David Fishman Profile picture
Sep 22 13 tweets 6 min read Read on X
A fun thing about Chinese rivers I learned from my research last week:

This map shows the ancient courses of the Yellow River (in blue) and the now-disappeared Ji River (in red). The upper blue line the Yellow route during the Western Han. The lower is its modern path. 🧵 Image
Actually, the Western Han route of the Yellow is one of the MANY known routes it has taken over the last 2000 years, as you can see from this image.

From 1128-1855, the Yellow spent 700+ years flowing in an entirely different direction - southeast. During that period, it merged with the Huai River near modern-day Huai'an in Jiangsu, and then traveled northeast again to dump into the ocean. The silt deposits around its estuary pushed the coastline out dozens of kilometers over those 700 years.Image
That lake system you can see at the bottom of the map above didn't exist at the time. That's Hongze Lake 洪泽湖 (literally: "flood marsh lake") which formed because after the Yellow River's course changed in 1855, the Huai River, lacking the volume of water the Yellow had previously provided, silted up itself, lost its exit to the ocean, formed Hongze Lake, and ended up finding a new outlet connecting south to the Yangtze near Yangzhou, turning the Huai River into a Yangtze tributary, rather then a Yellow tributary.

The Huai only regained its outlet to the ocean in the 1950s when the PRC built the North Jiangsu Main Irrigation Canal.Image
When the Yellow's 1855 floods happened, it burst its banks in eastern Kaifeng (Henan) and the new route sent it northeast once again into Shandong, overtaking and subsuming portions of both the Daqing River 大清河 and the Ji River 济水.

That's why the map in the first tweet shows the modern Yellow River route only overlapping with a portion of the ancient Ji River route; it some cases it now follows the route of other rivers from the time.

A major downstream portion of the ancient Ji River route is still a flowing waterway today: the Xiaoqing River 小清河 (in red on the map here), which flows east of Jinan parallel to the Yellow River and drains all the smaller rivers to its south in central Shandong. It enters the Bohai Sea independently, south of the Yellow River.Image
But none of those tidbits are the real thing I think it's funny about the Ji River; actually it's this:

Every map of the Ji River (in red) shows it CROSSING the Yellow River, upstream near Wen County in modern Jiaozuo City. For every Yellow River route.

This is impossible. Image
Rivers can't cross each other - they aren't like highway overpasses! They flow into each other. Thus, if you see such a scenario descrived as a "crossing", one is a tributary, and subsequently a new river (a distributary) is formed on the other side.

But ancient Chinese texts are quite insistent on this matter: the Ji River CROSSES the Yellow River, from north to south. It's even baked into the name: the 济 River, or the "crossing river". So whatever distributary was being formed on the other side, the ancient Chinese believed it was still the Ji River.

Now, keep in mind, the Ji River, flowing down from Wangwu Mountain in modern Jiyuan (literally: "source of the Ji") was fed by groundwater springs and rainfall, so would have been a clear stream. Meanwhile, the Yellow River is famously silty, carrying loess plateau sediment from upstream.

This means that the new distributary formed on the south side of the river also likely would have had to have clear water, for this vision of the Ji River's "crossing" to make sense at all. And they definitely belived the river that flowed into Shandong was still the Ji (e.g., Jinan City, “south of the Ji”).
The original Water Classic《水经》written durring the Three Kingdoms period (220-280 CE) doesn't mention the existence of the Ji River on the south bank of the Yellow River at all. It only says the Yan River (沇水) which was the name for the upstream portion of the Ji River, north of the Yellow, flows into the Yellow River.
"济水出河东垣县东王屋山,为沇水"

It was written during a period when the "downstream" section of the Ji River had indeed dried up, and so there was no river on the south side to describe.

But Li Daoyuan, in his Commentary on the Water Classic 《水经注》written sometime in the early 6th century, feels the need to remind his readers that the Ji River enters the Yellow and then exits the Yellow, i.e. "crosses":

"与河合流,又东过成臯县北,又东过荥阳县北,又东至砾溪南,东出过荥泽北"

"After confluence with the Yellow River, it flows eastward past northern Chenggao County, eastward past the northern Xingyang County, then eastward to the south of Li Stream (砾溪), and finally flows out eastward passing north of Xingze Marsh (荥泽).
He follows this with some notes from other ancient texts to back up his assertion:

《释名》曰:济,济也,源出河,北济河而南也。

​​"In The Explanation of Names it says: Ji means "to cross". Its source is from the Yellow. It traverses north of the Yellow and then goes south."

as well as:

《晋地道志》曰:济自大伾入河,与河水斗,南泆为荥泽。

"The Jin Dynasty Treatise on Geography says: 'The Ji River enters the Yellow at Dapi Mountain; it struggles with Yellow River, and breaks out southward to form the Xingze Marsh."
The Xingze Marsh 荥泽 mentioned here no longer exists, but would have been on the south bank of the Yellow River near modern-day Xingyang City 荥阳市 west of Zhengzhou.

