Pilot of the aircraft carrying president von der Leyen experienced GPS issues as they approached Plovdiv airport, Bulgaria Sun Aug 31.
Recordings of tower and plane comms are clear.
Transponder reported good GPS-signal and is likely separate from the instrument pilots used.
Half an hour after first reporting GPS-issues the aircraft of von der Leyen is taxiing on Plovdiv airport as the pilot repeats "we had GPS-issues" and thanks the flight controller for the support.
Full recordings with additional comms available at live-atc.net
From this we can derive that the pilot did *experience* GPS/GNSS-issues.
Given the area and years of jamming it is likely to have been caused by the common jamming of area. Other explanations are possible.
Some institutions/people yesterday concluded from the ADS-b data that there were no issues with GPS. In my opinion that was a faulty conclusion taken on a very weak basis.
There were likely several receivers on board and the one our pilot looked at seem to have had issues. Or the pilot made a mistake, we cant say for certain with this. The flight data recorder likely can though =)
It is realistically possible it was a directed attack on v d Leyen but to say that we need more data, unlikely to surface but hopefully looked into by Bulgarian services/military.
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Stockholm-Helsinki ferry SILJA SERENADE made a sharp turn for unknown reasons night between Tu & We. Owner claims weather and collision avoidance. There were damages to loose items.
But there was no other ship on AIS, no sharp turn registered and weather was calm.
Calm weather is substantiated by an anonymous maritime professional witness to YLE.
Heavy jamming? Malfunctions? Dark ship in the way? Submarine? Possible explanations are many but the one from the ferry company seem unfinished.
South Baltic sea is experiencing a newish type of GNSS-jamming. It is affecting units at sea level far and wide, much further than one ground based jammer can reach.
The most intense attack so far took place as the political elite of Denmark and 100k visitors met at Bornholm.
Data for animation above is the signal levels that RINEX stations receive from various GNSS-constellations.
Last year a limited span of frequencies were affected. 2025 all frequencies/bands are affected. BeiDou, not illustrated (noisy).
The Bornholm station is used as example.
Looking per station we can see the geographic and temporal reach.
South-east corner of Baltic is affected (but not all stations!) and with an intensified period right now.
It is also evident that the ongoing 2025 attacks result in a much more degraded signal to noise ratio.
There is an estimated 1 in 10k-100k years chance that all 8 of the Nov 2024 - Jan 2025 Baltic Sea cable breaks are coincidental.
Data is hard to get by but no matter which real data or reasonable assumption one picks it is very unlikely all 8 of them are explained by chance.
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Illustration of a 1 in 108 908 years chance that all 8 of the Nov 2024 - Jan 2025 Baltic Sea cable breaks happens with present background levels. Above is 1 in 10 609 years illustrated.
Two alternative ways of illustrating the extremely low probability of the Baltic Cable breaks being normal. Red dots in each, promise!