Introduction to the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor
Following the recent Red Sea “interception” of a P-8 and my thread on the system (the airframe is just the platform that gets the sensor where it needs to be) I thought it would be useful to describe what the “sensor” was clipped to the fuselage.
As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @Raytheon_UK
1/25 The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) is a state-of-the-art multifunction radar developed by Raytheon (now RTX Corporation) for the United States Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), the AAS represents a significant advancement in airborne radar technology. This thread attempts to follow its development from conceptualisation to operational deployment, elucidates its functionality, and examines its integration with the P-8A.
Furthermore, it explores opportunities for the United Kingdom and NATO allies—Canada, Norway, and Germany—to enhance their P-8 fleets, addressing capability gaps such as those left by the we retired Sentinel R1 and soon the Shadow R1, and concludes by highlighting its role as a force multiplier.
Conceptual Origins of the AAS
2/25 The AAS was conceived in the late 2000s to counter evolving threats in littoral and maritime environments, where traditional radars struggled to detect low radar cross-section (RCS) targets, such as stealthy vessels, low-flying drones, or submerged submarines. Building on the classified AN/APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), deployed on select P-3C Orion aircraft, the AAS aimed to enhance multi-function capabilities like moving target indication (MTI) and high-resolution mapping, adapting them for modern asymmetric warfare.
Defining Operational Requirements
3/25 The US Navy (USN) established rigorous requirements for the AAS, mandating all-weather, day-and-night operation independent of optical sensors. The system needed to provide near 360-degree coverage, simultaneous scanning, mapping, tracking, and target classification. It was also required to integrate with networked weapons for real-time targeting, serve as a communications relay, and support electronic warfare (EW) functions. Tailored for the P-8A Poseidon, the USN’s successor to the P-3C, the AAS was designed to operate effectively in contested environments, detecting subtle threats at extended ranges.
Development Contract and Initial Milestones
4/25 On 31 July 2009, Raytheon was awarded a multi-year USN contract to develop the AAS as a direct successor to the LSRS. This contract marked the transition from concept to engineering, leveraging LSRS prototypes to expedite progress. Emphasis was placed on modularity for future upgrades and compatibility with the P-8A’s Boeing 737-based airframe, ensuring the radar could meet the USN’s need for enhanced situational awareness in complex operational theatres (like the Red Sea - as recently seen).
Design Phase: Core Architecture
5/25 The AAS is designed around a double-sided active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, housed in a pod mounted beneath the P-8A’s fuselage. The pod, deployed via a hydraulic arm, minimises aerodynamic drag when stowed, preserving the aircraft’s performance. The double-sided array provides near-omnidirectional coverage, a marked improvement over single-sided predecessors, enabling comprehensive surveillance without requiring aircraft manoeuvres to cover blind spots.
AESA Technology and Functionality
6/25 The AAS employs AESA technology, utilising thousands of transmit/receive modules to steer radar beams electronically, eliminating mechanical components. This enables rapid beam switching and multitasking, with beams adapting in real-time to prioritise search, tracking, or imaging tasks. The double-sided configuration—effectively two radars operating back-to-back—ensures continuous 360-degree surveillance, enhancing operational efficiency over earlier systems with limited fields of view.
Operational Modes: MTI, SAR, and ISAR
7/25 The AAS integrates multiple operational modes for versatility. Moving Target Indication (MTI) filters stationary clutter to detect moving objects, such as vehicles or ships. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) generates high-resolution images by simulating a large antenna through aircraft motion, enabling ground mapping through adverse weather. Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) leverages target motion for detailed imaging, ideal for classifying maritime targets like periscopes or ship hulls. These modes operate concurrently, providing a comprehensive operational picture.
