The Argentine's are pushing for a direct loan (which risks being a bailout for an unsustainable policy regime ... ) from the United States through the Exchange Stabilization Fund
But I suspect the question of what more the IMF can do will also come up ...
1/
The Fund has only lent out about a quarter of its quota resources, so it has the funds ...
2/
The issue is one of balance sheet concentration -- Argentina is getting close to being about 1/2 of all outstanding non concessional Fund credit ...
3/
As a share of Argentina's GDP, Fund exposure is large -- but it could be raised in extremis ... (note GDP is now inflated by the overvalued peso)
4/
The real issue isn't a balance sheet one (imo) it is a policy one -- namely does it make sense to double down on the current policy framework (including a defense of the peso at the edge of the band that could deplete Argentina's limited reserves) or not ...
5/
My vote is no -- it doesn't make sense to double down on the current program.
But that is the key call.
There are all policy options here (a broader band so more peso depreciation, a bond debt reprofiling, etc)
6/
and my personal view is that the peso is still significantly overvalued (last data point in chart is end June) for a country with Argentina's mix of external debt (a lot) and reserves (not many)
7/7
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
My actual concern -- a concern that is global -- is that China's unbalanced domestic economy has contributed to an incredibly unbalanced pattern of global trade.
China has a great deal of agency. It chooses to have its state banks intervene to hold its currency down v the USD. It has chosen to maintain a regressive tax system (with heavy taxes on low wage work and consumption) and to limit redistribution and social benefits
2/
I do wonder what parts of my actual policy recommendations Dr. Hauge objects to -- the increase in Chinese social spending? an increase in income tax collections? more central government domestic spending and less state bank fx intervention?
US imports are on track to be up modestly for the year
(with strong electronics imports driven by the AI boom and the tariff exclusion for chips offsetting weakness in vehicle trade)
2/
Set aside the craziness in pharmaceuticals and gold -- which drove enormous volatility in the reported trade balance in both q1 and q2 -- and the monthly trade data looks surprisingly normal
Probably time for China to try a different strategy
The IMF article IV is due this fall. Shouldn't the IMF be recommending that the central government use its obvious fiscal space to directly support household spending?
1/
The FT stated the obvious "Beijing has relied on exports in recent years to meet its ambitious annual growth targets" - the IMF should too ...
The IMF staff, in an excellent 2023 working paper, found that the central government doesn't really have any net debt (unlike some of the more indebted local governments). Time for the IMF to start reflecting those findings in its policy advice ...
A chart that I always find interesting -- global reserves v Treasury notes and bonds (reserve managers generally don't buy bills) as a share of US GDP
Period between 03 and 08 notable for reserve growth w-o // increase in supply of US classic reserve assets
1/
Always striking to me that there is a lot more talk about the dollar as a reserve currency now, when the impact of reserve holdings on markets is waning, than there was talk of the market impact massive reserve growth back when it was happening
2/
A similar chart for the euro area -- there haven't been enough euro area securities to meet all global reserve demand since 2006!
Not a fan of most of the Miran paper (and the Treasury restructuring proposals), but also not a fan of Employ America's claim that dollar strength doesn't impact the US manufacturing sector
This argument in particular has two particular problems --
a) it ignores lags, and treats 02 to 08 as one period of dollar weakness
b) it doesn't look at petrol and non-petrol trade
2/
In reality, dollar strength impacts trade flows with long lags (8 to 12qs on exports is standard), so the dollar's exceptional strength in 2000 and 01 and still relatively strong levels in 02 and 03 were weighing on exports for some time (see graph)
Set aside politics for a moment (which no one in Argentina ever does) and focus on the numbers. Milei's core problem is that fiscal adjustment hasn't generated balance of payments adjustment. Net out IMF lending and Argentina has been burning through its reserves
1/
and set aside funds borrowed from the IMF and SDR conversion -- even so Argentina's net fx reserves are flat (data through July). And ~ half of that fx more or less is CNY from the PBOC swap line which isn't freely convertible into USD ...
2/
A strong harvest (plus Chinese buying as China isn't buying from the US) actually brought the current account deficit down this summer -- but those inflows aren't expected to last, and the real problem is that there is once again a deficit ...