Russia is exploiting economic struggles in developing nations, luring thousands of Africans with promises of escaping poverty - only for many to end up KIA or missing. Key findings from Frontelligence Insight’s analysis of unique mercenary records in Africa and the Middle East:
2/ According to available data, Egypt is the leading contributor, with 291 documented cases. While the full roster of mercenaries remains incomplete, Egyptians make up nearly 25% of the more than 1200 records we have manually reviewed.
3/ We requested materials from the Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com, which deals with POWs from all countries fighting for Russia, to see whether they have matching documents. Their records confirmed several individuals have been listed in Russia as missing in action:
4/ According to the provided MIA card, Egyptian citizen Al-Hudi Amr Ashraf Abdelbari, born July 8, 1989, went missing near Verkhnokamianka during an assault against Ukrainian forces. According to the report, he disappeared following a UAV-dropped munition hit on July 11, 2024
5/ While Egyptian cases dominate, they are not the only ones. Cameroon and Ghana follow with 199 and 180 documented cases, respectively. The data also confirm earlier reports of Yemeni participation, with at least 49 citizens. Surprisingly, Iraqis outnumber Iranians: 85 to 6
6/ Respectively to its geographic and population size, The Gambia stands out - 42 confirmed records for a country of 2.7 million population. In comparison, while Egypt is the biggest total number provider, its population is over 115 millions
7/ Surprisingly, we found very few records from the Central African Republic, despite Russia’s long-standing presence and influence there. In Mali, where the African Corps is also active, only 38 mercenaries were documented to join Russia's army - just two fewer than in Algeria
8/ Overall, recruitment in Africa and Middle East is accelerating rapidly. Out of all records, 1,045 included a contract signing date, allowing us to track the trend: in 2023, there were 146 contracts; in 2024, 248; and in just the first six months of 2025 we identified 651 cases
9/ According to information provided by the @hochuzhit_com project, more than 100 POWs from 34 countries, excluding Russia, are currently held in Ukrainian custody. It also appears that not all countries are eager to secure the return of their citizens.
10/ Based on another dataset of 3081 mercenary records from around the world, the vast majority of recruits are assigned to infantry, assault, or other combat roles. This indicates that, despite Russian promises of non-combat positions, such assurances are unlikely to be honored
11/ Thank you for reading. In the coming weeks, we will release more materials on mercenaries from different continents, offering further details on mercenaries fighting for Russia. If you find our work useful, you can support us via the BuyMeACoffee:
12/ We would also like to thank the @hochuzhit_com project for providing data and individual case details, which made our investigation possible in the first place
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Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence
SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread: