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Aug 28, 2025 25 tweets 10 min read Read on X
Introduction to the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor

Following the recent Red Sea “interception” of a P-8 and my thread on the system (the airframe is just the platform that gets the sensor where it needs to be) I thought it would be useful to describe what the “sensor” was clipped to the fuselage.

As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @Raytheon_UK

1/25 The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) is a state-of-the-art multifunction radar developed by Raytheon (now RTX Corporation) for the United States Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), the AAS represents a significant advancement in airborne radar technology. This thread attempts to follow its development from conceptualisation to operational deployment, elucidates its functionality, and examines its integration with the P-8A.
Furthermore, it explores opportunities for the United Kingdom and NATO allies—Canada, Norway, and Germany—to enhance their P-8 fleets, addressing capability gaps such as those left by the we retired Sentinel R1 and soon the Shadow R1, and concludes by highlighting its role as a force multiplier.Image
Conceptual Origins of the AAS

2/25 The AAS was conceived in the late 2000s to counter evolving threats in littoral and maritime environments, where traditional radars struggled to detect low radar cross-section (RCS) targets, such as stealthy vessels, low-flying drones, or submerged submarines. Building on the classified AN/APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), deployed on select P-3C Orion aircraft, the AAS aimed to enhance multi-function capabilities like moving target indication (MTI) and high-resolution mapping, adapting them for modern asymmetric warfare.
Defining Operational Requirements

3/25 The US Navy (USN) established rigorous requirements for the AAS, mandating all-weather, day-and-night operation independent of optical sensors. The system needed to provide near 360-degree coverage, simultaneous scanning, mapping, tracking, and target classification. It was also required to integrate with networked weapons for real-time targeting, serve as a communications relay, and support electronic warfare (EW) functions. Tailored for the P-8A Poseidon, the USN’s successor to the P-3C, the AAS was designed to operate effectively in contested environments, detecting subtle threats at extended ranges.
Development Contract and Initial Milestones

4/25 On 31 July 2009, Raytheon was awarded a multi-year USN contract to develop the AAS as a direct successor to the LSRS. This contract marked the transition from concept to engineering, leveraging LSRS prototypes to expedite progress. Emphasis was placed on modularity for future upgrades and compatibility with the P-8A’s Boeing 737-based airframe, ensuring the radar could meet the USN’s need for enhanced situational awareness in complex operational theatres (like the Red Sea - as recently seen).
Design Phase: Core Architecture

5/25 The AAS is designed around a double-sided active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, housed in a pod mounted beneath the P-8A’s fuselage. The pod, deployed via a hydraulic arm, minimises aerodynamic drag when stowed, preserving the aircraft’s performance. The double-sided array provides near-omnidirectional coverage, a marked improvement over single-sided predecessors, enabling comprehensive surveillance without requiring aircraft manoeuvres to cover blind spots.Image
AESA Technology and Functionality

6/25 The AAS employs AESA technology, utilising thousands of transmit/receive modules to steer radar beams electronically, eliminating mechanical components. This enables rapid beam switching and multitasking, with beams adapting in real-time to prioritise search, tracking, or imaging tasks. The double-sided configuration—effectively two radars operating back-to-back—ensures continuous 360-degree surveillance, enhancing operational efficiency over earlier systems with limited fields of view.Image
Operational Modes: MTI, SAR, and ISAR

7/25 The AAS integrates multiple operational modes for versatility. Moving Target Indication (MTI) filters stationary clutter to detect moving objects, such as vehicles or ships. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) generates high-resolution images by simulating a large antenna through aircraft motion, enabling ground mapping through adverse weather. Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) leverages target motion for detailed imaging, ideal for classifying maritime targets like periscopes or ship hulls. These modes operate concurrently, providing a comprehensive operational picture.Image
Submarine Detection and Electronic Warfare Capabilities

8/25 A key feature is Mast and Periscope Detection (MPD), which identifies submarine snorkels or surface wakes at long ranges. The radar’s high sensitivity detects subtle disturbances caused by submerged vessels, enhancing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Additionally, the AAS supports EW by jamming or deceiving enemy sensors and functions as a data relay, linking with satellites or ground forces, positioning it as a critical node in networked operations.
Development and Prototyping Efforts

