T. Profile picture
Aug 21 3 tweets 1 min read Read on X
To understand the nature of Druze ‘asabiyya, one must return to the 19th century and the Druze revolt against the forced conscription imposed by Egypt’s Ibrahim Pasha, a revolt that helped unravel his ambitions of integrating Syria into the nascent Egyptian state.

When asked how the Druze managed to resist for so long against a materially and numerically superior Egyptian army, a Druze chieftain replied: “Your army is but a gathering of strangers, while ours are brothers and cousins” (جيشكم لمّ وجيشنا إخوة وولاد عم).
Fun fact: One of the most famous victories of the Druze fighters in that revolt, against Ibrahim Pasha’s Hawwara forces, was later immortalized in the popular Levantine dabke song ‘al-Hawwara (عالهوّارة), which has since inspired countless variations of the original.

I wrote about this below 👇
المختصر المفيد: الحرب فعلاً بدها شطارة، وخسأت يا أبو محمد يا جولاني، يا غازي، يا متعالي.

بإذن الله، جيش الإخوة وولاد العم رح يهزم رجالك المجهولي النسب من مغول وتتر هيدا العصر، ورح يحرر كل شبر من جبل الدروز 😏✌️

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More from @levantophile

May 6
I have been asked several times over the past few days how my views on Ahmad al-Sharaa have evolved, so I thought it was worth laying them out more fully here.

This is one of the longer threads I’ve written. While parts of it are speculative, it reflects the analysis and conclusions I have recently reached about the unfolding situation in Syria. (🧵)Image
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1/ First, I want to say that I still respect al-Sharaa as a capable leader. It takes real grit to rise to the top among Syria’s opposition militias and to build the kind of state capacity he did in Idlib, an achievement that provided a model to replicate across the country.

Unlike his detractors, I also believe he is not a classical Salafi jihadist anymore. He has clearly disavowed international jihad, and today he strikes me more as a shrewd nation-builder and political strategist.

Where I was mistaken - and admittedly too optimistic - was in taking seriously his rhetoric about building a new Syria for all Syrians. I assumed that, even if he didn’t instinctively like the country’s minority groups, his inclusive language and approach was at least a pragmatic response to the reality that minorities collectively make up 25–30% of Syria’s population.

It also seemed like a necessary step toward ending the war and securing international legitimacy.
2/ In hindsight, I no longer believe that al-Sharaa was ever truly interested in ending the war.

His aim seems to have been to reassure minority communities just enough to enable a largely bloodless takeover, only to then continue the conflict in a more controlled, selective fashion, using limited violence and preserving plausible deniability wherever possible.

Why take this approach? The logic is straightforward. From al-Sharaa’s perspective, Syria’s minorities are actual or potential enemies of the Sunni-led order he’s trying to build. Their sizable numbers and geographic concentration don’t compel him toward reluctant inclusion; on the contrary, it forces him to see them as a fundamental obstacle to his project and hence a threat that cannot be ignored.

This can’t be separated from Syria’s unique history: the Sunni majority endured over 50 years of disproportionate repression under a minoritarian regime. When the revolution came, it was almost entirely Sunni-led. Meanwhile, the minority communities either actively supported the regime or stood aside. Understandably, many Sunnis, including their new leadership, are determined never to return to a situation where they are subordinated and abused, as they were under Assad.

Of course, the idea that al-Sharaa is continuing the war by other means is ultimately speculative - there’s no definitive proof. But I believe recent events point strongly in that direction. In the next sections, I’ll explain how I think this strategy has played out so far, especially in the cases of the Alawites and the Druze.
Read 8 tweets
Jan 12
This post is interesting and got me thinking: the Jumblatt-Tarif rivalry for Druze leadership has recently erupted into the spotlight and is likely the most significant intra-Druze conflict of our generation. Yet, surprisingly little attention has been given to it.

Below is a brief overview of the two competing visions for the future of the Druze, along with my initial thoughts on them. (🧵)
1) The Jumblatt Vision:

This approach, represented by the Jumblatt family, is rooted in a traditional feudal leadership model that emphasizes pragmatic engagement with the ever-shifting political landscape of Lebanon and the broader region. A notable example of this pragmatism is Walid Jumblatt being the first Lebanese political leader to visit and actively seek a positive relationship with Syria’s new strongman, Ahmad al-Sharaa (aka al-Jolani).

The Jumblatts are known for their strategic shifts in allegiances, always seeking to benefit from the prevailing power dynamics while maintaining positive ties with all competing factions. These ties are often reinforced through marriage alliances, a longstanding tradition among Druze feudal families. Walid Jumblatt, for instance, is married to a Syrian Sunni (and previously to a Jordanian-Circassian Sunni), while his children, Teymour and Dalia, are married to a Lebanese Shia and a Lebanese Christian, respectively.

The Jumblatt family’s power is deeply tied to the loyalty of the Lebanese Druze community, creating a symbiotic relationship where the political survival of the clan and the community are inextricably linked.Image
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2) The Tarif Vision:

This vision, represented by Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the spiritual leader of the Israeli Druze, ties the community’s future to the Israeli project. Building on the legacy of his grandfather, Sheikh Amin Tarif - who spearheaded Druze integration into Israeli society - Sheikh Mowafaq has further solidified this integration, aligning the fate of the Israeli Druze community with that of Israel.

Despite their small numbers, the Israeli Druze have enjoyed greater political stability and economic prosperity than their counterparts in Lebanon and Syria in recent decades. This stability has fostered wealthier and more cohesive communities, with limited emigration, giving them disproportionate influence relative to their population size.

Sheikh Mowafaq now appears to be seeking to extend Israeli (and American) protection to vulnerable Druze communities in Syria. This effort may also involve the Syrian Druze heartland in the Jabal al-Druze region, where local leaders are seeking greater autonomy in a post-Assad Syria.Image
Image
Read 5 tweets

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