Thread by @MichaKobs

#DRONES #POLAND ++
What's going on? A speculation.
I know of two ways to combat drones with electronic warfare.

1) GPS Jamming
A drone relies on GPS data received from satellites. These signals are weak but fairly reliable, as there are always several satellites in sight. ...

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1966915325510742513

Jamming uses a strong local signal to mask the signals from the satellites. The aircraft chooses the strongest signal and suddenly receives data that appears to be in a completely different location or jumps around.

Of course, you quickly realize that the data is nonsense and can take countermeasures, e.g. using GPS sensors that compare the direction of different signals from different directions and suppress the obviously incorrect data.

2) GPS Spoofing
This method is very similar, with the difference that the jammer initially "takes over" the flying object with correct data. Then, the apparent position is gradually shifted further and further from the reality. The flying object doesn't become suspicious ...

...because the data appears to be reasonable.
However, this spoofing can also be counteracted with countermeasures similar to jamming, for example, when data from different directions increasingly diverge from each other.

3) Pokrova
The system is, of course, top secret, but it is known that it centrally controls an entire network of spoofers. This makes it virtually impossible for the drone to compare different signals because the same false signal is coming from different directions.

One can now "accompany" a swarm of drones flying from east to west with the signal, allowing virtually the entire Ukraine to "fly along" with the drone, only at a slightly slower speed. The swarm of drones doesn't notice anything because there is no data to compare.

The drone only appears to be flying against the wind and therefore making slower progress. In reality, it flies much faster, perhaps even with a tailwind, and flies well beyond the target.

The "awakening" comes when the Pokrova shield ends and the drone suddenly finds itself in a completely different location, such as Poland or Belarus. Drones that first enter foreign airspace and then suddenly turn around after 50 km sound very much like "Pokrova victims."

In contrast, it makes no obvious sense to overfly a target by 50 km or 100 km just to approach it from the other side. It exposes the drone to potential air defenses for a long time. Instead, one might make a tight turn if a target is easier to hit from the other side.

And Russian drones are certainly not so disorientated that they would accidentally fly 50 km or 100 km off course while still hitting their target accurately.