Submarine Detection and Electronic Warfare Capabilities
8/25 A key feature is Mast and Periscope Detection (MPD), which identifies submarine snorkels or surface wakes at long ranges. The radar’s high sensitivity detects subtle disturbances caused by submerged vessels, enhancing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Additionally, the AAS supports EW by jamming or deceiving enemy sensors and functions as a data relay, linking with satellites or ground forces, positioning it as a critical node in networked operations.
Development and Prototyping Efforts
9/25 Following the 2009 contract, Raytheon accelerated development by building on LSRS hardware. Prototypes underwent extensive ground testing to refine signal processing and target discrimination algorithms. By 2015, integration with the P-8A commenced, focusing on compatibility with the aircraft’s avionics and mission systems to ensure seamless data fusion and operational reliability.
Build Phase and Technical Challenges
10/25 The build phase involved constructing the AESA arrays and pod structure, designed to withstand the rigours of high-altitude, long-endurance missions. Challenges included managing the pod’s substantial weight and ensuring electromagnetic compatibility with the P-8A’s avionics. Raytheon collaborated with Boeing to modify the fuselage mount, incorporating a hydraulic deployment mechanism to balance aerodynamic performance with operational flexibility.
Testing and Operational Validation
11/25 A significant milestone was achieved on 20 May 2015, when the AAS-equipped P-8A completed its first flight at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. Testing from 2015 to 2016 validated safe operation, MPD capabilities, and integration with other sensors. By 2020, the system reached operational readiness, with further tests confirming its ability to guide munitions like Tomahawk missiles. As of 2025, the AAS is fully deployed on select P-8As.
Advantages Over the LSRS
12/25 Compared to its predecessor, the AN/APS-149 LSRS, the AAS offers superior resolution and processing power, enabling detection of low-RCS targets at greater distances. The double-sided AESA design eliminates the LSRS’s single-sided limitations, providing continuous surveillance without the need for aircraft repositioning, thus enhancing mission efficiency.
Superiority Over JSTARS Radar
13/25 The AAS surpasses the AN/APY-7 radar on the E-8 JSTARS, particularly in its dual maritime and overland capabilities. Its sensitivity enables detection of submarine wakes and periscopes—functions beyond the JSTARS radar’s scope—while offering enhanced EW integration. The AAS’s modular design also facilitates rapid upgrades, ensuring adaptability to future threats.
Technological Advancements
14/25 The AAS’s technological advantages include all-weather performance, high sensitivity (capable of detecting personnel formations), and real-time multitasking. Advanced algorithms and AESA technology reduce operator workload, enabling rapid threat identification and response, positioning the AAS as a significant improvement over earlier radar systems.
Integration with the P-8A Poseidon
15/25 The AAS integrates seamlessly with the P-8A, complementing its AN/APY-10 radar for ASW tasks. The pod deploys mid-flight, feeding data into the aircraft’s mission computers, where it fuses with inputs from sonobuoys, electro-optical sensors, and weapons systems. This integration creates a unified battlespace picture, enhancing the P-8A’s effectiveness in complex missions.
Deployment Strategies
16/25 The AAS is deployed from USN bases, such as Jacksonville, Florida, or forward locations in the Indo-Pacific and Atlantic regions. Only a subset of P-8As is equipped with the AAS, allowing the fleet to tailor capabilities for specific ISR&T missions. This modular approach maximises resource efficiency while addressing diverse operational requirements.
Operational Utilisation
17/25 In operational contexts, the AAS tracks surface and subsurface threats, supports strike planning, and enhances maritime domain awareness. Its standoff range ensures the P-8A remains safe from anti-air threats, while its data-link capabilities enable real-time targeting for munitions like Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM), strengthening naval operations.
Functionality of the AAS
18/25 The AAS operates by scanning vast areas with electronic beams, processed by AI-assisted algorithms to classify threats. MTI uses Doppler shifts to isolate moving targets amidst clutter. SAR and ISAR generate images with metre-level resolution, even through clouds. Operators access data via intuitive cockpit interfaces, selecting modes to align with mission priorities.
