Pressure and Chaosization.
The russian offensive in Donetsk region has become an indicator of how the enemy applies its accumulated experience, compensates for its own weaknesses, and skillfully exploits ours.
Photo: settlement of Zorya, after an airstrike on one of the AFV UAV positions. 1/
For me personally and for our unit, the russian spring push in the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka area coincided in time with a change of unit (though not of sector), style, and structure of work. 2/
A very short pause before re-entering the sector between Myrnohrad and Kostiantynivka—where we had previously worked with mixed success and, in breaks between battles, further west—turned out to be a time of abrupt changes. For the worse. 3/
In a very short period, the russians sharply increased the range of their FPVs along logistical routes, which led to growing losses among all units operating in this direction. In addition, they densely saturated the first echelon with drones, complicating any movement or work in general. 4/
Airstrikes on our positions also focused on knocking out pilots. Logical and expected. We slow their advance and inflict losses. In some areas where the enemy cannot move covertly, one could practically map the bodies of occupiers destroyed by SOU drone operators. 5/
This text is an attempt at interim conclusions and personal reflections. I already described in earlier pieces the short prehistory of the current situation and how the enemy broke through our defenses near Vozdvyzhenka. 6/
Let’s move directly to the results. In this zone, the russians entered complex terrain. In some areas, the use of vehicles turned out to be nearly impossible. This refers to the Koptyeve area and the territory adjacent to the Kazennyi Torets River, western bank. 7/
Here, the enemy pushed forward with infantry. Only after seizing significant territory on the western bank of the river did they begin pulling artillery into the Koptyeve area. Armor operates around Malynivka or Yablunivka. This is still a risky move, which in most cases ends in losses.
For example, the other day in the Malynivka area, the enemy made two armored attempts within an hour. Both burned. 8/
Behind the enemy infantry, their drone pilots follow, creating major problems. This is one of the key issues: countering their pilots. The crisis in the sector escalated as the enemy turned the tactic of slipping behind our lines into mass practice, sowing chaos in the defense. 9/
As I wrote earlier, now limited resources are also spent working inside our own positions. This concerns both drones and the use of infantry units for search and clearing. With wide enough “gates” for slipping into the breakthrough zone and the ability to partially suppress our assets, the enemy can continue creating problems west of the Kazennyi Torets for quite a long time. 10/
By the way, about this. The information space exploded when the enemy appeared in the Zolotyi Kolodiaz area. Sensing progress, the enemy threw in more and more units. All according to the book. And we got what we got. 11/
What DeepState maps show in this direction… let’s just say, I have no idea how one could map what was actually happening here. In some places you needed eyes and ears on the back of your head. Though we are more or less adapting to this tactic. Still, the systemic nature of their attempts to “chaoticize” our defense is very visible. 12/
Since the “Zolotyi Kolodiaz bombshell,” many events have followed—attempts at stabilization, our countermoves on this very uncomfortable board, and so on. Here it makes sense to return to the ground configuration, so to speak. For such progress, in June–July, the Russians needed to: 13/
• Capture the fortified area around the village of Koptyeve. For those who began following the situation only when it became very difficult, this might be news—but the battles there were fierce. The enemy succeeded.
• Secure a reliable crossing point over the river, namely Razine. Here, the enemy set up crossings through which infantry is mass-transferred. This was the path toward Rodynske and the Stakhanov mine.
• Capture Novotoretske as a blocking line against our actions from the north and as another river crossing to secure Razine and provide space for further deployment. For the same purpose, they would also need to take Shakhove–Volodymyrivka. 14/
Firm control of Razine, Novotoretske, and previously Koptyeve gave the Russians options and opportunities. Meanwhile, we continue to suffer from the same problems, month after month, year after year. 15/
Tactically, this is also a hint for us. Taking these key points would nearly cut off the russian breakthrough—at least regarding holding Rodynske and Dobropillia. The only question is whether we have the capabilities. That’s another topic. 16/
AFU made countermoves, now the russians are making theirs. The question is not only what they will be, but where. I think the matter now stands such that they are doing this in several places. Here as well. A counterstep. 17/
They will do everything to avoid being pushed too far back from Zolotyi Kolodiaz. I think they still hope that, beyond the prize of the Pokrovsk agglomeration, they might break through the new defensive line westward into the rear of Kramatorsk. And Dobropillia, as a staging base, is also highly valuable. 18/
They have many options simultaneously.
