread 🧵
1/8
#UkraineWar #OSINT #Attrition 🇺🇦is now taking its highest equipment losses per km2 defended. In 2024, losses averaged 0.75 per km² lost. In 2025, that figure has risen to 1.3. Logistics, rotations, reinforcements are increasingly exposed. This trend is cumulative and accelerating.
2/8
#OperationalRisk #ForceAttrition

The Telegraph’s article on Russia’s “triple chokehold” offers a polished tactical view but lacks strategic framing. It misrepresents Russian forces and doctrine. The chokeholds reflect the Gerasimov Doctrine evolution: permanent, industrial, attritional warfare.
A 🧵for context.
#UkraineWar #MilitaryStrategy

(1/11)telegraph.co.uk/world-news/202… Russia’s approach is not brute force—it is an adaptive strategy I call "industrialized asymmetry":
leveraging mass-produced, low-cost systems (FPV drones, glide bombs, light mounted infantry) to disrupt and degrade conventional forces through sustained pressure. A doctrine evolution for scale ⬇️

(2/11)

https://x.com/Delwin655059/status/1923646582572057096

This is not just Putin’s war. While he sets the aim, Gerasimov shaped the strategy—following a doctrine for enduring struggle.
This thread is an analytical breakdown, not endorsement—meant to decode how the #GerasimovDoctrine became Russia’s blueprint for a war without end.
#UkraineWar #Thread
1/16 Often overlooked, #Gerasimov is the strategic mastermind behind Russia’s conduct of war.
Since 2013, he has articulated a doctrine where modern conflict blurs the line between peace and war, combining military, political, cyber, economic, and informational tools. His framework rests on five ideas:
▶️War and peace are continuous
▶️All domains are battlefield
▶️Strike threats early
▶️Conflict is permanent
▶️Every war must adapt to its context #HybridWarfare #MilitaryDoctrine
2/16