9/25 Following the 2009 contract, Raytheon accelerated development by building on LSRS hardware. Prototypes underwent extensive ground testing to refine signal processing and target discrimination algorithms. By 2015, integration with the P-8A commenced, focusing on compatibility with the aircraft’s avionics and mission systems to ensure seamless data fusion and operational reliability.
Build Phase and Technical Challenges

10/25 The build phase involved constructing the AESA arrays and pod structure, designed to withstand the rigours of high-altitude, long-endurance missions. Challenges included managing the pod’s substantial weight and ensuring electromagnetic compatibility with the P-8A’s avionics. Raytheon collaborated with Boeing to modify the fuselage mount, incorporating a hydraulic deployment mechanism to balance aerodynamic performance with operational flexibility.
Testing and Operational Validation

11/25 A significant milestone was achieved on 20 May 2015, when the AAS-equipped P-8A completed its first flight at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. Testing from 2015 to 2016 validated safe operation, MPD capabilities, and integration with other sensors. By 2020, the system reached operational readiness, with further tests confirming its ability to guide munitions like Tomahawk missiles. As of 2025, the AAS is fully deployed on select P-8As.
Advantages Over the LSRS

12/25 Compared to its predecessor, the AN/APS-149 LSRS, the AAS offers superior resolution and processing power, enabling detection of low-RCS targets at greater distances. The double-sided AESA design eliminates the LSRS’s single-sided limitations, providing continuous surveillance without the need for aircraft repositioning, thus enhancing mission efficiency.
Superiority Over JSTARS Radar

13/25 The AAS surpasses the AN/APY-7 radar on the E-8 JSTARS, particularly in its dual maritime and overland capabilities. Its sensitivity enables detection of submarine wakes and periscopes—functions beyond the JSTARS radar’s scope—while offering enhanced EW integration. The AAS’s modular design also facilitates rapid upgrades, ensuring adaptability to future threats.
Technological Advancements

14/25 The AAS’s technological advantages include all-weather performance, high sensitivity (capable of detecting personnel formations), and real-time multitasking. Advanced algorithms and AESA technology reduce operator workload, enabling rapid threat identification and response, positioning the AAS as a significant improvement over earlier radar systems.
Integration with the P-8A Poseidon

15/25 The AAS integrates seamlessly with the P-8A, complementing its AN/APY-10 radar for ASW tasks. The pod deploys mid-flight, feeding data into the aircraft’s mission computers, where it fuses with inputs from sonobuoys, electro-optical sensors, and weapons systems. This integration creates a unified battlespace picture, enhancing the P-8A’s effectiveness in complex missions.Image
Deployment Strategies

16/25 The AAS is deployed from USN bases, such as Jacksonville, Florida, or forward locations in the Indo-Pacific and Atlantic regions. Only a subset of P-8As is equipped with the AAS, allowing the fleet to tailor capabilities for specific ISR&T missions. This modular approach maximises resource efficiency while addressing diverse operational requirements.Image
Operational Utilisation

17/25 In operational contexts, the AAS tracks surface and subsurface threats, supports strike planning, and enhances maritime domain awareness. Its standoff range ensures the P-8A remains safe from anti-air threats, while its data-link capabilities enable real-time targeting for munitions like Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM), strengthening naval operations.
Functionality of the AAS

18/25 The AAS operates by scanning vast areas with electronic beams, processed by AI-assisted algorithms to classify threats. MTI uses Doppler shifts to isolate moving targets amidst clutter. SAR and ISAR generate images with metre-level resolution, even through clouds. Operators access data via intuitive cockpit interfaces, selecting modes to align with mission priorities.Image
Threat Detection Capabilities

19/25 The AAS excels at detecting low-flying drones, stealth vessels, and submarines by analysing wakes or emissions. In overland roles, it maps terrain, tracks convoys, and identifies threats like improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In maritime mode, ISAR classifies ships, aiding identification friend-or-foe decisions critical to naval engagements.
Data Integration and Networked Operations

20/25 Integration with the P-8A enhances its role as a networked platform. AAS data flows through MIL-STD-1553 buses and Ethernet, merging with other sensors for automated targeting. This reduces latency, enabling real-time data sharing via Link 16 with allied forces, thereby strengthening coalition operations across NATO.Image
UK Opportunity: Replacing the Sentinel R1

21/25 The UK retired its Sentinel R1 fleet in March 2021 due to high maintenance costs and obsolescence (the official reason). With nine P-8 MRA1 aircraft in RAF service, equipping them with AAS pods could help address this capability gap. The AAS’s ground mapping and MTI functions replicate the Sentinel’s capabilities, offering a cost-effective ISR solution without requiring new aircraft.Image
Addressing the Shadow R1 Capability Gap