Threat Detection Capabilities
19/25 The AAS excels at detecting low-flying drones, stealth vessels, and submarines by analysing wakes or emissions. In overland roles, it maps terrain, tracks convoys, and identifies threats like improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In maritime mode, ISAR classifies ships, aiding identification friend-or-foe decisions critical to naval engagements.
Data Integration and Networked Operations
20/25 Integration with the P-8A enhances its role as a networked platform. AAS data flows through MIL-STD-1553 buses and Ethernet, merging with other sensors for automated targeting. This reduces latency, enabling real-time data sharing via Link 16 with allied forces, thereby strengthening coalition operations across NATO.
UK Opportunity: Replacing the Sentinel R1
21/25 The UK retired its Sentinel R1 fleet in March 2021 due to high maintenance costs and obsolescence (the official reason). With nine P-8 MRA1 aircraft in RAF service, equipping them with AAS pods could help address this capability gap. The AAS’s ground mapping and MTI functions replicate the Sentinel’s capabilities, offering a cost-effective ISR solution without requiring new aircraft.
Addressing the Shadow R1 Capability Gap
22/25 The Shadow R1, used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, also faces retirement (currently grounded, US contractors currently fulfilling role out of Cyprus). AAS-equipped P-8 MRA1s could provide persistent surveillance, leveraging the platform’s 10-hour endurance and speed (1200nm transit - 4 hrs on station). This approach avoids the cost of new UAVs, utilising existing RAF infrastructure for training and maintenance, thereby enhancing operational efficiency.
NATO Collaboration: Canada and Norway
23/25 Canada, transitioning from CP-140 Aurora aircraft to P-8s, could adopt the AAS for Arctic surveillance, addressing regional security needs. Norway, with P-8s operational since 2022, shares interests in North Atlantic maritime security (Just look at what’s going on at the moment)
. Through NATO frameworks, joint procurement and training—supported by agreements with Boeing and CAE—could standardise AAS deployment, improving interoperability.
Germany’s Potential Contribution
24/25 Germany, receiving its first P-8 aircraft in 2025 to replace P-3C Orions, is well-positioned to integrate the AAS. NATO partnerships, such as the Poseidon cooperative programme in the North Atlantic, facilitate collaborative operations, data sharing, and cost-sharing for AAS upgrades, enhancing collective defence capabilities.
Conclusion: Technological and Strategic Advantages
25/25 The AAS delivers technological superiority through its all-weather, high-resolution detection and multitasking capabilities. As a force multiplier, it enhances NATO interoperability, reduces reliance on multiple platforms, and lowers costs through modularity. For the UK and allies, it offers a pragmatic solution to replace legacy systems like the Sentinel and Shadow R1, leveraging existing P-8 fleets to ensure robust maritime and overland security, thereby strengthening collective defence in an increasingly complex global security landscape. Does the UK have the ambition and foresight @DefenceHQ
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The Boeing P-8 Poseidon: An Essential Pillar of Contemporary Maritime Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare
1/25 In this quickly put together long thread, I shall attempt examine the Boeing P-8 Poseidon. The thread will attempt traverse its developmental trajectory from initial requirements to full operational service, with a particular emphasis on its integration and utilisation within the Royal Air Force (RAF).
Given the resurgence of underwater threats in the North Atlantic, the RAF’s (and others) recent and ongoing deployment of the P-8 underscores its strategic relevance. This thread is tailored for a predominantly British audience, highlighting RAF-specific applications, whilst attempting to remain relevant for other readers. It will follow my standard format and address the aircraft’s concept of operations, its synergies with complementary assets, the geopolitical significance of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, specifically including recent multinational activities—and detailed analyses of its sensors, armaments, configurations, and comparisons to predecessors and contemporaries. It will explore the RAF’s infrastructure adaptations, procurement decisions, and the platform’s pivotal role in supporting the United Kingdom’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD).