Will we have something to oppose them with? Or do we just need to avoid a critical collapse and buy time until the bloodthirsty gas station runs out of fuel—it’s hard for me to judge. I have little optimism. When it’s necessary, the butchers will come for you on foot. 19/
One thing can be said for certain: if we don’t decisively solve the problem of enemy pilots and EW—with all these Rubicons and other undoubtedly serious players—our problems will only continue to grow. This understanding is gradually spreading. We’ll see if what could be an effective solution spreads as well. 20/
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Натиск і хаосизація.
російський наступ в Донецькій області став показником того, як противник втілює накопичений досвід, компенсує власні проблеми та вдало використовує наші.
Фото: н.п. Зоря, декілька діб після авіаудару по одній з позицій БПЛА СОУ. 1/
Особисто для мене і нашого підрозділу весняний ривок росіян в районі Покровська-Костянтинівки збігся в часі зі зміною підрозділу (але не сектору), стилю та побудови роботи тощо. 2/
Дуже коротка пауза перед повторним заходом у сектор між Мирноградом і Костянтинівкою, де ми до цього працювали з перемінним успіхом і у перервах між боями західніше, виявилася часом різких змін. На гірше. 3/
One of the biggest mistakes made by those who cover the topic of the tussian–Ukrainian war is the attempt to squeeze the issue into narrow content and time frames. Focusing exclusively on what preceded the full-scale war a few weeks or months before, and on what happened after the invasion, while refusing to examine deeper preconditions, leads to the oversimplification of any material.
Of course, limiting research to the period of Ukraine’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union creates a similar trap. Still, it allows one to broaden the perspective and demonstrate how primitive many theses are, and how easily people fall for russia’s semantic tricks. So, let me talk about how the russians tried to pressure Ukraine after it gained independence and up until they were ready to start the war.
Already in 1992, the president of the so-called russia, Yeltsin, signed a decree transferring the entire Black Sea Fleet under russian jurisdiction, including the part stationed in Ukraine and under Ukrainian jurisdiction.
Yeltsin’s vice president, Rutskoy, declared that Ukraine was a “temporarily lost territory.” Moreover, he visited Ukraine and publicly called for the annexation of Crimea back then. Regarding both events, the Ukrainian parliament issued a statement in April 1992: zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2267…
1/
Thus, practically right after the proclamation of independence, and also after the referendum on December 1, 1991, at which Ukrainians firmly chose to restore our statehood, the tussians actively began interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs and attacking its sovereignty, questioning territorial integrity and calling for the annexation of Ukrainian lands.
Of course, at that time there was no talk of NATO in Ukraine, which today the Kremlin cites as a pretext for its attack. Ukrainian statehood was still in its formative stage, with many issues that needed resolution.
By the way, Rutskoy – an honorary citizen of Kursk – supported russia’s attacks on Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022. Consistent, like the entire russian elite, in seeking Ukraine’s destruction. He threatened to revise Ukraine’s borders by force on August 28, 1991 – just days after the Act of Proclamation of Independence of Ukraine.
And to make it clear that this was not political freelancing by a former Su-25 pilot, two days earlier, on August 26, 1991 – just two days after Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Act of Proclamation of Independence – Voshchanov, the press secretary of President Yeltsin, announced russia’s official position regarding relations with “union republics”: “The RSFSR reserves the right to raise the issue of border revision.” 2/
On May 21, 1992, the Supreme Council of the russian federation passed a resolution canceling the 1954 act of transferring Crimea to Ukraine and demanded that the “issue of Crimea be resolved through intergovernmental negotiations between russia and Ukraine, with the participation of Crimea and based on the will of its people.” The Soviet Union no longer existed, and legally this document was an example of interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs within its internationally recognized borders.
