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Aug 21 4 tweets 1 min read Read on X
News of Ukrainian missile production (Flamingo missile) is inspiring, both at home and abroad. Yet, unless the production site, which was opened for journalists, was staged for cameras, it is striking how many details were left exposed - enough to make geolocation possible. Image
2/ Equally concerning is the decision to show crew members’ faces and list their positions. In our past investigations, my team was able to identify Russian servicemen and intelligence officers using just one facial photo, tracing some even to their actual home addresses
3/ Revealing factory staff could enable local agents from locals to follow employees and, in turn, uncover the site almost certainly making it a target. The interior itself is highly distinctive, a skilled team could likely narrow its location to a handful of candidates.
4/ Overall, I hope I am overstating the risks and that this was merely a showcase facility rather than an active production site. If it was the latter, exposing it so openly would border on a criminal act, given the potential consequences.

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Aug 20
Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:Image
2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.
3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China
Read 17 tweets
Aug 20
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread: Image
2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller. Image
3/ The unidentified drone is powered by a two-stroke gasoline DLE engine produced by China’s Mile Haoxiang Technology Co.

The DLE engine is mounted in the nose of the fuselage, making the drone most similar to the “Italmas” loitering munition produced by Russia’s Zala Group Image
Read 7 tweets
Aug 19
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold
Read 5 tweets
Aug 18
So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:

Demilitarization – failed.

Regime change in Kyiv – failed.

Full control over Donbas – failed.

Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.

🧵Short thread:
2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.
3/ Russia failed to remove Zelenskyy or his government. Kyiv remains fully under Ukrainian control. The chances of a pro-Russian party winning the next election are slim to none
Read 7 tweets
Aug 17
Brief update on Dobropillia situation.🧵Thread:

1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration Map Credit: Deep State Live
2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context
3/ It is positive that Ukrainian forces contained the threat and prevented it from developing into an operational breakthrough. However, the scale of reinforcements required was significant. According to Deep State, the following units were involved in the reinforcement effort:
Read 8 tweets
Aug 16
Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread:

1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each;Image
2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" (@dallasparkua) shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms Image
3/ The documents show that in 2021, a year before the war, the Russian Defense Ministry formally accepted Su-57 aircraft without the 101KS-N, an electro-optical targeting subsystem. This was allowed under Additional Agreement No. 8. Image
Read 14 tweets

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