Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
4/ Further analysis of procurement records showed Uralvagonzavod ordering IS-445 sensors for T-90M, T-90M2, and BMPT “Terminator” production - covering the years 2026–2036. Only 1 sensor fits each tank, allowing us to estimate production targets (Screenshot of a technical manual)
5/ Another document proved decisive: a letter from Uralvagonzavod’s commercial director to ZOMZ outlined production plans from 2026 to 2036, detailing annual projections for new tanks, capital overhauls (CO), and modernization (M).
6/ At least 10 new T-90M2 tanks are scheduled for 2026, but production surges from 2027, peaking in 2028 with 428 T-90M and T-90M2 units, a near 80% jump from 2024. Between 2027–2029, Russia plans to produce, overhaul and modernize 1,118 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks
7/ Even if Moscow misses its target by 30%, the total still exceeds 780 modern tanks in just three years. Across the full decade, planned production of T-90M and T-90M2 models reaches at least 1,783 units.
Curiously, 2030 is not present on the production schedule at all
8/ 2029 is the last year marked “P” for production. Our team has speculated that 2030 may be reserved for factory reorganization, expansion, or modernization, which could explain the missing year
9/ One expert who consulted us suggested that the absence of new production (P) data after 2029 could reflect plans to introduce a newer tank variant around that time, making it unnecessary to reserve production capacity so far in advance.
10/ Parallel documents show that by 2036, Russia intends to overhaul or upgrade 828 tanks into the T-72B3M configuration. Peak modernization also hits in 2028, with nearly 500 T-72B3M units expected between 2027 and 2029 alone.
11/ That said, we treat T-72 figures with caution. While modernization parts are supplied at a 1:1 ratio like the T-90, some may be spares. Due to this uncertainty, we do not include T-72s in our final production estimates, keeping our confidence lower than for T-90 numbers
12/ Combining all known figures for T-90M, T-90M2, and even T-72B3M, Russia’s armored modernization target reaches 2,611 tanks from 2026–2036, in addition to vehicles already produced in 2024 and 2025. That’s enough to fully refresh its tank fleet for another large-scale war
13/ Another notable and somewhat unexpected finding was the BMPT “Terminator.” Unlike the T-90M, its production remains limited, with just 86 vehicles planned for overhaul or assembly between 2027 and 2036. The vehicle appears to be somewhat sidelined
14/ Russia’s long-term tank production plan is ambitious: from 2026–2036, Moscow aims to fully supply its operational fleet without downsizing the wartime army. Most of these tanks are scheduled for production by 2029, well ahead of the decade’s end.
15/ Thank you for reading. If you found this insightful but still have questions, check out our free full report via the link below. Paid subscribers can download the original documents to conduct their own analysis of Russia’s modernization plans: frontelligence.substack.com/p/exclusive-in…
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The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
Thread:
2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.
Analysis: New Data Suggests Russia Is Sustaining Mi-8 Output Despite Wartime Losses
According to non-public Russian procurement documents obtained and analyzed by the Frontelligence Insight team, current Mi-8 production appears sufficient to offset wartime losses. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the Soviet era, more than 12,000 Mi-8 helicopters of all types have been produced. It’s a versatile military transport platform that can move troops, cargo, serve as a flying hospital or EW asset, and conduct attack missions with unguided rockets and 100–500 kg bombs.
3/ Correspondence between Aviafarm and ZOMZ the Defense Ministry and ZOMZ show a request for 40 IS-264A thermometers: 20 for Kazan and 20 for Ulan-Ude, where Mi-8s are produced.
Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all
Financial Times reports that, under the draft plan, Ukraine would be required to cede full control of the Donbas region and halve the size of its armed forces. The plan would also require Ukraine to give up certain types of weaponry:
2/ The plan would also require Ukraine to recognize Russian as an official state language and grant official status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, provisions that echo long-standing Kremlin political objectives.
3/ Officials in Kyiv briefed on the plan said it closely aligns with the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and would be a non-starter for Ukraine without significant changes, according to @ChristopherJM with @FT