22/25 The Shadow R1, used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, also faces retirement (currently grounded, US contractors currently fulfilling role out of Cyprus). AAS-equipped P-8 MRA1s could provide persistent surveillance, leveraging the platform’s 10-hour endurance and speed (1200nm transit - 4 hrs on station). This approach avoids the cost of new UAVs, utilising existing RAF infrastructure for training and maintenance, thereby enhancing operational efficiency.Image
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NATO Collaboration: Canada and Norway

23/25 Canada, transitioning from CP-140 Aurora aircraft to P-8s, could adopt the AAS for Arctic surveillance, addressing regional security needs. Norway, with P-8s operational since 2022, shares interests in North Atlantic maritime security (Just look at what’s going on at the moment)
. Through NATO frameworks, joint procurement and training—supported by agreements with Boeing and CAE—could standardise AAS deployment, improving interoperability.Image
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Germany’s Potential Contribution

24/25 Germany, receiving its first P-8 aircraft in 2025 to replace P-3C Orions, is well-positioned to integrate the AAS. NATO partnerships, such as the Poseidon cooperative programme in the North Atlantic, facilitate collaborative operations, data sharing, and cost-sharing for AAS upgrades, enhancing collective defence capabilities.Image
Conclusion: Technological and Strategic Advantages

25/25 The AAS delivers technological superiority through its all-weather, high-resolution detection and multitasking capabilities. As a force multiplier, it enhances NATO interoperability, reduces reliance on multiple platforms, and lowers costs through modularity. For the UK and allies, it offers a pragmatic solution to replace legacy systems like the Sentinel and Shadow R1, leveraging existing P-8 fleets to ensure robust maritime and overland security, thereby strengthening collective defence in an increasingly complex global security landscape. Does the UK have the ambition and foresight @DefenceHQImage

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More from @MtarfaL

Jan 23
The Troubled Odyssey of the GDLS AJAX Programme: A Chronicle of Procurement Failures

Views my own, corrections welcome.

1/25

In the annals of British defence procurement, few sagas rival the protracted and scandal-ridden journey of the AJAX armoured vehicle programme (but E-7 seems to be giving it a good run for its money). Conceived as a cornerstone of the British Army’s modernisation efforts, AJAX promised to deliver a family of cutting-edge platforms capable of revolutionising reconnaissance and combat operations in an era of networked warfare. Rooted in the late 1990s’ Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) initiative, it evolved into a £5.5 billion contract awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) in 2010 for 589 vehicles across six variants: the reconnaissance-focused AJAX, the ARES personnel carrier, the ATHENA command vehicle, the ARGUS engineer reconnaissance variant, the ATLAS recovery vehicle, and the APOLLO repair platform.
These vehicles were envisioned as digitally integrated marvels, boasting superior mobility, sensor fusion, and data-sharing capabilities to align with the Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine. Yet, what began as a beacon of innovation has devolved into a quagmire of missed milestones, manufacturing blunders, health and safety catastrophes, and institutional intransigence. Drawing on exhaustive reports like the Sheldon Review (2023), the Ajax Noise and Vibration Review (2021), parliamentary evidence sessions, whistleblower testimonies, and the latest update from Defence Secretary Luke Pollard on the 22nd January 2026, this thread attempts to unravel the programme’s timeline. It exposes how commercial pressures from GDLS-UK and the Army’s unyielding push for capability have consistently trumped the welfare of service personnel. Special emphasis is placed on the pivotal role of the Institute of Naval Medicine (INM) report, which laid bare the severe noise and vibration risks, with direct quotes (just to remind everyone) underscoring the gravity of these failures. As I go deeper into this narrative, the evidence paints a damning picture of systemic failures that have allowed AJAX to limp forward, at great human and financial cost.Image
Origins and Contract Award: Seeds of Controversy (Late 1990s–2010)

2/25
The AJAX story traces its roots to the post-Cold War era, when the British Army sought to replace its ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) fleet with something more agile and technologically advanced. Initiatives like the Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) and FRES laid the groundwork, but by 2010, the MoD opted for GDLS-UK’s ASCOD-based design over rivals such as BAE Systems’ CV90. This choice was not without debate: critics argued that selecting an unproven adaptation of the ASCOD—primarily to diversify suppliers and avoid a BAE monopoly—introduced unnecessary risks. The contract emphasised assembly in Merthyr Tydfil, Wales, touting economic benefits like job creation, but it also locked in a firm-priced structure where GDLS-UK shouldered cost overruns, potentially incentivising shortcuts.