As always, all views my own and facts can be challenged. This has been written (at pace) to give some context to the recent events other contributors (@TBrit90 @NavyLookout @pegge49 @auonsson)
For additional context I have worked on the RAF P-8 (not as an aviator) Nimrod MR2 and Nimrod MRA4 (the world’s best ASW long range fixed wing aircraft).
Apologies for grammar and any repetition.
The Boeing P-8 Poseidon demonstrates an uplift in maritime patrol capabilities, evolving from the United States Navy’s (USN) need to modernise its fleet in the face of evolving submarine technologies. For the RAF, the P-8 has restored a critical capability absent since the retirement of the Nimrod fleet, enabling robust surveillance over vast oceanic expanses. Its adoption by NATO allies, including the UK , reflects a collective commitment to countering asymmetric threats posed by advanced submarines from potential adversaries (specially Russian). In recent months, the RAF has markedly heightened its operational tempo with the P-8, deploying aircraft for extended missions in contested waters, thereby reinforcing the UK’s maritime security posture and contributing to alliance-wide deterrence efforts but also (in the RAf’s case) if nine aircraft was enough.
Historical Origins and Initial Requirements
2/25 The genesis of the P-8 Poseidon can be traced to the late 1980s, when the USN identified significant operational constraints in its ageing Lockheed P-3 Orion fleet. Issues such as airframe fatigue, escalating maintenance demands, and diminished range and endurance necessitated a successor capable of sustaining prolonged missions in increasingly contested maritime environments. This led to the initiation of the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) programme in 2000, which aimed to procure a platform excelling in ASW, anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), all whilst achieving substantial reductions in lifecycle costs through innovative design and manufacturing efficiencies.
Prospective designs included Lockheed Martin’s Orion 21, an evolutionary upgrade of the P-3; Boeing’s innovative proposal predicated on the commercial Boeing 737-800ERX airliner; and briefly, BAE Systems’ Nimrod MRA4, which withdrew from contention in 2002 due to the absence of a viable American industrial partner (sound familiar?)
Boeing’s selection on 14 May 2004, underpinned by a $3.89 billion system development and demonstration contract for at least 108 airframes, was predicated on the platform’s modularity, leveraging mature commercial technologies to expedite development and mitigate risks. This decision not only addressed the USN’s immediate needs but also laid the groundwork for international variants, including those adopted by the RAF to bridge a decade-long gap in long-range maritime patrol capabilities following the contentious cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Conception and Detailed Design Phase
3/25 At the conceptual stage, Boeing envisioned a hybrid aircraft that amalgamated the reliability and cost-effectiveness of a commercial jetliner with the specialised requirements of military maritime operations. The design philosophy centred on adaptability, incorporating structural reinforcements by Spirit AeroSystems to endure the rigours of low-altitude flight over turbulent seas, a dedicated bomb bay positioned aft of the wing for ASW munitions, and enhanced wings derived from the 737-900 model, featuring raked wingtips to improve aerodynamic efficiency and range.
Further modifications encompassed advanced electro-mechanical expulsion deicing systems to facilitate operations in adverse weather conditions prevalent in northern latitudes, such as those encountered by RAF crews in the North Atlantic. The cockpit was meticulously optimised for tactical ASW manoeuvres, permitting steeper bank angles and incorporating a responsive autothrottle system, whilst eliminating non-essential audible alerts to minimise distractions during high-stakes engagements. Propulsion was upgraded with CFM56-7B27A engines, each equipped with generators providing 180 kVA—twice the capacity of civilian counterparts—necessitating redesigned nacelles and wing mountings to accommodate the increased electrical demands of sophisticated avionics and sensor suites. This fusion of civilian and military engineering principles not only accelerated the development timeline but also ensured the P-8’s versatility, making it an attractive option for the RAF’s urgent re-establishment of
maritime patrol capability.
Introduction to the UK’s Immigration Protest Crisis
Every now and again I like to focus on different parts of Defence and National Security. Views are my own, I’ve tried to stay apolitical.