荥泽 is still mentioned all over Xingyang, though, for example Xingze Boulevard and Xingze Hotel. Image
So, since Li Daoyuan was certain the Ji River crosses the Yellow River, the mapping convention from then on was to show them crossing.

As for what was actually happening here, there are two plausible explanations for how a clear Ji River "crossed" the Yellow.
1. The "Ji River" on the north bank was a different river emerging from Xingze Marsh, fed by groundwater springs.

2. The stillness of the Yellow's Xingze Marsh allowed the silt to settle in some parts, with a clear river stream exiting, which was seen as the Ji River.
Some combination of the two is possible too of course.

But this would explain the compelling visual phenomenon of a clear water river entering the silty Yellow River and then, further downstream, another clear water river exiting via the Xingze Marsh.
Anyway...this was just another fun fact a I picked up from my essay esearch last week.

I actually have enough fun facts to make a whole China Rivers - themed quiz and post it on Sporcle. Maybe I'll do that later...

Here's the essay if you missed it:
feelingthestones.com/p/whats-the-we…

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More from @pretentiouswhat

Sep 20
Involution 内卷 or 卷 doesn't have to be a hard word, but I keep seeing it misused in China commentary, e.g. this article, which I also have mixed feedback on.

Simply: Involution is the state of intense competition AND the symptoms of that competition.🧵
csis.org/blogs/trustee-…
Quick history lesson:

内卷 (nei juan) is the original word for involution used today to describe a state of intense and fruitless competition. It literally translates as "inward coiling" and was borrowed from the anthropology field.

It began to see its new use in China around 2019-2020, initially as a noun. Students and young people feeling exhausted by intense competition in school, for jobs, and society in general described those environments as having 内卷.
The key point is the competition. So in 2020 you'd see usages like "job market involution" (职场内卷)" society involution" (社会内卷).

But the full word is less common these days vs. the slangier word for involution, which sees the "内” portion dropped in favor of just "卷". Image
Read 13 tweets
Sep 9
China's National Computing+Energy Strategy:

This is the layout for China's national computing strategy. Under the "East Data, West-Computer" 东数西算 slogan, high-priority tasks are handled by local clusters, while lower-priority tasks are outsourced to the energy-rich west.🧵 Image
According to China's renewable consumption quota policy, all new data centers in these hub regions must buy at least 80% of their power from renewable sources.

This should be no problem for the blue hubs, located in renewables-rich regions. Might be trickier for red hubs.
Local municipalities might have their own, even more stringent requirements. Ningxia, for instance, requires new data centers be 100% green.

Good news for wind and solar developers, looking for a new offtake channel now that the FiTs are gone. No relief for coal power.
Read 6 tweets
Sep 5
Oh no...🤦‍♂️

This op-ed on Chinese cleantech overcapacity and competition was in The Wire China a few days ago. Unfortunately it contains many huge errors about Chinese cleantech sectors I can't ignore.

Paywalled. I'll provide screenshots and comment. 🧵
thewirechina.com/2025/08/31/bei…
[Oh, and this will be another long thread. It probably should have been a long-form essay instead, but I already wrote more than half of it before I realized how long it had gotten. Sorry in advance.]

This piece has problems immediately in the second paragraph, starting with:

"China's domestic demand for green tech has also peaked given the massive frontloading of installed capacity during the last few years, fueled by subsidies."

This has two big errors:

1. Chinese demand for green tech has not peaked, as evidenced by the steadily rising annual installed capacity figures for wind and solar. In fact, the installed capacity isn't just rising each year, but even the volume of new installs in a single year has grown every year from 2020-2024. Last year saw 277 GW of solar PV and 80 GW of wind.

Even now in 2025, with the offtake policy reforms starting from 1 June, it looks like solar is going to at least match the capacity growth from last year, while wind is actually going to EXCEED the capacity figures from last year. Domestic demand is strong. As for next year, we'll see what the market reforms bring.

2. Chinese newbuild solar and wind farms have not been subsidised for several years already now (since 2021). Over the past few years (until 1 June 2025) they were built on a feed-in-tariff (FiT) basis, which means they earn a fixed on-grid price from the gridco, independent of what's happening in power markets.

If market prices are high, the FiT may be less than the market rate. If market prices are low, the FiT may be more than the market rate. In a power market context, this is very different from a subsidy (although it could be construed as/look like a subsidy if market prices end up lower than the FiT rate for long periods).Image
Same second paragraph, continued:

"plummeting external and domestic demand have forced Chinese tech companies to compete aggressively to gain market share by cutting prices"

This is wrong on both the domestic and international counts. We already know from the last post domestic demand for wind and solar installs is still rising.

