Lots of reporting today about alleged claims for what the KGB would have done in the UK in the event of a run up to war, to support a new book about MI5.
Lets look at actual Cold War MI5 documents, quoting Oleg Gordievsky (codename OVATION) to see what MI5 really thought...
A new book about the Soviet spy Lyalin claims that the Soviets looked at trying to poison Holy Loch in the 1970s to cause peace activists to force a ban on the presence of US Navy Polaris submarines - a key risk to Russia in the event of war.
Was it likely to work though? By the 1980s, MI5, drawing on the work of Gordievsky, the greatest spy publicly known to the British public, and by his SIS codename OVATION assessed the risk from the peace movement as actually significantly lower.
The UK expected in TTW that the Soviets would mount some kind of sabotage operation. All Home Defence planning involved protection of Key Points to reduce this risk from Spetznatz and other special forces - probably about 500 in total.
But where else would the threat come from?
MI5 assessed by 1989 that the Communist Party of Great Britain, and its various extremist affiliates, posed very little risk. There were only a couple of thousand of them, many were elderly and none were likely to serious disrupt TTW.
The Peace Movement was another possibility, but in reality MI5 assessed, based on OVATIONs reporting that the Soviets, despite attempting to influence it, would be unlikely to persuade them to do anything they wouldn't be doing anyway.
In fact OVATION was clear that the Peace Movement was a low priority for the KGB, with limited contact and few agents in place. Rather they worked through existing contacts sympathetic to their views, while the GRU and others had no impact at all.
In fact, during TTW the KGB goal in the UK was to retain access for as long as possible, but it recognised it would be unable to disrupt UK preparations for war - this would need to be a job for the Spetznatz, but that wouldn't occur until war began.
MI5 assessed that in wartime the peace movements may try to carry out some subversive activity, but their ability to disrupt transition to war would be limited to ineffectual protests.
Indeed MI5 saw a greater risk from Scottish and Welsh extremists carrying out terror attacks than it did from the KGB or Peace activists - and even then the risk was extremely low.
There was no risk seen from other foreign terrorist groups during TTW - at the first sign of war, practically all immigration to the UK would be stopped, making it impossible for terrorist groups to arrive and operate.
MI5 placed significant faith in vetting to prevent any Soviet agents from within the armed forces or establishment - this seems remarkably bold!
Overall though, by 1989 MI5 judged that the risk of Soviet subversion in the UK during the run up to general war was extremely low - and that the chances of cooperation were slim to put it mildly. The risk was far lower than we perhaps realise today.
This short primary source thread on Agent OVATION (Gordievsky) reporting and the MI5 assessment of sabotage to the UK may interest @NavyLookout @UKDefJournal @Sandbagger_01 @MarkPiesing @MarkUrban01 @gordoncorera @BenMacintyre1 @PhilipIngMBE @IBallantyn @ColdWarPod
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"I present you the Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarine Red October" - A line from a superb movie. In reality the CIA knew far more about the Soviet TYPHOON class from the mid 1970s than Clancy could have guessed.
Thread on the CIA, Typhoons and spying on the Soviets...
In 1975 whispers were emerging of a new Soviet class of SSBN, known as the TYPHOON. While Brezhnev hinted at its existence, the West knew little.
In briefings to US Senators, the CIA admitted "we have virtually no information on this"...
Tracking the TYPHOON construction became one of the highest US intelligence priorities. A significant amount of overhead (e.g. Space / SR71) effort was put into tracking the construction, not just of the hull, but her reactors, missiles and shoreside infrastructure.
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Headline reading indicated that in 1982, Sea Dart had achieved 63% reliability, and Sea Wolf 65% in Op CORPORATE - the hope was that this would be improved for Sea Dart to 85% during 1983.
It was noted that although the AIM9L sidewinder had achieved 95% reliability of missiles fired, when the 'technical failures' were added in, in reality the weapons serviceability rate was closer to 50% - "which equated to that of Sea Dart".
This is the Canberra bomber, made famous through over 50 years of operations. What is less well known is that in the 1950s TOP SECRET plans were made to use RAF Canberra's to carry out an audacious attack on Soviet shipping canals using Tall Boy bombs in the event of WW3...
A key NATO concern on the outbreak of war was how to prevent Soviet Baltic Fleet ships and amphibious vessels launching attacks in Denmark and Northern Germany to deny the Baltic to NATO.
One way to do this was destroying the canals that would move these ships into place.
The most complex canal was the Baltic-White Sea Canal in the Soviet Union. This was a major strategic artery and needed to be destroyed. The UK realised taking out No10&11 Locks at Nadvoitsy would deny the canal.
This TOP SECRET map from 1954 shows how the UK MOD planned for New Zealand to assume defence responsibility for UK and allied islands in the South Pacific in the event of WW3.
Short thread on how even in the 1950s, the UK saw NZ as a key partner in the event of global war.
In the 1950s the UK still had a significant colonial footprint across this region, with a range of island colonial possessions and commonwealth responsibilities. It was assumed that if global war came, NZ would be asked to lead the defence of the region.
In 1954 the New Zealand Service Chiefs asked their British counterparts for their opinion on the defence obligations. The UK analysed it and drew on intelligence reporting to assess what the likely requirements would be in wartime.
In 1984 the UK "Director General Intelligence", the most senior MOD Intelligence Official visited Washington. His trip report covers spies, espionage, ZIRCON, Typhoon SSBNs and sneaky submarine visits to the Barents Sea...
PSL Thread
The DIS was the MOD core intelligence organisation, covering 'all source' analysis, overhead imagery and a range of military collection capabilities. Throughout the Cold War it enjoyed a very deep relationship with their US and Canadian counterparts.
The visit served as a final call for DGI. He noted the strength of the relationship between the UK and US intelligence communities - with regular UK access to 'NOFORN' but of note, the NSA was concerned about UK security (possibly an aftermath of the Cyprus 9 SIG Regt trial)
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The F3 was dogged by challenges and in the post Cold War world, was not the ideal jet for facing the very different environment for air defence operations. An upgrade was badly needed pending the Eurofighters arrival, but was this the right option?