Initial projections were optimistic: an in-service date around 2017, with vehicles enhancing NATO interoperability and addressing capability gaps exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the bespoke modifications—over 1,200 unique requirements—transformed ASCOD into a complex, heavy, custom beast, setting the stage for future woes.
Early Manufacturing and Timeline Slippages (2010–2014)

3/25 From the outset, production decisions sowed discord. The first 100 hulls were fabricated in Spain by GDLS-UK’s parent company, sparking concerns over quality assurance and supply chain vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in welding and hull tolerances emerged early, issues that would later manifest as debilitating vibrations. By 2014, the MoD formalised the £3.5 billion manufacture phase, aiming for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in July 2020—a squadron deployable with full support.
Yet, the programme’s timeline had already ballooned by three years, a harbinger of deeper problems. The overlap between demonstration and manufacturing phases, intended to be brief, stretched perilously, amplifying risks as prototypes informed production without full validation. These early slippages reflected an underestimation of the engineering challenges in adapting a foreign platform to (1200+ extra) British specifications.

telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/10/1…
Read 25 tweets
Dec 29, 2025
Introduction to the Challenger 3 Challenges

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome - it’s about the debate.

1/25 The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has long prided itself on maintaining a capable armoured force, with the Challenger series of main battle tanks (MBTs) serving as the backbone of its heavy armour since the 1980s. The transition from the Challenger 2 to the Challenger 3 represents a critical upgrade programme aimed at extending the life of these vehicles into the 2040s. However, this endeavour has been beset by a myriad of challenges, ranging from technical hurdles such as weight management and turret integration to logistical issues like component shortages and the reactivation of stored vehicles. These problems are not isolated; they reflect broader systemic difficulties within the British Army’s armoured vehicle procurement, as evidenced by the troubled Ajax programme. In this thread, I’ll attempt to examine these challenges in detail, drawing on official reports, defence analyses, and comparative insights from other nations such as Germany and Poland. I’ll argue that while the decision to upgrade existing Challenger 2 hulls rather than procure new platforms may have seemed cost-effective, it risks leaving the UK with an outdated and insufficiently modernised fleet, potentially compromising its strategic posture in an era of renewed great-power competition.
By comparing the UK’s approach to those of its NATO allies, this analysis highlights why the upgrade path may have been a suboptimal choice, perpetuating vulnerabilities in an increasingly contested global security environment.Image
Background on the Challenger 2

2/25 The Challenger 2, introduced in 1998, has been a stalwart of the British Army, renowned for its robust Dorchester armour and combat-proven reliability, including in operations in Iraq. By the 2010s, obsolescence concerns prompted the MoD to initiate the Life Extension Programme, which evolved into the Challenger 3 upgrade.Image
The Challenger 3 Upgrade Contract

3/25 This upgrade is under a £800 million contract awarded to Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) in 2021. It involves refurbishing 148 Challenger 2 hulls with a new turret featuring a smoothbore 120mm L55A1 gun, advanced Trophy active protection system (APS), and enhanced digital systems.Image
Read 25 tweets
Dec 25, 2025
The Challenges Facing the British Army: Strategic Drift, Procurement Failures, and Operational Shortcomings in the Post-Afghanistan Era

Views and thoughts my one, corrections and comments welcome.

1/25 A Christmas Day thread on the British Army’s struggles over the past 15 years. From identity crisis post-Afghanistan to procurement woes like AJAX and Challenger 3. Critical, factual analysis with NATO comparisons.Image
Introduction

2/25 The British Army, once a cornerstone of global military power, has grappled with profound challenges over the past 15 years, particularly since the final withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This period marks a transition from prolonged counter-insurgency operations to an era of strategic uncertainty, exacerbated by geopolitical shifts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.Image
3/25 Unlike the Royal Navy, which maintains a clear maritime deterrence role through its carrier strike group and nuclear submarines, or the Royal Air Force (RAF), with its emphasis on air superiority and strategic airlift, the Army has struggled to articulate a coherent post-Afghanistan identity.Image
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Read 25 tweets
Nov 25, 2025
Canada’s Fighter Jet Crisis: Why Replacing the CF-18 Is So Much More Than Buying Planes

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome.