Meanwhile, in the international space, Chinese solar panel exports totaled 236 GW in 2024, rising 13% YoY. Wind turbine exports were 5.2 GW, rising 42% YoY.

In 2025 to date, completed *panel* exports have fallen 5%, but cell and wafer exports are rising dramatically, up 73% and 26% YTD, respectively. Exports to some countries are down, but they have been more than offset by rising exports to other countries and regions. Unfortunately, I don't have a source on YTD wind turbine exports for 2025 so can't comment there.

The point I'm trying to make here is that while there's oversupply relative to demand, it's not reasonable to attribute much - if any - of this supply-demand mismatch to the demand side. Demand is fine. The primary driver of the supply-demand mismatch is coming from the supply side.
Read 15 tweets
Sep 3
This is funny and sad. Secretary Wright's post is so silly and unsophisticated, and yet Twitter's Community Noters managed to find a way to miss the argument entirely and "rebut" with an even more unsophisticated response. It's just all so tiresome. 😞

But let's break it down🧵
First, this this broader idea about not conflating energy with electricity is fine, even good and necessary. 💯

Electricity is what's called "secondary energy", a specific kind of energy that has been transformed from "primary energy" sources like coal, oil, sunlight, etc.
In 2024, about 21% of global energy consumption was electricity. This is called "share of electricity in final energy consumption".

China's electricity share is ~28% and rising rapidly, among the top 10 worldwide.

#1 in the world is Norway, at ~47%.

yearbook.enerdata.net/electricity/sh…Image
Read 15 tweets
Aug 30
Okay. Here we have a boldly stated series of ideas about Chinese solar. They are unsupported and wrong.

But it's a good opportunity to talk through some issues re: how we integrate solar, and some of the important and hotly-debated considerations. So I'll try to make this educational, not merely critical.

Let's dig in...

1.
"local solar prodution numbers are based on models, not measurements"

No. Models are typically forward-looking, used for forecasting, not describing the past. No matter whether the solar generator is offtaking to a power user, a power retailer, or the gridco itself, there's a business transaction going on there. The generator is being compensated based on how much electricity they generate, so you need measurement (i.e. metering). Without metering each kWh of power, how could you run a power business? 🤨

In China, the grid companies (e.g. State Grid and Southern Grid) and their subsidiaries have a monopoly over installation, maintenance, and reading of metering infrastructure. They report monthly, quarterly, and annual data to the NEA/NBS (or to the China Electricity Council, which compiles data on behalf of the NEA and NBS). That's the source of the generation stats. You could find always find a way to criticize the measuring and reporting methodology I suppose, but it's definitely a measurement approach, not a modeling approach.
2.
"Industrial solar production numbers aren’t backed by enough batteries to match consumption curves..."

The claim I think being made here is China's daily power consumption demand curves are not matched to the generation profile of solar, thus solar production would need to be time-shifted to a different time of the day with batteries for those production numbers to be realistic. But since China doesn't have "enough batteries" to do this, then the solar production data must be fraudulent.

This is speculative nonsense. I know OP pulled this argument out of thin air, because it's a fairly complex argument that would necessitate validation via datasets, models, or market access he doesn't have. Are China's 95 GW/222GWh of batteries installed nationwide "enough"? How would anyone besides a Chinese power trader, regulator, or market dispatch modeler know? You need to have a robust, data-backed argument here, because you're seeking to overturn/debunk reported data from State Grid.

But even without a quant-based argument, it's just a weird argument for solar.

Solar produces power during the day, aligning with human activity, as we are generally diurnal creatures. So solar already produces when humans tend to consume power. At low penetration levels for solar (say, <10%) you hardly even need batteries to time-shift solar to another part of the day because solar's production can be fully absorbed by the typical daytime rise in power usage.

At higher penetration rates for solar, you actually will get to the point where production can't be absorbed by the daytime consumption spike and thus storage becomes not just "nice-to-have" but necessary to avoid wastage - unless you have very flexible generators that can easily ramp up and down (more on this later). This issue can arrive earlier for wind than for solar, because wind tends to produce more when humans are asleep and power loads are lower, but we're talking about solar here.

There are a few provinces where daytime overproduction of solar is a real problem, like Shandong...and they are indeed installing storage rapidly, as you would expect from what I have just described. But Shandong is a frontrunner. Nationwide, solar provided just 8% of China's generation mix last year, so its ability to be disuptive is muted, paradoxically both massive, but also mostly absorbed with only a few ripples by the overall vastness of the Chinese power sector.
3.
"...but solar producers don’t pay for increased costs and waste induced in competing sources."

In China, this is broadly true, but not true everywhere, as it depends entirely on local market design. China's design has evolved over time but remains reasonable for China.

