Ukraine's reports that strikes on Russian production and storage facilities of Shahed (Russian: Geran-2) strike UAVs reduced the number of their launches by a third in August, from 6302 to 4132. 1/ Militarnyi.com
The Russian practice of accumulating Shaheds for massive attacks every 3-4 days was also diminished, with the maximum attack in July of 728 drones reduced to 110 in August. 2/
The Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol" that produces chips for military drones was struck in July, destroying four production workshops.
The company completely stopped working. 3/
On July 4, a facility near Moscow for the production of Shahed warheads was struck.
Fires and heavy smoke were recorded.
Also near Moscow the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant that supplies thermobaric compounds for warheads was struck. 4/
A ship carrying components for Shaheds from Iran was sunk on Aug 14 by a long-range Ukrainian UAV near the pot of Olya on the Caspian Sea.
This logistics network allows Russia to increase the rate of production of Shaheds. 5/
Also in August a logistics warehouse in Tatarstan 1300 km from Ukraine that stores completed Shaheds was struck twice.
Satellite images confirmed six hits on the facility, destroying large stocks of the drones. 6/
Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Shahed production was 170 units per day, with plans to increase production to 190.
The losses caused by the various Ukrainian strikes may prevent this increase, and production may indeed fall below 170 units per day.
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Russian blogger “Philologist in Ambush” (Svyatoslav Golikov) has written a series on the problems of drone units entitled
“Problems of Practical Implementation of the Drone Component in the Active Army.”
“1⃣ A Number of Specific Problems in Implementing the Unmanned Aerial… 1/
“…Component in Combined Arms Structures
First. The problem of insufficient understanding by the command staff of the technical capabilities and specifics of drone use, starting from the tactical level up to senior officers.
2/
“- Crews are not allowed to independently choose positions for operation and are directed by commanding decisions to unfavorable positions, without taking into account the specifics of the terrain.
3/
As Russia increases its production of Shahed (Geran-2) kamikaze UAVs that led to the recent 800 drone raid, Ukrainian interceptor drones are urgently needed.
Missile systems are too expensive, so a cost-effective, very fast, and rapidly produced solution is required. 1/
Standard quadcopters are too slow and lack altitude reach to intercept a Shahed.
They were designed for hovering and flights at low level.
The key design change for interceptors is a fixed wing or hybrid frame that trades hovering for high speed and climb rate. 2/
Both the altitude and speed of Shaheds are challenges.
They cruise between 2–3 km high, at 160–190 km/hr.
An interceptor must be able to reach at least 250 km/hr to achieve an intercept, and acceleration to 300 km/hr to close the distance is preferable. 3/
Israeli-Ukrainian analyst Yigal Levin emphasizes that only Ukraine will ultimately hold the Russians responsible for their deliberate terror attacks on Ukrainian civilians.
“Every morning I read about how Ukrainians have taken out another oil refinery or railway substation… 1/
“…from the Russians in Russia, or hit another headquarters, or a logistics hub.
The fact that these strikes are effective is confirmed by the very Z soldiers howling, as well as objective local control, including factual evidence: …
2/
“…the Russians have started having problems with gasoline.
Just think about it: Russia has problems with gasoline. Iran, is that you? Log in again!
3/
Batteries are the unsung heroes of FPV drones in Ukraine.
Motors and fiber optic control may get more attention, but it’s the chemistry inside lithium packs that sets limits on speed, payload, range, and battlefield effectiveness. 1/
FPVs in Ukraine use lithium-polymer (LiPo) batteries.
They’re lightweight, store a lot of energy for their size, and can discharge at very high rates.
That high “C rating” matters, because driving motors at full throttle demands extreme current in an instant. 2/
At its core, a LiPo battery is made of lithium-ion cells.
Each cell has a graphite anode, a lithium-metal-oxide cathode, and a liquid electrolyte.
When discharging, lithium ions flow from anode → cathode, releasing electrons through the circuit to power the motors. 3/
Russian blogger “Atomic Cherry” argues that much greater Ukrainian organizational flexibility has defeated Russian systems run by Soviet-style thinking.
“Within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, one can clearly see an interesting trend: … 1/
“…the mismatch of competencies of military structures regarding the technologies used on the battlefield. Sounds unclear, right?
2/
“Well, in reality, it is very simple– for example, the Air Force turned out to be extremely incompetent in the war of unmanned systems, although formally the vast majority of the weapons used are aircraft, ie, they correspond to the environment in which the Air Force operates. 3/
Russian nationalist and war critic Igor Girkin (aka Stelkov) writes from his prison cell that Ukraine doesn't need the 18–22 year olds now able to leave the country.
“Ukraine has started allowing men aged 18 to 22 to leave the country; the first conscripts have already left. 1/
“For some reason, everyone here insists on seeing some kind of PR in the enemy's actions and denies the enemy any rationality. We still haven't unlearned ‘throwing hats’ at the enemy,’ ‘laughing’ at Iskanders, and saying that if we want, if we strain ourselves, …
2/
“…we will be in Kyiv and defeat everyone.
Things are completely different. The enemy is smart, cunning, resourceful, ruthless, determined, and resilient. And after three and a half years of war, some propagandists, to put it mildly, have not appreciated or understood this. 3/