Thread by @sfrantzman

What is the end game of Israel's current multi-front war? This is worth considering in the wake of the strike on Hamas in Doha on September 9 and a new round of airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen. In addition Israel continues to operate in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. This is unprecedented in Israel's history to be fighting in so many places for so long.

There is no doubt that when it comes to tactical precision strikes and intelligence gathering that Israel has excellent capabilities. After the massive failure of October 7 Israel has clawed back this perception of being able to operate on multiple fronts at a high tempo.

However, the continues to be an elephant in the room in terms of end game and strategy. The war with Hezbollah was a trickle in 2023-2024 until Israel escalated in Sept-Nov and got a ceasefire. Since then Israel has struck Hezbollah but Hezbollah does not strike Israel. Will that be a "norm" for years?

There are reports that this new "forward" policy is a response to the Oct. 7 failure. The enemies must be always confronted, not allowed to build strength. However, this would seem to commit Israel to multiple fronts for the long term.

In Syria Israel shifted from a Campaign Between the Wars against Iran and Iranian trafficking/proxies; to attacking the new transitional government. Ostensibly the new Shara'a government and Israel had much in common potentially in terms of the region. However, Israel's officials portray him as a potential adversary and have committed to backing the Druze and holding more territory in Syria. This potentially also sets up Israel for a long term low level conflict and commitment inside Syria. It has possibly switched one enemy in Syria for another, rather than for stability and peace.

Then there is Gaza. The Gaza war grinds on with the new campaign aimed at Gaza City. 700 days of war, 900 IDF soldiers killed, 60,000 reservists called up. The IDF tactic now is destroying high-rise buildings. Each one that is destroyed will likely need to be rebuilt. Fantasies about Gazans moving to Egypt or abroad are unlikely to be fulfilled. However, Israeli officials speak about long-term security control in Gaza as well. This means another long-term commitment.

Then there is the West Bank. Talk of annexation may be hollow, but the low level conflict and commitment there also remains. There are more units established to focus on the Jordan border and other threats. Unlike the other fronts, the WB is the one Israel is most familiar with pacifying. If the PA weakens though, it's unclear what comes next.

Then there are the further threats, the 2nd or 3rd circle. The war with the Houthis is tit-for-tat; the Houthis are not giving up, and neither is Israel. They might stop if there is a ceasefire. However, air power along won't likely defeat them, they held out against the Saudi-led Coalition and the US.

Iran is another challenge and potentially militias in Iraq. However, both Tehran and the PMF seem concerned now and may not want to challenge Israel. That doesn't mean Israel, emboldened by the multi-front war, might not seek to continue to challenge them. More "rounds" against Iran are subjects for talk in media.

And now there is Qatar. There is also media chatter about Israel continuing to go after Hamas abroad. However, Doha has shown it has a lot of support. Although the strike has pierced the sense that Hamas can relax in Doha openly, this new potential front is not an easy thread.

The question in all these places is what is the strategy and what is the end game. Israel has never had this level of so many fronts and such a long war in its history. Israel has fought multi-front wars (1967) in the past; and it has had hard wars such as 1948 that dragged on; and it has had long wars in countries against insurgents (Lebanon 1982-2000); however, the current tactic seems to combine all of these, and more.

Israel's economy so far seems to chug along. Israel's defense industry is growing. International condemnation is also growing, but Israel tends to see this as a built-in phenomenon, as in "they will always condemn." The latest war has gone further though. More than 60,000 killed in Gaza, according to the Hamas-run Health Ministry, is an unprecedented number. In the Second Intifada or 2009 wars, more than 1,000 killed was seen as a huge number. The level of destruction in Gaza is immense and unprecedented.

When I've mentioned this level of destruction in Gaza and the need to get to an end game and post-war strategy, some people will say "the destruction in Germany in WWII was large, Mosul, Hue, Hiroshima, etc." However, what all those other wars have in common is that they ended and those places were rebuilt. The battle of Berlin in 1945 was several weeks. Mosul was 10 months. The war in Gaza is 700 days. This is Siege of Leningrad levels of length. And Leningrad was rebuilt.

I don't disagree with voices who say urban battlefields lead to destruction or that enemies hiding in buildings lead to those buildings being destroyed. What I disagree with is the lack of a discussion about what comes next. Yes, the battle of Hue (January 1968 – March 1968) was destructive, but it was eventually over...and then the Vietnam War was over and then it got rebuilt and Vietnam became a thriving country. I've not heard anyone suggest that Gaza will become a thriving country.

German cities were destroyed in the war, but they were rebuilt with aid from the Marshall Plan; except in the East. Are we going to say that Gaza is going to be the equivalent of Soviet-run East Germany? That's not a good model, I don't think. This leaves us with deep questions about the future of Gaza.

Destruction for destruction's sake in war is not a good strategy. Many wars have been fought like this but usually we don't admire them. The policy of the British in the Boer War is not admirable. Neither is the Roman destruction of Carthage or Assad's destruction of his country; or the Russians in Chechnya in the 1990s; I can't think of one example in fact where destruction became the main goal and it is looked upon in a positive light historically. The Gaza war therefore requires questions about the post-war period.

Each time the war is expanded, such as the Doha strikes, it's worth asking if this adds up to a strategy. There is no doubt Doha should not host Hamas. One could argue this strike should have happened long ago. The question is, now that it has happened, will this change the game. If it doesn't then does it set up Israel for yet another front. Another new taboo broken (i.e attacks in the Gulf).

It's plausible that a proverbial hair is pulled from the hat in this war; Hamas gives up, gives into a deal, collapses; and there is suddenly peace; the Houthis stop firing, the guns fall silent in Gaza, the eastern front in Syria comes to some kind of agreement; Hezbollah is disarmed...and all is well...and the Free People's of Middle Earth can go back to the nice days of the Shire again. We'd like a way to wrap this up like stories of old. The question is, will this happen.