Non-flexible power sources are typically forced to try to "get out of the way" in spot markets when variable generators are producing, to their disadvantage. They incur losses caused by the existence of the variable generator. Coal generators in particular suffer from very low annual operating hours in China, although this was historically mostly because the coal generation sector is overbuilt and cannibalizes itself, with the "shouldering-out" effect from renewables starting to play a material role only since ~2021.

Generally speaking, generators being pushed out by renewables will usually have the opportunity to make up the losses on power sales by serving as load-following generators or suppliers of capacity, earning revenues in the ancillary services market or capacity market, respectively. Gas-fired power plants and battery farms are very well suited to play this role. Coal-fired power and nuclear can do it as well, although they are less well-suited and may need retrofits to perform in this way. This is how we keep these generators whole and happy and prevent them from exiting the market - assuming we felt we needed them to stick around.

Of course, these ancillary services fees or capacity fees have to come from somewhere, which brings us back to the original issue - whether solar producers are paying for it or not. Broadly, there are two competing philosophies here: "causer pays" and "beneficiary pays". Sometimes it makes sense to force the renewables generators to pay, as their existence necessitated the load-following service ("causer pays"), and sometimes it makes more sense to socialize those costs to everyone who benefitted from the service provided ("beneficiary pays").

The question of how to allocate these costs is a major point of contention in power market and power system design all around the world right now, and there is no "right answer"; it really depends on your country's economic and energy priorities and the ability of each of the stakeholders to pay. Someone who tries to force a one-size-fits-all to this question is not going to make a very good analyst or advisor!

China deals with these costs in a China-specific way that makes sense for its needs in this moment: Capacity charges for backup coal, batteries, gas, are mostly socialized to end-users (i.e., beneficiary pays). Ancillary services are broadly socialized too. Wind and solar generators are mostly exempt and hardly held financially responsible for any of the losses they cause for other generators in the market. They command a low-carbon privilege and the "victims" are primarily coal-fired generators, as China is trying to peak emissions, so this shouldn't be surprising.

Passing charges to end users is a more socially acceptable approach when you've already been highly effective in keeping power rates low. It also helps to have a huge base of power customers to share the burden. Another benefit of China's scale.

Nuclear generators are basically shielded from this mess, since they sell almost all their power via annual contracts to either the grid or large end-users, guaranteeing their dispatch and sidestepping the gladiator arena of the short-term markets. Even if they have to compete in spot markets someday though, they'll likely be fine, since they should be able to handily out-compete coal-fired generators and consistently earn dispatch. Chinese nuclear is cheap.
Read 5 tweets
Aug 26
Translation of key portions of the public statement from China's National Energy Administration (NEA) July press conference re: power supply and demand during the 2025 summer peak.

I'll add comments inline [like this] and after.
Translation next post. 🧵
nea.gov.cn/20250731/d34b8…Image
These comments were from Deputy Director Liu Mingyang of the NEA's Electric Power Department:

"Friends from the media, good morning. Next, I will introduce the power supply situation during this summer's peak demand period.

First, power loads during the summer peak repeatedly set new record highs. In July, peak temperatures were seen, with most provinces experiencing average temperatures 1-2 degrees C higher than the same period in the past. Together with the end of the rainy season in the south, the weather has been hot and humid.

GDP grew by 5.3% YoY in the first half of the year, rapidly driving power loads higher, increasing by over 200 GW versus the end of June. The national peak power load successively saw new records on July 4th, 7th, 16th, and 17th, exceeding 1500 GW and finally reaching a peak of 1508 GW, which is 57 GW higher than the peak load record last year. To date, 19 provinces have seen record-high peak loads, including Jiangsu, Shandong, and Guangdong, breaking records 46 times."Image
"Second, power supply across the country has been stable overall. In the first half of the year, over 200 GW of new generating capacity was brought online, including 30 GW of supporting and regulating power sources [DF: here, this means dispatchable capacity] including hydropower, gas-fired power, and coal-fired power. Three new cross-region transmission corridors were brought online, increasing cross-region transmission capacity by 16 GW. [DF: this means new UHV lines]

In July, another 10 GW of additional dispatchable capacity was connected to the grid, further strengthening the power supply guarantee. Since summer's start, all kinds of supporting and regulating power have been fully operating. Primary fuels including thermal coal and natural gas have been amply supplied, ensuring stable and orderly national power supply, with only Sichuan needing to implement demand response measures on the evening of the 17th. This demonstrates the system has withstood its first round of high-temperature, high-load challenges this summer."

[DF: This is the first I hear of this, but if Sichuan was truly the only province to use its demand response mechanism during the July peak, then it's quite impressive. I'm quite curious how August has been so far...I have heard some buzz that we might have set ANOTHER new peak a few days ago. Guess we'll find out in the August press conference later this week.]Image
Read 7 tweets

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