Regarding drones entering Poland last night: the event is serious and requires a muscular response, otherwise Russian carelessness and provocations will continue. A brief thread on flight paths+ the behavior of Russia/Belarus since this event and what it reveals /1
Flight path: after the pink line (mine), Gerbera and other drones from two northern routes veer in multiple directions into Poland. Launch routes to the south continue to their targets. /2
This is what typical Russian launch patterns look like lately: drones skim the border of Belarus and drop in sometimes, and often they loop around cities. Compared to last night, the drones got choppy up top and some try to complete a loop but went wide into Poland /3
The next question to address is: do these patterns mean mean deliberate Russian targeting of Poland? Programming error among 2-4 Russian launch sites that cause divergence in or around the same place of their route? or encoutering a jamming nudge from Ukraine? I unpack below:/4
Keeping in mind I don't have the technical data or launch plans: with that caveat in mind - do drone operators have the capacity to deliberately program 1-2 dozen drones to split off from the group? yes. Can they reroute in air, sometimes yes. /5
Are Russian drone planners under pressure with larger and more frequent salvos every night, leading to possibility of mistakes? yes. But mistakes coming from 2-4 different launch sites, and making ~20 mistakes? that becomes less likely unless it's the same central targeteer. /6
What about jamming? one could look at this like i did and consider, ok maybe need consider jamming from Ukraine or Belarus. Ukraine does suppress drones, but do they have the capacity to jam so many in one place, @sambendett ?
(Aside: this is what Ukraine hopes to build this year and next - a wall of jammers.) I hope they have such a capability but i am not yet aware of something so powerful fielded. /8 spectrum.ieee.org/electronic-war…
Belarus forces and Russian forces creating EW friendly fire from inside Belarus seems implausible also, but people do dumb things sometimes, the Belarusian military is not known for high readiness, and preps for Zapad are happening so then we have to look at behaviors: /8
Last night, Belarus contacted Poland and immediately put out two statements, in Russian and English, about this event and how they coordinated with Poland to track. they claim they were drones knocked off track. Moscow at this time was silent./9
Belarus got in front of Moscow on this, and is eager to deflect blame and avoid drawing NATO's heat for this, while they try to manage Russia using their territory for these strikes. I think that Belarus was not prepared for this event. /10
Russian behavior is interesting. Officially they were silent as the grave for hours --suggesting a surprise, and the controlled media and mil bloggers were silent also and they had not received their approved talking points. Silent, for such a serious event? /11
When the Russians did react hours later, first the MOD nonchalantly buried in a social media post "No targets on the territory of Poland were planned for striking" and they remain ready to talk with Poland. This could be admission of mistake, but it is complete carelessness /12
Peskov then referred questions back to the Ministry of Defense, the MFA is denying that these Gerbera drones in Poland are Russian, so the usual bag of tricks. At BEST - it is careless mistake and they don't care. At WORST - its deliberate and they also don't care /13
So, where do I land on the intentionality of it? The picture is a bit confusing. 10-19 drones going off course is not the result of a minor mistake, given they were launched from different locations and diverged in a similar area. would have to be a giant mistake. /14
Was it jamming from Ukraine? Again i hope the Ukrainians can jam that many at one time and place but i'm not aware that they can. Did something happen in Belarus? Technically that seems hard to plot out, but I can't verify. /15
Regardless of combing through it - policy response now must be the same: increased air or air defense vigilance for the next week of ZAPAD, and shifts to consistent monitoring from Poland and other borders of Russia who have experienced this already, AND, /16
The Russians *will not learn* unless NATO shoots down wayward drones. Russian carelessness and provocations will get worse unless this starts getting done. My advice: do it quietly let the actions speak; it is a message that they understand. /17
Moscow's nonchalant nonapology /attitude is unacceptable, and hopefully diplomats behind the scenes are conveying through appropriate channels that this is unacceptable behavior for which there will be consequences and a response for any future behaviors. / 18
I'll update my thinking as more becomes clear in the days ahead. Russia has learned already from this event and others about NATO response capabilities. The choice now is with NATO how to respond. / end
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For the second time, Russia finds itself with few military options to support a critical partner in the Middle East. This thread explains Russia’s military options and limitations for supporting Iran before, during, and after this conflict. /1
Note: this thread doesn't delve into the political balancing Russia engages in across the Middle East, which informs their choices. Here, I address Russian military and defense base capacity and how it shapes options. /2
I didn't expect the Russian military to intervene last minute to head off IDF operations – there was no viable “dash to Tehran” type of scenario here for Russia. And, the cooperation treaty between Russia and Iran has no mutual defense clause. /3
It’s official- the new commander of the Russian ground forces is Mordvichev. Previously op group center commander (Donetsk front & longest in post as op group commander). It signals a few things about the next phase for the Russian army 🧵 /1
Mordvichev’s appointment to Ground Forces commander is a signal that the military intends to integrate experience from the war in Ukraine. This position is responsible for force posture/employment, training, readiness and other roles critical for reconstituting the army. /2
As the most experienced op group commander, he could have been placed into a higher command role as a deputy commander of the special military operation in Rostov, along with other senior generals like Kim or Rudskoi . The choice to put him in the GF role is telling …/3
Russia did not call off a large drone attack last night within ten minutes of the presidents’ call, and 100+ drones were launched last night from 1900 (when call ended) until after midnight Moscow time. We can step through this with basic timelines and calculations. /1
We know Shaheds speeds, launch sites thanks to various monitors, we know general routes, and what time they impacted cities last night. (Older image below for reference). /2
Ukraine said the attacks began at 1900, close to when the call ended, until 0200+. So some Shaheds were probably already airborne by 1800 Moscow time, but Russia continued to launch fresh waves up to 5-6 hours after the call ended. /3
On the operational impact of US aid suspension to Ukraine: frontline stability for the AFU rests on effective drone and artillery use. The timeline below is a gradual degradation and not off/on switch. The suspension will have other problems for soldier morale and operations. /1
Morale: Ukrainian forces are undermanned already, and this problem is unresolved. Desertions, recruiting, soldiers going AWOL for a few weeks to recover, are known problems. Suspension of aid and simultaneous rapprochement with Russia worsens these problems /2
Will to fight: Ukrainian forces continued to fight through wavering US support in 2024 when aid was paused in Congress for over six months. They are tough. Too soon to assess impact of this situation but there are negative potentials here and I will watch closely. /3
Pausing to reflect, I've now worked 20 years in DC. 20 years on the Russian military. 5 U.S. administrations and 4 Russian wars. What a time it has been. A brief thread of gratitude to those I've met on the way. /1
To friends and colleagues from the Pentagon and the shadows: as we said back then, if they made a movie about things we've seen with our own eyes, no one would believe it. Pacing the Pentagon courtyard at dawn and late night, windows all lit up, I was proud to be part of it. /2
To our 🇺🇸servicemen and women that I've met, from our most senior officers to our junior enlisted, it has always been one of my greatest privileges to support you, work with you, study with you, and understand the adventures and sacrifices of a military life. I'm proud of you. /3
There are many rumors that Russia is evacuating its bases at Tartus and Khmeimim in Syria, but most assets remain there. If evacuation happens, it will be obvious. A brief thread on what is happening now and what future moves would look like. 🧵
As of 7 December, most of Russia’s ships are in or near port in Tartus. Follow @KaptainLOMA for updates on their presence.
These ships cannot return to the Black Sea while Turkey has closed the straits under the Montreux Convention so they would have to attempt a very long journey to the Baltic Fleet, or try to find a temporary accommodation nearby at a limited number of ports (Libya, Sudan, Algeria)