Lots of reporting today about alleged claims for what the KGB would have done in the UK in the event of a run up to war, to support a new book about MI5.
Lets look at actual Cold War MI5 documents, quoting Oleg Gordievsky (codename OVATION) to see what MI5 really thought...
A new book about the Soviet spy Lyalin claims that the Soviets looked at trying to poison Holy Loch in the 1970s to cause peace activists to force a ban on the presence of US Navy Polaris submarines - a key risk to Russia in the event of war.
Was it likely to work though? By the 1980s, MI5, drawing on the work of Gordievsky, the greatest spy publicly known to the British public, and by his SIS codename OVATION assessed the risk from the peace movement as actually significantly lower.
The UK expected in TTW that the Soviets would mount some kind of sabotage operation. All Home Defence planning involved protection of Key Points to reduce this risk from Spetznatz and other special forces - probably about 500 in total.
But where else would the threat come from?
MI5 assessed by 1989 that the Communist Party of Great Britain, and its various extremist affiliates, posed very little risk. There were only a couple of thousand of them, many were elderly and none were likely to serious disrupt TTW.
The Peace Movement was another possibility, but in reality MI5 assessed, based on OVATIONs reporting that the Soviets, despite attempting to influence it, would be unlikely to persuade them to do anything they wouldn't be doing anyway.
In fact OVATION was clear that the Peace Movement was a low priority for the KGB, with limited contact and few agents in place. Rather they worked through existing contacts sympathetic to their views, while the GRU and others had no impact at all.
In fact, during TTW the KGB goal in the UK was to retain access for as long as possible, but it recognised it would be unable to disrupt UK preparations for war - this would need to be a job for the Spetznatz, but that wouldn't occur until war began.
MI5 assessed that in wartime the peace movements may try to carry out some subversive activity, but their ability to disrupt transition to war would be limited to ineffectual protests.
Indeed MI5 saw a greater risk from Scottish and Welsh extremists carrying out terror attacks than it did from the KGB or Peace activists - and even then the risk was extremely low.
There was no risk seen from other foreign terrorist groups during TTW - at the first sign of war, practically all immigration to the UK would be stopped, making it impossible for terrorist groups to arrive and operate.
MI5 placed significant faith in vetting to prevent any Soviet agents from within the armed forces or establishment - this seems remarkably bold!
Overall though, by 1989 MI5 judged that the risk of Soviet subversion in the UK during the run up to general war was extremely low - and that the chances of cooperation were slim to put it mildly. The risk was far lower than we perhaps realise today.
This short primary source thread on Agent OVATION (Gordievsky) reporting and the MI5 assessment of sabotage to the UK may interest @NavyLookout @UKDefJournal @Sandbagger_01 @MarkPiesing @MarkUrban01 @gordoncorera @BenMacintyre1 @PhilipIngMBE @IBallantyn @ColdWarPod
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In 1995 the US offered to lease the RAF the F16 jet to replace the Tornado F3 in the Air Defence role. This offer was quickly rejected by the MOD, for reasons that make fascinating reading. Thread on why 'leasing American' can be more expensive than 'buying British'.
The Tornado F3 entered service in the 1980s, intended to provide long range air defence. It was well designed for its task - namely to be a missile carrier to shoot down incoming Soviet bombers / MPA over the Atlantic, and not as a dogfighter in Germany.
The F3 was dogged by challenges and in the post Cold War world, was not the ideal jet for facing the very different environment for air defence operations. An upgrade was badly needed pending the Eurofighters arrival, but was this the right option?
This is the V Force, designed to carry out nuclear strikes on every Russian city with over 100,000 people in it in the event of WW3. How did the UK decide its target plans, and how did it plan to defeat Russia in war?
Long PSL thread on early British nuclear war plans.
In 1948 the British atomic weapons programme was underway. To understand how many weapons would be needed, and why, the Chiefs of Staff directed the MOD to come up with an analysis of how best to use nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union as part of an UK/US bomber offensive.
The assumption was that war would be no sooner than 1957 and that when it began, UK and US forces would conduct nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union at the earliest opportunity. No assessment was made of Russian nuclear capability.
Planning assumed that the UK would be using an early near 'Hiroshima' style atomic bomb rather than any other device. All the target planning was done on this basis, rather than more advanced hydrogen bombs.
In 1958 the MOD conducted a detailed study on the logistics stockpiles held by all 3 armed services for wartime use. Its findings were of great concern about the shortfall of stores, equipment and ammunition for use in general war. Short thread on why logistics win wars...
The goal of the paper was to set out the wartime stockpile needs for all 3 services. It began by defining what was meant by conflict - a simple question but far more complex to define. For example - the UK used 'upper, midddle and lower' thresholds.
NATO by contrast assumed that stockpiles were needed for 90 days conflict, and that by D+90, reinforcements and fresh supplies were on the way to the battlefield. It wasn't assumed that widespread nuclear release would have happened at this point.
In 1977 the German SF Unit 'GSG' stormed a hijacked Lufthansa airliner in Mogadishu, rescuing all hostages. Two SAS participated using 'flash bang' grenades.
This led to demand for SAS CT training, and to buy their grenades including from the Iranian Government...
Thread!
In the aftermath of the operation, the FCO received over 20 different requests for support from different countries, keen to learn about the SAS role in the rescue, get training and assistance and learn how to conduct hostage rescue.
The FCO view was that international help mattered - 5 EYES SF engagement existed, along with the EEC nations (except Ireland). It was noted Japan, Portugal & Greece could be useful, while "Arab States could be valuable allies in dealing with Arab terrorism".
In 1958 the JIC circulated an MI6 memo about the subversive threat of Egyptian school teachers in the ME/Africa region - in the eyes of British intelligence, they were a front for subversion and espionage!
Now pay attention 007 and read on for a most unusual MI6 memo...
The Joint Intelligence Committee is the hub of British intelligence analysis, fusing reporting together to produce coherent assessment that informs policy making at the highest levels of the British Government. Any issue considered here is of major national importance.
MI6 noted that between 1950 and 1958, the numbers of highly educated Egyptian teachers rose from 300 - 3000. This was due to Egypt recruiting a surplus of teachers to fill the gaps left by departing European teachers in former colonies.
It is June 1983, you have just been elected to Parliament and appointed a Minister in the MOD. Your staff provide you with an induction briefing pack, including a section on Counter Terrorism. This is the actual brief Ministers had on the role of the SAS & SBS in CT operations.
Ministers were told that there was a permanent SAS team ready to conduct CT Operations in the UK. On the mainland this was known as OP MINSTREL, while in NI, it was OP GASTRIC.
The Home Secretary would lead a MINSTREL response in COBR, and the NI Secretary would lead GASTRIC from the NI Ops Room in Belfast.
Responses were Police led "until Ministers authorise an assault by the SAS as the only way of resolving an incident".