Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
4/ Further analysis of procurement records showed Uralvagonzavod ordering IS-445 sensors for T-90M, T-90M2, and BMPT “Terminator” production - covering the years 2026–2036. Only 1 sensor fits each tank, allowing us to estimate production targets (Screenshot of a technical manual)
5/ Another document proved decisive: a letter from Uralvagonzavod’s commercial director to ZOMZ outlined production plans from 2026 to 2036, detailing annual projections for new tanks, capital overhauls (CO), and modernization (M).
6/ At least 10 new T-90M2 tanks are scheduled for 2026, but production surges from 2027, peaking in 2028 with 428 T-90M and T-90M2 units, a near 80% jump from 2024. Between 2027–2029, Russia plans to produce, overhaul and modernize 1,118 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks
7/ Even if Moscow misses its target by 30%, the total still exceeds 780 modern tanks in just three years. Across the full decade, planned production of T-90M and T-90M2 models reaches at least 1,783 units.
Curiously, 2030 is not present on the production schedule at all
8/ 2029 is the last year marked “P” for production. Our team has speculated that 2030 may be reserved for factory reorganization, expansion, or modernization, which could explain the missing year
9/ One expert who consulted us suggested that the absence of new production (P) data after 2029 could reflect plans to introduce a newer tank variant around that time, making it unnecessary to reserve production capacity so far in advance.
10/ Parallel documents show that by 2036, Russia intends to overhaul or upgrade 828 tanks into the T-72B3M configuration. Peak modernization also hits in 2028, with nearly 500 T-72B3M units expected between 2027 and 2029 alone.
11/ That said, we treat T-72 figures with caution. While modernization parts are supplied at a 1:1 ratio like the T-90, some may be spares. Due to this uncertainty, we do not include T-72s in our final production estimates, keeping our confidence lower than for T-90 numbers
12/ Combining all known figures for T-90M, T-90M2, and even T-72B3M, Russia’s armored modernization target reaches 2,611 tanks from 2026–2036, in addition to vehicles already produced in 2024 and 2025. That’s enough to fully refresh its tank fleet for another large-scale war
13/ Another notable and somewhat unexpected finding was the BMPT “Terminator.” Unlike the T-90M, its production remains limited, with just 86 vehicles planned for overhaul or assembly between 2027 and 2036. The vehicle appears to be somewhat sidelined
14/ Russia’s long-term tank production plan is ambitious: from 2026–2036, Moscow aims to fully supply its operational fleet without downsizing the wartime army. Most of these tanks are scheduled for production by 2029, well ahead of the decade’s end.
15/ Thank you for reading. If you found this insightful but still have questions, check out our free full report via the link below. Paid subscribers can download the original documents to conduct their own analysis of Russia’s modernization plans: frontelligence.substack.com/p/exclusive-in…
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Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all
Financial Times reports that, under the draft plan, Ukraine would be required to cede full control of the Donbas region and halve the size of its armed forces. The plan would also require Ukraine to give up certain types of weaponry:
2/ The plan would also require Ukraine to recognize Russian as an official state language and grant official status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, provisions that echo long-standing Kremlin political objectives.
3/ Officials in Kyiv briefed on the plan said it closely aligns with the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and would be a non-starter for Ukraine without significant changes, according to @ChristopherJM with @FT
A clear video showing a Kh-family cruise missile descending, releasing flares and striking a residential building in Ternopil this morning indicates the attack was deliberate, contradicting claims by Russian propaganda and bot networks that it resulted from air-defense.🧵Thread:
2/ In the first second of the video, the sound of the cruise missile is clearly audible, and flares can be seen deploying before impact. Russians started to use flares on their missiles as countermeasures against air-defence systems, including MANPADS around 2023.
3/ The missile’s silhouette, with its relatively short, swept-back wings and boat-shaped fuselage, closely matches the Kh-series of cruise missiles
In November, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that 44 Indian nationals were serving in the Russian army. Frontelligence Insight obtained and reviewed data that shows the real number is higher. At least 146 Indian citizens have signed contracts. 🧵Thread:
2/ Thanks to data provided by @hochuzhit_com and our own investigation, we found that Russia, working through local recruiters in India, actively targeting Indian nationals and pulling them into military service despite the Indian government’s attempts to reduce such activities.
3/ We identified more than a dozen ongoing or recently concluded advertising campaigns targeting Indian citizens. In the image below, you can see examples from Facebook, YouTube, and other social-media platforms promotions. Notably, some advertisements directly mention Alabuga
A year and a half ago, in April 2024, I warned (the section is highlighted in the auto-translated text) that aid to Ukraine would continue to dwindle, and that without proper changes we would find ourselves in a poor position. What we’re seeing now was set in motion a while ago.
2/ Besides Europe, which I was mostly addressing in that post, Ukraine has also fallen short, mainly in strategic-level organization, despite several successes such as expanding and deploying unmanned forces and improving long-range strikes that have hurt the Russian economy.
3/ The winning strategy, as my team outlined after the 2023 counteroffensive, can be summed up as “stall the enemy while destroying the rear,” meaning inflict maximum socio-economic damage while preventing the enemy from making real gains and making the war plainly too costly.