Thread by @ChrisO_wiki

1/ Internet shutdowns and blocks on Telegram continue to cripple the coordination of Russia's air defences. Mobile fire teams are reported to be secretly using insecure Chinese radios instead, and despite the name aren't allowed to be mobile. ⬇️

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1960919288782708923

2/ As previously reported, local officials frequently shut down mobile Internet access during drone raids to prevent Ukrainian drones using them for navigation. The Russian government has also recently blocked calls on Telegram and WhatsApp.

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1958891217380413623

3/ The Nerybar Telegram channel complains:

"Any initiative can be ruined by a thoughtless approach to its implementation. I remember when the UAV raids began, a multitude of warning methods proliferated, including even special applications."

4/ "Now, someone's bright mind has decided to cut off communications in the event of a drone raid. But how are we supposed to alert and warn people? Apps and Telegram, God forgive me, work via mobile internet.

5/ "By the way, communication between fire teams also breaks down, because our communications are, shall we say, a bit weak, with unpatched Baofeng radios in sealed safes so that we don't have to report them if they are lost.

6/ "The story with mobile fire teams is even more amusing. Mobile fire teams are often restricted to moving within the territory of the protected object.

7/ "In theory, this may be convenient for reporting purposes, and it is easier to collect the casings for it, and no one scares civilians.

8/ "But even the clumsiest retard has the ability to cause damage even when it is debris, when a UAV falls in one piece, formally shot down on the target object.

9/ "No, technically, of course, it was riddled with buckshot and other lead, but that doesn't prevent it from overcoming the final hundred metres. That's why..."

10/ The widely-read Rybar channel concurs, and correctly locates the source of the problem in the Russian Ministry of Defence's long-running failure to provide an secure official alternative to Baofengs and Telegram:

11/ "Here we could throw a fit of blame at the authors of the idea and its executors in the person of telecom operators for the fact that with such measures they interfere with the destruction of enemy drones. But first, I still want to ask a question:

12/ "❓How did it happen that in 2025, ordinary messengers and civilian applications are used as a means of control for the troops?

13/ "The problems with communications in the Russian Armed Forces were fully revealed at the very beginning of the Special Military Operation. In total, almost 4 years have passed, but the overall situation with unprogrammed Baofengs in sealed safes has not changed dramatically.

14/ "❗️There may be questions for telecom operators and local authorities. But it is not their fault that mobile fire teams have no other means of communication and situational awareness other than those tied to the mobile Internet.

15/ "I would like to believe that the integrated information interaction system will be diligently implemented, and the satellite group will begin to grow with devices.

16/ "It is strange that when there are problems with communications in the army, for some reason they blame [the phone operators] Megafon and MTS, and not the relevant [Ministry of Defence] department." /end

Sources:
🔹 t.me/ne_rybar/10504
🔹 t.me/rybar/73114