Thread by @iwasnevrhere_

The recent airspace closure and announced trade cutoff over Gaza are part of a choreography, signaling to the domestic base, the wider Muslim world, and partners in Asia and the Gulf that Türkiye can confront Israeli policy when it chooses.

But maritime trackers show the economic umbilical cord hasn’t been cut. Turkish-owned vessels like the KAAN DEVAL and KAPTAN ERDOGAN have continued to sail toward Haifa, sometimes under vague “ORDER” AIS destinations or indirect routing.

This fits a long-standing pattern: when Ankara limits direct channels, exports are re-routed through intermediaries or mislabeled as bound for the Palestinian Authority, allowing commerce to continue while Erdoğan claims the political capital of confrontation.

For Erdoğan, this duality is pragmatic. Publicly challenging Israel boosts his credibility on the Arab street and strengthens his bargaining position with Washington and Brussels. Quietly maintaining selective economic ties preserves revenue streams, industrial contracts, and leverage over Israeli policy. Israel, for its part, benefits from these flows blunting the material impact of Turkish hostility.

The result is an adversarial optics–transactional reality model: Ankara and Tel Aviv may clash rhetorically and even diplomatically, but neither is willing to fully sever profitable and strategically useful ties. The ships at sea tell the story, beneath the rhetoric, the relationship remains one of calculated interdependence.

Around 30–40% of Israel’s crude oil comes through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, terminating at Türkiye’s Ceyhan port. Under binding international agreements, Ankara must allow uninterrupted flow, earning roughly $1.27 per barrel in transit fees. This creates a dual-track reality: Türkiye can close airspace, cut visible trade, and host Hamas leaders for political theatre, while still profiting from energy flows that underpin Israel’s war economy.