Thread by @ChrisO_wiki

1/ A critical commentary from a Russian soldier about Ukrainian dominance in drone warfare has reportedly (and unsurprisingly) resulted in retaliation against him. Russian warbloggers have nonetheless defiantly pointed out more Russian deficiencies. ⬇️

2/ The commentary by a soldier with the callsign 'Hades' has prompted much discussion from Russian warbloggers. He provided an unusually frank assessment of how Ukrainian drones have stalled Russia's efforts to advance in several directions.

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1965902150749532391

3/ However, according to warblogger Andrey Filatov, it has resulted in predictable relaliation from "thick-headed security guards". "Only a degenerate in uniform could have been offended and started throwing a tantrum."

4/ "And judging by some information, that's exactly what happened..."

'Yasinovataya, Donbass on the front line' see this as symptomatic of official attitudes towards constructive criticism:

5/ "The system lulls itself and its leadership into complacency, ignoring reality, which leads to strategic losses. Filatov calls for professional dialogue and an end to simulation.

6/ "The system in its current form prefers the comfort of illusions—it prefers to hear confirmation of its own rightness than to accept facts that require a reconsideration of approaches and an acknowledgement of mistakes.

7/ "A direct look at reality requires professionalism, responsibility, and a willingness to change—and this conflicts with the interests of those integrated into the vertical for status, not results.

8/ "When real fighters, developers, or analysts voice inconvenient truths, the system's reaction is often defensive rather than constructive: suppression instead of analysis, discreditation instead of dialogue. This is not a sign of strength, but a symptom of managerial weakness.

9/ "If the system were focused on victory, it would seek the truth in every report, not flattery in every comment."

'Yasinovataya' provides a systematic analysis of Russia's problems with its use of drones:

10/ "The defeat in the UAV sector, despite quantitative saturation, is the result of several systemic factors. Filatov points this out directly: there are many drones, but the enemy has tactical and operational superiority.

11/ "The key reasons, confirmed not only by his text but also by the entirety of observations of the Special Military Operation, are:

12/ 📌 1. Tactical weaknesses in use

- Drones are used without a clear understanding of their role in conjunction with other assets.

- The enemy's FPV drones are integrated into tactical schemes: reconnaissance, suppression, and finishing.

13/ - Our side often employs them in a fragmented manner, without coordination or analysis of the results.

14/ 📌 2. Lack of rapid adoption of advanced methods.

- The enemy quickly adapts tactics to new conditions: changing routes, camouflaging equipment, using decoys.

- Our system is slow to respond to changes, often continuing to use outdated schemes.

15/ 📌 3. Problems with management and initiative

- Initiative groups and developers in Russia face bureaucracy, a lack of support, and sometimes even outright resistance.

16/ - Our opponents, especially in the volunteer and private sectors, act flexibly: quickly testing, implementing, and scaling.

17/ 📌 4. Communication and control quality

- The enemy has a better-organized digital infrastructure: secure channels, precise navigation, and integration with combat systems.

- Russian units often suffer from communication outages and the lack of a unified UAV control system.

18/ 📌 5. Command Psychology

- The enemy is quicker to admit mistakes and adjust their approach.

- Our system is prone to complacency, ignoring criticism, and suppressing inconvenient voices—as Filatov points out, this leads to a loss of touch with reality.

19/ 📌 6. Logistics and Supply

- The enemy has an established supply chain for components, including civilian solutions.

We have supply chain interruptions, dependence on a limited number of suppliers, and a lack of systemic support at the Ministry of Defense level.

20/ 📌 7. Feedback and Training

- The enemy actively trains operators, collects data, and analyzes performance.

- Our system has weak feedback, a lack of centralized analysis, and insufficient operator training.

21/ "Conclusion:

The deficit lies not in the number of drones, but in the inability to transform them into a tool for systemic superiority. The enemy operates as a flexible, adaptive network.

22/ "Our side operates as an inertial vertical, where even obvious solutions are drowned in managerial viscousness. This is precisely what Filatov notes: drones exist, but they don't bring victories because the system doesn't know how to use them." /end

Sources:
🔹 t.me/filatovcorr/57…
🔹 t.me/DonbassYasinov…