On July 9, 1993, the russian parliament adopted a resolution “On the Status of the City of Sevastopol,” recognizing it as part of russia. On August 23, deputies of the Sevastopol City Council voted for the city’s russian status. On December 5, 1996, the Federation Council declared that Ukraine “contrary to objective reality does not wish to discuss in negotiations the issue of the russian status of Sevastopol.”
Thus, legally, as early as 1993 russia had annexed part of Ukrainian territory within its own legislation – simply without carrying out a military occupation as it would in 2014. In 1992, an active “oath war” was underway in Crimea within the Black Sea Fleet. The russians did everything to push Ukrainians out of the fleet and gain de facto control over it. They forcefully seized ships and administrative buildings, expelling those who had sworn allegiance to Ukraine from the barracks.
On July 21, 1992, russians opened fire and tried to ram the SKR-112 ship, which was sailing under the Ukrainian flag toward Odesa. The agreement that the countries eventually signed merely formalized what russia had already seized by force. More than 80% of ships and assets remained in Russian hands. The russian fleet stayed in Sevastopol and always served as a tool of pressure on Ukraine. 3/
Тема "обміну територіями" (насправді спроби змусити віддати ще частину української землі росіянам) виникла звісно недарма. хуйло звіно дуже хотів би отримати дві агломерації в Донецькій області без бою. 1/
Попри всі наші нинішні проблеми, про які тут не пише тільки лінивий або мертвий, захопленя Покровської і Краматорської агломерацій обійдеться росіянам значними втратами. В тому числі під посилення тиску противник, як сказав ВГК, перекидає частини з Курщини. 2/
Звісно ніхто добровільно не віддасть жодного метра. Як би цього хто не вимагав. Як би сильно трамп і компанія не викручували б Україні руки. Це буде постріл собі в обидві ноги, або і в голову. Натуральне самогубство. Все це москалям доведеться взяти з боєм. 3/
It's no secret to anyone that the russians aim to gain an advantage on the left flank of the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad defensive line. After managing to push forward in the Koptieve area and crossing the Kazennyi Torets near Razine, they began expanding their breakthrough, attempting to capture Shakhove and Rodynske. 1/
If you look at the image (link) above, the road between Novyi Shakhove and Shakhove is marked in red. The russians need to take control of it to facilitate the capture of Shakhove. The road is located on higher ground above the village itself. I also marked in red the section of the railway from Rodynske, which leads to both Dobropillia and Novodonetske. 2/
To establish firm control over this area, they need to take over the railway station at Dorozhne. The yellow arrows indicate the possible logic of their attempts to advance—not a certainty. From Dorozhne, they may launch their usual motorcycle assaults toward Bilytske. 3/
Загалом ні для кого не секрет що росіяни хочуть зробити на лівому фланзі оборони Покровська-Мирнограда. Змігши прорватися далі в районі Котлиного, пересікши Казений Торець в районі Разіного, вони почали розрювати свій прорив, намагаючись захопити Шахове і Родинське. 1/
Якщо повидитесь на картинку вище, то там червоним кольором позначені дорога між Новим Шаховим і Шаховим. Її москалі мають захопити щоб полегшити захоплення Шахового. Дорога знаходиться на висоті над самим селом. Також червоним підсвітив ділянку залізниці від Родинського, яка веде і до Добропіллля і до Новодонецького. 2/
Для міцного контролю над ділянкою їм треба взяти під контроль залізничну станцію Дорожнє. Жовті стрілочки - можлива логіка спроб просування. Не константа. З Дорожнього можливо буде організувати їхні улюблені штурми на мотоциклах в напрямку Білицького. 3/
Meanwhile, the russians continue their offensive, attempting to capture Rodynske and encircle Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad. At this point, we are no longer dealing with mere pressure, but with deliberate attempts to throw our defense into chaos. 1/
The enemy continues to push forward with superior infantry numbers, whose task is not just to advance but to increasingly fragment our defense and make it less dense. It's no longer just about pushing our forces out of their positions. 2/
The enemy is deliberately trying to push its infantry deeper in. Wherever there's a chance to bypass our positions and infiltrate as far into the rear as possible, they take it. This creates a situation where fighting sometimes takes place beyond the front line — during our own movements — because we now know the enemy may be encountered deep behind our positions. 3/