He gave the occupier exactly what they wanted: validation from the so-called left that Hamas is beyond negotiation and that the only acceptable framework is Israel’s endless war.
Bernie Sanders is not a friend of Palestine, he is the reliable mouthpiece of Zionist framing dressed in progressive language.
Every statement he makes begins by spitting on Hamas, branding them as the irredeemable “terrorists” so that his audience can applaud his supposed “courage” while nodding along to the occupier’s script.
He plays the part of the left mask of empire: a Zionist clown who borrows the vocabulary of justice while defaming the only resistance that actually fights on the ground.
His function is clear, he launders Israel’s narrative into progressive spaces, repackaging it in terms palatable to liberals who want to feel moral without ever confronting the state machinery of genocide.
Sanders gives them the illusion of opposing slaughter while keeping their loyalty firmly tied to the Zionist project.
What gets paraded as solidarity is, in practice, sabotage. His words don’t challenge the system, they stabilize it.
They provide comfort to audiences who want to condemn genocide abstractly while refusing to support the resistance that prevents Palestine from being erased.
That is his true role: the gatekeeper who keeps liberal outrage safe for Israel.
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What the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics just confirmed is more devastating than any battlefield headline: the Zionist project is bleeding from the inside.
In 2024 alone, 82,000 Israelis packed up and left, while only 31,000 came in. Migration is the euphemism; evacuation is the reality, masked by documents and forms.
The trend isn’t new, 55,000 departures against 27,000 arrivals in 2023 already signaled the crack. But the Gaza war, Tel Aviv under Yemeni ballistic fire, collapsing markets, and the total absence of political legitimacy have turned that trickle into a flood.
Zionist propaganda used to sell the dream of “aliyah”; now, the numbers show the reality of yerida, mass departure.
The economy is suffocating under war costs. Political divisions are ripping through the ruling class. Social cohesion is eroding under the pressure of conscription, casualties, and visible international isolation.
Israelis are voting with their passports: the occupation is no longer sustainable, and the settler-colonial experiment is becoming what it always was, temporary scaffolding on stolen land.
The Saudi-Pakistan compact was the patch that removed a single-point failure; a second wave of Arab signatures turns that fix into an operating system. The control plane moves off U.S.-Israel’s permission stack and onto a sovereign grid where Arab treasuries and airspaces are callable resources Pakistan can task, with Chinese arsenals and sensors supplying depth.
When multiple Gulf courts underwrite Pakistan on term, deposits, swap lines, insured letters of credit, oil on structured swaps, the war budget stops breathing through Washington. Liquidity ceases to be a choke and becomes duration on tap: predictable import cover, stable rupee, funded surge orders, and fuel uplift that doesn’t spike with headlines. Remittances become signal, not noise, directed flows that reinforce reserves during pressure windows.
If the Saudi clause, aggression on one triggers both, propagates, Arab corridors graduate from permissive transit to treaty-bound shield. That anchors PAF forward detachments, shared early-warning tapes, GBAD drills, AEW rotations, and rules of engagement that don’t wait for an American key turn. Israeli overflight, once assumed, becomes contested across policy, radar, and narrative, all under a picture Pakistan helps compile.
For Pakistan, the pact addresses its historical Achilles heel. While Islamabad has maintained a robust indigenous defense posture, backed by nuclear deterrence and a deepening weapons pipeline from China, it has always been vulnerable in two critical areas: energy supply and financial sustainability during prolonged conflict.
Wars are not won by missiles alone, they require sustained logistics, fuel, and liquidity to keep the war economy running under pressure. In the past, external shocks, sanctions, oil price spikes, or financial cut-offs, created a ceiling on Pakistan’s war endurance. With Riyadh’s oil wealth and financial backing formally locked in, that ceiling has been removed.
Pakistan now enjoys an unprecedented warfighting depth: Chinese arms and ammunition on one side, Saudi oil and money on the other. It is an industrial-scale supply chain that neutralizes the constraints India has historically counted on.
Inside accounts show how Hamas in Jerusalem evolved from small student cells into a lattice that linked Gaza and the West Bank. Figures like Muhyiddin al-Sharif and Muhammad Aziz Rushdi sketched the early geometry: educated youth in quarters the occupier deemed “safe,” quietly building the embryo of a military network under the city’s skin.
By 1991-92 the first cells had formed. What began as social circles became organized groups, stretching from Jerusalem into Bethlehem, Hebron, and Khan Younis. Muhyiddin al-Sharif, the movement’s No. 2, framed the theory: Jerusalem’s own sons could wound the occupier from inside its claimed capital. Rushdi became the field executor, carrying responsibility after Sheikh Saleh’s arrest.
Operations followed: the capture of soldiers, the killing of settlers, infiltration of camps. Links ran southward to Gaza, with reciprocal flows of weapons and funds. The meetings with Muhammad Deif (Abu Khaled), who would later embody escalation dominance, fused Gaza’s fire with West Bank initiative. By then six groups were active across Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron.
In the shadow of Israel’s regional war, another front has opened, this one not on the battlefield but in the refugee camps of Lebanon.
Behind closed doors, Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah and Nawaf Salam in Beirut are coordinating with U.S. and Saudi backers to strip Palestinians in Lebanon of their weapons.
Marketed as “reform” and “dialogue,” the initiative is in fact a liquidation project: dismantling the camps’ resistance backbone, coercing families into exile, and erasing the political presence of Palestinians abroad.
The early “disarmament” gestures, rusted rifles from Fatah cells, were symbolic, a soft opening before targeting the only forces that matter: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and camp networks aligned with Hezbollah.
The plan is mapped out in eight steps.
First, a sweeping criminalization campaign: anyone refusing to disarm will be branded a fugitive, hunted inside and outside the camps.
Second, Ramallah-controlled security units will be rebuilt to work with the Lebanese army in joint raids.
Third, camp residents will have their civil and social rights tethered to disarmament, no aid, no schooling, no health care without compliance.
Fourth, non-Palestinians in camps will be expelled under the pretext of “law enforcement,” while Islamic factions listed as terrorists will be directly targeted.
This Jerusalem Post “exclusive” is classic psychological warfare dressed up as revelation.
The claim that “dozens of Mossad women penetrated Iran” during the 12-Day War reads less like intelligence and more like a recycling of orientalist spy-fiction tropes.
By centering female operatives, the narrative borrows from the old Mossad Amazons mythos, seduction, disguise, infiltration, designed to glamorize Mossad’s reach and mask its actual dependence on U.S. coordination and foreign assets.
What the piece admits, buried under theatrics, is that Israel had to deploy hundreds of operatives and manage networks of Iranian dissidents just to enable airstrikes.
Mossad agents were not waltzing through Tehran unscathed; they were propping up a kill-chain reliant on aerial refueling, foreign basing, and informant networks vulnerable to Iranian counterintelligence.
The “female operatives” framing is cover for this wider dependence, turning an operational liability into PR spectacle.
The article also concedes the real failure: despite “destroying” (they didn’t) Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, Israel left untouched over 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, enough feedstock for several warheads if advanced to weapons-grade.
Even Israeli officials are split, with critics acknowledging that Iran could rush enrichment in months. Others admit it would take years to rebuild the bombed infrastructure.
Either way, the West’s immediate concern is access: forcing Iran to admit IAEA inspectors under threat of snapback sanctions.