For Pakistan, the pact addresses its historical Achilles heel. While Islamabad has maintained a robust indigenous defense posture, backed by nuclear deterrence and a deepening weapons pipeline from China, it has always been vulnerable in two critical areas: energy supply and financial sustainability during prolonged conflict.
Wars are not won by missiles alone, they require sustained logistics, fuel, and liquidity to keep the war economy running under pressure. In the past, external shocks, sanctions, oil price spikes, or financial cut-offs, created a ceiling on Pakistan’s war endurance. With Riyadh’s oil wealth and financial backing formally locked in, that ceiling has been removed.
Pakistan now enjoys an unprecedented warfighting depth: Chinese arms and ammunition on one side, Saudi oil and money on the other. It is an industrial-scale supply chain that neutralizes the constraints India has historically counted on.
For Saudi Arabia, the pact is equally revealing. Riyadh has watched the limitations of U.S. security guarantees with growing unease. The recent incident in which Israeli missiles crossed Saudi airspace to strike Qatar without interception exposed the cracks in U.S. air defense systems stationed in the region.
For a kingdom sitting at the intersection of Gulf trade, oil infrastructure, and potential escalation regionally, this vulnerability is existential.
By binding its defense to Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state with hardened conventional and unconventional warfare experience, Saudi Arabia acquires an ally that does not depend on Washington’s permission slips.
The pact is a hedge against both Israeli encroachment and the unreliability of the American shield.
The political signaling is just as important as the military calculus.
For India, this pact closes the book on any illusions of exhausting Pakistan through drawn-out confrontation. The endurance gap has been plugged.
For Washington, it is a clear rebuke: Gulf monarchies no longer see U.S. guarantees as sufficient on their own and are diversifying their security anchors.
And for China, it is an indirect but significant win: Beijing now operates in a security triangle where its strongest regional partner, Pakistan, has been structurally linked to Riyadh’s defense.
This pact is a structural reconfiguration of deterrence in South Asia and the Gulf, and it signals the emergence of a new strategic corridor, where China supplies the arms, Saudi Arabia supplies the lifeline, and Pakistan acts as the pivot capable of converting both into real warfighting capability.
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Inside accounts show how Hamas in Jerusalem evolved from small student cells into a lattice that linked Gaza and the West Bank. Figures like Muhyiddin al-Sharif and Muhammad Aziz Rushdi sketched the early geometry: educated youth in quarters the occupier deemed “safe,” quietly building the embryo of a military network under the city’s skin.
By 1991-92 the first cells had formed. What began as social circles became organized groups, stretching from Jerusalem into Bethlehem, Hebron, and Khan Younis. Muhyiddin al-Sharif, the movement’s No. 2, framed the theory: Jerusalem’s own sons could wound the occupier from inside its claimed capital. Rushdi became the field executor, carrying responsibility after Sheikh Saleh’s arrest.
Operations followed: the capture of soldiers, the killing of settlers, infiltration of camps. Links ran southward to Gaza, with reciprocal flows of weapons and funds. The meetings with Muhammad Deif (Abu Khaled), who would later embody escalation dominance, fused Gaza’s fire with West Bank initiative. By then six groups were active across Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron.
In the shadow of Israel’s regional war, another front has opened, this one not on the battlefield but in the refugee camps of Lebanon.
Behind closed doors, Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah and Nawaf Salam in Beirut are coordinating with U.S. and Saudi backers to strip Palestinians in Lebanon of their weapons.
Marketed as “reform” and “dialogue,” the initiative is in fact a liquidation project: dismantling the camps’ resistance backbone, coercing families into exile, and erasing the political presence of Palestinians abroad.
The early “disarmament” gestures, rusted rifles from Fatah cells, were symbolic, a soft opening before targeting the only forces that matter: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and camp networks aligned with Hezbollah.
The plan is mapped out in eight steps.
First, a sweeping criminalization campaign: anyone refusing to disarm will be branded a fugitive, hunted inside and outside the camps.
Second, Ramallah-controlled security units will be rebuilt to work with the Lebanese army in joint raids.
Third, camp residents will have their civil and social rights tethered to disarmament, no aid, no schooling, no health care without compliance.