1/25 The United Kingdom is grappling with a wave of protests centered on immigration, particularly the Home Office’s use of hotels to house asylum seekers. Demonstrations in Epping, Canary Wharf, and other regions have exposed deep community divisions, fueled by specific incidents and broader policy frustrations.
The recent announcement of “online monitoring units” to track social media has intensified concerns about free speech, further complicating an already volatile situation. This thread tries to examine the protests, their management, the role of agitators, and the risks of escalation if unaddressed.
The Epping Protests – A Catalyst for Unrest
2/25 In July 2025, protests erupted outside the Bell Hotel in Epping, Essex, which has housed single male asylum seekers for years. The spark was the arrest of HGK , a 38-year-old Ethiopian asylum seeker, charged with sexual assault after allegedly attempting to kiss a 14-year-old girl. This incident inflamed local tensions, leading to demonstrations that escalated into violence, with significant implications for community cohesion and public safety.
Escalation and Violence in Epping
3/25 The Epping protests saw over 1,000 participants across multiple dates (July 13th, 17th, and 20th). Demonstrators threw bottles, eggs, and smoke flares, damaging police vehicles and injuring eight officers on July 18. Six arrests were made on 20th July for offenses including violent disorder and criminal damage. Two security guards were also attacked at a bus stop, highlighting the growing aggression.
The Ajax Ares Platform: A Comprehensive Analysis of British Army Modernisation, Peer Comparison, Procurement Challenges, and Strategic Missteps
This is a long read (a shorter version will also be published). Views as always my own and facts or statements can be challenged. Source references are available on request. All sources are open. (I have background in this subject, I drafted some of the questions for the Defence Select Committee during their inquiry into AJAX.
For more in-depth information on this, FRES and other land systems check out @thinkdefence and for Army strategic direction and organisation check out @nicholadrummond
Forward
1/20 The Ajax Ares platform, a key component of the British Army’s Ajax family of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), is designed to provide protected mobility and overwatch, replacing the ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) (CVR(T)) Spartan. Developed under the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) programme, the Ajax family has faced significant delays, technical issues, and controversies, collectively termed the “Ajax scandal.” This essay provides an in-depth examination of the Ajax programme’s original requirements, its historical context, and the technical specifications of the Ares variant, including its power plant, transmission, armour, C2 systems (with a focus on the delayed ZODIAC system’s role in intelligence dissemination), and limited weapon systems. It incorporates a recent statement by Defence Procurement Minister (Min DP) Maria Eagle, confirming Ares’ expanded role in infantry formations alongside Boxer, assessing its suitability, number of dismounts, and whether this reflects original requirements or poor strategic planning. The essay compares Ares with peer platforms—the Swedish CV90 and American M2 Bradley—to highlight its capabilities and shortcomings. It explores the MoD’s challenges, including noise and vibration issues, Parliamentary scrutiny, and the cancellation of the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP). It critiques the platform-for-platform approach, contrasts it with the Royal Navy’s Crowsnest programme, and evaluates the implications of emerging threats like First-Person View (FPV) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Finally, it assesses the MoD’s damaged credibility and its impact on securing Treasury funding, arguing that systemic procurement failures threaten the British Army’s readiness.
Table of Contents
2/20
1. Introduction
2. Historical Context: The Road to Ajax 2.1 Early Requirements and Predecessor Programmes 2.2 The Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) Programme
3. The Ajax Family: Overview and Variants 3.1 Ajax: The Reconnaissance Variant 3.2 Ares: Protected Mobility and Overwatch 3.3 Other Variants: Athena, Argus, Apollo, and Atlas
4. The Ares Platform: Technical Specifications 4.1 Power Plant and Transmission System 4.2 Armour and Protection 4.3 Command and Control (C2) and the ZODIAC System’s Role in Intelligence Dissemination 4.4 Weapon Systems and Limitations
5. Maria Eagle’s Statement and Ares’ Expanded Role 5.1 Ares in Infantry Formations: Statement and Context 5.2 Suitability for the Infantry Role 5.3 Number of Dismounts and Replacement of CVR(T) Spartan 5.4 Original Requirement or Poor Strategic Planning?