1/25 The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is flying 40-year-old CF-18 Hornets on borrowed time. Structural cracks, obsolete avionics, and readiness rates hovering below 50 % mean the clock is ticking louder than ever. The Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) — meant to deliver 88 new jets — has become one of the most politically charged, industrially complex, and strategically fraught procurements in Canadian history. This thread attempts to explain why, from post-war history to the November 2025 standoff with the United States.Image
Post-War RCAF: From Empire Air Training to Cold War Interceptor

2/25 1945–1960: Canada demobilised from a 215,000-strong wartime air force to a small peacetime RCAF focused on continental defence. First jet: the Canadair-licensed F-86 Sabre (1,200 built in Montreal). Role: high-altitude interception of Soviet Tu-95 Bears over the Arctic. Industry: massive licensed production. Lesson: Canada could be a serious aerospace player when offsets were generous.Image
The Nuclear Era and the Controversial CF-104 Starfighter

3/25 1961–1986: The RCAF (later CAF) bought 200 CF-104 Starfighters for low-level nuclear strike in Europe under NATO. Accident rate was appalling (“Widowmaker”), and the aircraft hated Canadian winters. Political takeaway: Ottawa accepted a technically suboptimal platform because NATO political solidarity trumped operational fit.Image
Read 25 tweets
Nov 13, 2025
The E-7 Wedgetail Programme: A Case Study in Strategic Procurement Failure

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. References in post 25.

1/25 The Royal Air Force’s (RAF) acquisition of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail was intended to restore sovereign airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability post-E-3D retirement. Instead, it has become emblematic of systemic deficiencies in Ministry of Defence (MoD) major project delivery. This thread attempts to examine the requirement, procurement strategy, risk management, and international ramifications using official reporting and parliamentary evidence.Image
Original Requirement and Operational Concept

2/25 The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated a successor to the E-3D Sentry capable of persistent, multi-domain surveillance and command and control (C2). The E-7’s Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) provides 360° coverage, simultaneous air/maritime tracking of 2,000 contacts, and range exceeding 370 km. The Initial Gate business case specified five airframes to sustain a continuous two-aircraft orbit with appropriate maintenance float.
Role Within RAF Force Structure

3/25 The Wedgetail is designed to function as a high-endurance C2 node, integrating sensor feeds from F-35, Typhoon, P-8, satellites, and ground-based radars via Link 16 and sovereign datalinks. It enables standoff direction of offensive counter-air, strike coordination, and maritime domain awareness. Endurance: 9 hours unrefuelled, >20 hours with AAR. The platform was to be fully interoperable with NATO and Five Eyes partners while preserving UK cryptographic sovereignty (from aircraft 3).Image
Read 25 tweets
Nov 11, 2025
The British Army, November 2025: A Force Asked to Do Too Much with Too Little

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. All information comes from open source.

1/25 Five months after the June Strategic Defence Review promised a “NATO-first” land power capable of deploying a full division to Europe within ten days, the British Army is smaller, lighter, and more fragile than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. This thread attempts to examine one straightforward question: can the Army actually deliver the tasks the government has set for it, both at home and within NATO? I will try and walk through the commitments, expose the critical gaps in capability, and contrast the polished rhetoric of senior officers and politicians with the harder reality on the ground.Image
National Tasks – What the Government Expects at Home

2/25 The SDR 2025 and its predecessors expect the Army to defend the United Kingdom against hybrid threats such as sabotage, cyber strikes, and disinformation campaigns. It must also be able to mount rapid counter-terrorist operations anywhere in the world and evacuate British citizens from crisis zones, whether in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. All of these missions demand an agile, resilient, and rapidly deployable force. With only (circa) 73,800 regular soldiers—the smallest regular Army since 1714—true agility is in increasingly short supply.
NATO Tasks – The Real Heavy Lifting

3/25 NATO commitments are far more demanding. Britain leads the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Estonia, a formation that must be able to expand seamlessly to a full brigade on demand. In the event of a major Article 5 emergency—Russia crossing a NATO border, for example—the United Kingdom has promised to deploy an entire division, roughly 20,000 troops with armoured brigades at its core, within ten days and to sustain it in combat for months. This is the centrepiece of the government’s “NATO-first” policy, and it is not a paper commitment; allies are counting on it.Image
Read 26 tweets

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