Fourth, non-Palestinians in camps will be expelled under the pretext of “law enforcement,” while Islamic factions listed as terrorists will be directly targeted.
This Jerusalem Post “exclusive” is classic psychological warfare dressed up as revelation.
The claim that “dozens of Mossad women penetrated Iran” during the 12-Day War reads less like intelligence and more like a recycling of orientalist spy-fiction tropes.
By centering female operatives, the narrative borrows from the old Mossad Amazons mythos, seduction, disguise, infiltration, designed to glamorize Mossad’s reach and mask its actual dependence on U.S. coordination and foreign assets.
What the piece admits, buried under theatrics, is that Israel had to deploy hundreds of operatives and manage networks of Iranian dissidents just to enable airstrikes.
Mossad agents were not waltzing through Tehran unscathed; they were propping up a kill-chain reliant on aerial refueling, foreign basing, and informant networks vulnerable to Iranian counterintelligence.
The “female operatives” framing is cover for this wider dependence, turning an operational liability into PR spectacle.
The article also concedes the real failure: despite “destroying” (they didn’t) Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, Israel left untouched over 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, enough feedstock for several warheads if advanced to weapons-grade.
Even Israeli officials are split, with critics acknowledging that Iran could rush enrichment in months. Others admit it would take years to rebuild the bombed infrastructure.
Either way, the West’s immediate concern is access: forcing Iran to admit IAEA inspectors under threat of snapback sanctions.
The Jerusalem Post has confirmed the conviction of a 22-year-old Haredi yeshiva student, Elimelech Stern, for espionage on behalf of Iran. Stern, from Beit Shemesh and belonging to the Vizhnitz Hassidic dynasty, was indicted for conspiring with an Iranian intelligence handler through the encrypted Telegram app.
According to court filings, Stern not only maintained regular contact with his Iranian handler but also executed specific tasks on their behalf. More significantly, he managed to recruit two additional Israelis into the espionage network, expanding the operational scope of Iranian intelligence inside the occupied territories.
This case highlights Tehran’s ability to infiltrate Israeli society through unconventional channels, leveraging ideological, religious, or disenfranchised elements within the Zionist state. The incident is another blow to Israeli counterintelligence credibility, exposing cracks inside its social fabric and showcasing how Iran can tap into deep internal divisions to run assets within the Zionist entity itself.
Egyptian sources reveal that Cairo has issued a direct warning to the Zionist entity against any attempt to target Palestinian leaders present in Egypt. Egyptian intelligence reportedly has concrete information that Israel is planning to strike Palestinian resistance leaders who have been living under Egyptian protection for years.
If true, this is Egypt acknowledging that the Doha strike is part of a broader Zionist decapitation campaign against resistance leadership abroad, and that Cairo could be next on the target list. These leaders are not simply “political figures,” but strategic nodes in the regional resistance architecture, linked to active command-and-support pipelines into Gaza.
Hitting them on Egyptian soil would be an escalation far beyond symbolic politics; it would be a direct attempt to dismantle the operational continuity of the resistance while severing one of Gaza’s key logistical and diplomatic lifelines. Egypt’s public warning is a signal shot, both to Tel Aviv and to allied capitals, that any breach of this sovereignty will not just undermine mediation, it will shift Egypt’s role from neutral broker to a frontline state in the wider regional confrontation.
Even enemy media concedes what Tel Aviv’s censors want buried, the Ramon Airport strike was no isolated mishap, but part of a proven Yemeni pattern from Tel Aviv to Eilat: missile salvos, split warheads, and now a direct drone hit eroding the occupier’s illusion of security.
Maariv warns the hit could cripple the airport’s reputation, spook foreign airlines back out of “Israel,” and force an urgent conscription of resources just to convince them to keep flying in. Even Arkia’s CEO admits the incident will have lasting consequences for the aviation sector.
Channel 14 concedes the Yemenis remain a “continuous challenge” despite months of bombardment and assassinations.
The Ramon hit exposed that even a supposedly low-tech adversary can bypass Israel’s air defense gaps, and that Ansar Allah is now using more complex flight paths to evade detection.