6. Comparison with Peer Platforms: CV90 and M2 Bradley 6.1 CV90: Design and Capabilities 6.2 M2 Bradley: Design and Capabilities 6.3 Comparative Analysis: Ares, CV90, and M2 Bradley
7. The Ajax Scandal: Challenges and Controversies 7.1 Noise and Vibration Issues 7.2 Parliamentary Defence Committee Scrutiny 7.3 The Sheldon Review and Lessons Learned
8. The Platform-for-Platform Approach 8.1 Comparison with the Royal Navy’s Crowsnest Programme 8.2 Implications for Capability Development
9. The Warrior IFV: Background, Upgrades, and Cancellation 9.1 Warrior’s Role and Legacy 9.2 The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP) 9.3 The Recce Variant and Strategic Missteps
10. Emerging Threats: FPV UAVs and Ares’ Vulnerabilities 10.1 The Rise of FPV UAVs and Loitering Munitions 10.2 Ares’ Vulnerabilities and Required Upgrades
11. The MoD’s Procurement Challenges and Treasury Relations 11.1 Systemic Issues in UK Defence Procurement 11.2 Impact on MoD and Army Credibility 11.3 Financial Implications and Treasury Scepticism
12. Conclusion
1. Introduction
3/20 The Ajax family of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), developed by General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK), represents the British Army’s most significant attempt to modernise its armoured capabilities since the Cold War. Conceived under the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) programme, the Ajax family aims to replace the Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) (CVR(T)) family, in service since 1971, with a networked, medium-weight capability for reconnaissance, protected mobility, and support roles.
The Ares variant, specifically, is designed to deliver protected mobility and overwatch for specialist troops, such as anti-tank Javelin teams and snipers, within Armoured Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and the Deep Recce Strike BCT.
A recent statement by Min DP (Maria Eagle), made this month (July 2025), confirms an expanded role for Ares in infantry formations alongside the Boxer wheeled vehicle, raising questions about its suitability and whether this reflects original requirements or poor strategic planning.
However, the Ajax programme has become synonymous with delays, technical failures, and mismanagement, earning the label “the Ajax scandal.”
With a £5.5 billion firm-price contract for 589 vehicles, the programme’s challenges—ranging from excessive noise and vibration to the cancellation of the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP)—have raised profound questions about the UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) procurement processes and the British Army’s ability to deliver modern capabilities. These issues have been compounded by the delay in the ZODIAC command and control (C2) system, critical for moving intelligence across the battlefield, which has limited Ares’ operational effectiveness.
This essay tries to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Ajax Ares platform, tracing its origins to FRES and earlier initiatives, detailing its technical specifications, and assessing Min DP’s statement on its expanded infantry role. It compares Ares with peer platforms—the Swedish CV90 and American M2 Bradley—to highlight its capabilities and shortcomings.
The essay examines the Ajax programme’s controversies, the platform-for-platform replacement strategy, and comparisons with the Royal Navy’s Crowsnest programme. It also addresses the Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), its cancelled upgrades, and the implications of emerging threats like FPV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Finally, it evaluates the MoD’s damaged credibility and its impact on securing Treasury funding, arguing that systemic procurement failures threaten the British Army’s readiness in an increasingly complex threat environment. For those involved is should be an uncomfortable read.
1/25 The CAPTOR radar is the beating heart of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s sensor suite, enabling its air superiority and multi-role capabilities. Developed through a multinational effort, it has evolved from a Cold War-era concept to a cutting-edge system. This thread traces its journey from requirement to operational use, its technology, variants, and relevance today, with a focus on the UK’s investment in the ECRS Mk2. As always views are my own and posts can be corrected if errors are found. This is third in series of UK airborne radars (Blue Fox/Vixen, Fox Hunter and now CAPTOR). Larger radars will be covered soon (Search Water etc).
