China -- per the excellent reporting on the WSJ/ @Lingling_Wei -- appears to be pursuing a strategy of applying maximum pressure in pursuit of maximum concessions ... full tariff rollback, rollback of export controls, relaxation of nat'l security review on Chinese investment
1/
China though may have miscalculated -- Trump's "Truth" suggested real frustration. Betting on an even bigger (and more publicly visible TACO) has its own risks
China really has put its full economic toolkit on the table -- using its control of grain and oil seed imports (COFCO) to zero out orders for beans (having a bit of a stockpile helps), and rolling out an extraordinary set of export controls ...
3/
The reality that the US now struggles to counter is that a country that controls a third of global manufacturing capacity dominates a lot of chokepoints (and goods where competition is typically supplied by competition among Chinese companies are great sources of leverage)
4/
Trump is threatening to put more tariffs on -- which is his natural response. To have a real impact, those tariffs will need to be extended to cover embedded Chinese content in goods with final assembly in third parties ...
5/
And to be effective, the new round of tariffs need to be tariffs that the US can credibly sustain -- unlike the 145% tariffs of April ... and that means a willingness to eat a bit of bitterness (not the easiest thing for a gold loving President to accept)
6/
Trump's truth asserted that the US controls 2 times as many choke points as does China. I have my doubts -- the choke points that have been identified (jet engines/ parts of the C919) only impact (for now) a small part of the Chinese economy ...
7/
The US can exert substantial control over chip exports to China (via leverage over TMSC & US chip designs -- not so much b/c of actual US chip production) but it seems (would want to confirm with real experts) that China's export controls may generate reciprocal leverage
8/
my colleague (and friend) @RushDoshi thinks that the US will have to cross retaliate with financial sanctions to level the negotiating table -- that implies a serious escalation
@RushDoshi The trade war with China neither proved easy or easy to win (China actually went on an export tear and its manufacturing surplus doubled globally after the Trump term 1 tariffs) --
Supply chain wars will be even harder. The US starts from a weaker position too
10/10
@RushDoshi p.s. anything by @KeithBradsher on China's control over rare earths is worth reading closely. China clearly decided to show its full hand yesterday; it thinks it has the high cards
There are rumors -- based on material reported in the Argentine press -- that suggest the US lifeline to Argentina will be funded using Special Drawing Right certificates, and that the BCRA will on lend some funds to the MoF to do bond buybacks ...
1/
The logic of using the SDRs (The Treasury technically borrows dollars from the Fed using SDR certificates as collateral) is simple: the ESF has $173b of SDRs, and only ~ $23b of dollars ...
2/
So if the US is thinking that the $20b may not be enough (and if it is financing bond buybacks as well as a peso defense it may not be enough ... ) using SDRs opens a path to an even bigger program
The real story isn't that Kenya is saving ~ 200m in debt service costs by restructuring into CNY --
It is that China has already gotten $1.5 b of the principal on the original railway loan back
1/
It is well known in sovereign debt circles (but not among the foreign policy world) that the amortization structures on Chinese policy bank loans are super steep, and that China has taken big $$$ off the table between 22 and 25 ...
2/
I am working on a piece on Ecuador that will show that IMF support (and a bond restructuring) effectively allowed Exim and CDB to dramatically reduce their exposure ...
3/
Argentina's governemtn has two pools of fx assets. The Treasury fx account -- which can be sold "inside" the band agreed with the IMF, and the BCRA's fx. The Treasury account is close to being empty
1/
The Treasury bought ~$2b in fx from the ag exporters when the ag export tax was dropped (irritating US farmers) ... but that pool of funds is about gone. The BCRA also has a bit of cash but that can only be sold at the edge of the band
2/
The BCRA's actual cash position is much lower than its reported fx reserves b/c $13b of the reported reserves is from the PBOC swap, & that cannot really be used (open question as to whether it should be counted toward gross reserves as it isn't really available to the GoA)
3/
Bessent: US Treasury wants to support Argentina's strong policies ...
The message seems a bit off. Countries with strong policies don't usually need a second bailout in a year. Argentina already blew through $14b from the IMF
Bessent's rhetoric overlooks the fact that Argentina doesn't in fact, have a strong balance sheet. The central bank has as many fx liabilities as fx reserves (fx reserves net of the PBOC swap are in the low double digits)
Japan has attracted a bit of attention after the LDP's leadership election -- yen down, stocks up, long-term JGB yields up
Two observations -- one is that the increase in JGB yields over the last 12ms hasn't had much of any impact on US yields. At least not for the 10y
1/
The yen also hasn't recently moved with at least the 10y rate differential (and there is an argument that other rates matter more of course ... but the same would be true at most tenors)
2/
The corollary is that higher Japanese rates (long-term nominal rates that is, real rates are a bit different) haven't pulled Japanese funds back home. This is a lagged chart -- but it shows how stable Japanese (private) fixed income portfolios have been after 22 ...
Have the tariffs reduced the trade deficit? The answer is actually not obvious ...
The headline data misleads because of massive swings in the pharmaceuticals balance and the gold balance
1/ many
If you look at goods trade net of pharma and gold, imports are down a bit from earlier in the year (consistent with a tariff impact) but the base earlier in the year was inflated by a bit of front running
2/
Recent monthly deficits (last data point is July, August will likely be down but this calculation takes the detailed data) are running a bit below last year in recent months -- but the YTD numbers are still driven by q1 (front running)