Thread by @GrandpaRoy2

Russian blogger “Atomic Cherry” argues that much greater Ukrainian organizational flexibility has defeated Russian systems run by Soviet-style thinking.

“Within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, one can clearly see an interesting trend: …
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“…the mismatch of competencies of military structures regarding the technologies used on the battlefield. Sounds unclear, right?
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“Well, in reality, it is very simple– for example, the Air Force turned out to be extremely incompetent in the war of unmanned systems, although formally the vast majority of the weapons used are aircraft, ie, they correspond to the environment in which the Air Force operates.
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“Or, say, take the naval structures, which turned out to be surprisingly helpless in the naval war, despite the apparent abundance of technical means and resources.
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“This leads to very curious results – the war in complex operational environments begins to be waged by structures that seem to be extremely far from such by their competencies.
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“It is especially interesting to observe this in the example of Ukraine – despite the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are de facto the same fragment of the Soviet system as the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian military bureaucracy has a much…
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“…lower level of systemic influence – it is structurally ‘loose,’ and it has been possible to extract resources, functions, means, and technologies from it in favor of alternative forms and types of organization.
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“(similar processes are happening in Russia, but on a less massive and obvious scale, because the military bureaucracy is much more monolithic and knows how to defend its historical monopoly).
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“This made it possible to form parallel General Staff and Ministry of Defense military-civilian structures–such as the Forces of Unmanned Systems, for example–or to transfer part of the military functions to other power agencies as happened with the Security Service of Ukraine.
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“And interestingly, these rather modest in scale and number parallel structures have become some of the key pillars of Ukrainian defense capability.
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“Why did this happen? The difference in the thinking of the leaders. The difference in the system of organizing combat work, approaches, and goal-setting.
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“For example, look at the units responsible for "deep strike" on Russian territory – the 14th Regiment of the Forces of Unmanned Systems. It is easy to assume that the topic of long-range air attack means is handled by a former Air Force officer, right?
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“But no, the 14th Regiment was organized by an officer...of the Special Operations Forces. A person who has nothing to do with air warfare–but nevertheless ensured very serious results (not only the destruction of oil refineries but also work on Russian military warehouses; ..
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“…regular strikes on fuel echelons – also the work of this unit).

A professional saboteur and infiltration specialist turned out to be more competent, flexible, and understanding of the situation than the ‘classic’ specialists formally trained to operate in this environment.
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And this is a widespread situation on both sides of the front. "Classical military education" turned out to be mostly ineffective, not corresponding to the moment and needs. Trends are set by specialists from more flexible, adaptive structures…
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“…(by the way, about trends: the use of FPV drones in combat originated in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine), by default related to intelligence activities, working with complex data, and non-standard tasks.”
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Source t.me/atomiccherry/8…