Origins of the CAPTOR Radar
2/25 The CAPTOR, originally the ECR-90, was born in the 1980s under the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) programme, aimed at countering Soviet aircraft like the MiG-29. Led by the EuroRadar consortium (UK, Germany, Italy, Spain), it built on the Ferranti Blue Vixen radar from the Sea Harrier FA2, leveraging pulse Doppler technology for superior target detection in cluttered environments.
Heritage and Technological Roots
3/25 The CAPTOR’s heritage lies in Cold War radar advancements, particularly pulse Doppler systems used in the Tornado’s Foxhunter radar. These provided robust electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) against Soviet jamming. Collaborative expertise from GEC-Marconi (UK), DASA (Germany), FIAR (Italy), and INISEL (Spain) shaped a radar that balanced performance, cost, and NATO interoperability.
I’m not a lawyer but I do have some knowledge of information security.
1/25 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) operates in a high-stakes environment where safeguarding sensitive information is critical to national security and public trust. This thread explores the MoD’s information security processes, their alignment with UK laws and standards, and the fallout from the 2022 Afghan data breach, revealed after a superinjunction was lifted on 15 July 2025. Here is how the MoD manages data and where (I believe) it went wrong.
Views my own.
The MoD’s Information Security Framework
2/25 The MoD’s information security is governed by the Government Security Classifications Policy (GSCP), which uses three tiers: OFFICIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. Each tier has specific security controls to protect data based on its sensitivity and potential impact if compromised. This ensures proportionate safeguards for everything from routine admin to critical intelligence.
Technical and Organisational Measures
3/25 The MoD employs technical measures like encryption, secure IT systems, and access controls to protect data. Organisational measures include mandatory training, governance structures, and incident response protocols. These are outlined in the Defence Records Management Policy (JSP 441), which governs data retention and destruction to minimise risks.
1/25 The British Army should restructure into two divisions—one tracked, one wheeled—each with three brigades of three all-arms battle groups, to meet Strategic Defence Review (SDR) requirements. This suggestion aims to spark debate on sustaining NATO commitments in the High North and Baltics while enabling operations in the Middle East and Africa. The Heavy Division would sustain armoured battle groups, with brigades and divisions as resource providers, supported by modern equipment like Challenger 3 and Boxer. Cultural and structural challenges, including resistance to change and logistical constraints, must be addressed. A phased timeline from 2025 to 2032 aligns with equipment deliveries. Without significant reform, the Army risks irrelevance in a volatile strategic environment.
This thread has been put together following discussions with @thinkdefence and @MrSnaplegs last year (TD followed with a long read).
@nicholadrummond @509298 @BO3673 @PhilipIngMBE @BenWallace70 thoughts welcome on this
Why Restructure the British Army?
2/25 The British Army faces evolving threats that demand a modern, agile force to remain relevant. The SDR, published in spring 2025, prioritises NATO deterrence and global deployability. A two-division model—one Heavy (tracked) for high-intensity conflict and one Expeditionary (wheeled) for rapid deployment—offers a solution. By focusing on all-arms battle groups, the Army can deploy flexible units while sustaining commitments. Reform is critical to avoid obsolescence amidst budget and personnel constraints.
The Heavy Division Structure
3/25 The Heavy Division, built on the 3rd (UK) Division, would comprise three Armoured Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), each with three all-arms battle groups. Each battle group would include a squadron of 14 Challenger 3 tanks, an Ajax infantry company, an Ares mechanised company, and support elements like 120mm mortars and Javelin missiles. The division would sustain one battle group in the High North (three-year accompanied posting) and one in the Baltics (six-month rotations), aligning with NATO priorities.