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Oct 11 15 tweets 5 min read Read on X
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report: Image
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery Image
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1 Image
4/ Further analysis of procurement records showed Uralvagonzavod ordering IS-445 sensors for T-90M, T-90M2, and BMPT “Terminator” production - covering the years 2026–2036. Only 1 sensor fits each tank, allowing us to estimate production targets (Screenshot of a technical manual)Image
5/ Another document proved decisive: a letter from Uralvagonzavod’s commercial director to ZOMZ outlined production plans from 2026 to 2036, detailing annual projections for new tanks, capital overhauls (CO), and modernization (M). Image
6/ At least 10 new T-90M2 tanks are scheduled for 2026, but production surges from 2027, peaking in 2028 with 428 T-90M and T-90M2 units, a near 80% jump from 2024. Between 2027–2029, Russia plans to produce, overhaul and modernize 1,118 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks Image
7/ Even if Moscow misses its target by 30%, the total still exceeds 780 modern tanks in just three years. Across the full decade, planned production of T-90M and T-90M2 models reaches at least 1,783 units.

Curiously, 2030 is not present on the production schedule at all
8/ 2029 is the last year marked “P” for production. Our team has speculated that 2030 may be reserved for factory reorganization, expansion, or modernization, which could explain the missing year
9/ One expert who consulted us suggested that the absence of new production (P) data after 2029 could reflect plans to introduce a newer tank variant around that time, making it unnecessary to reserve production capacity so far in advance.
10/ Parallel documents show that by 2036, Russia intends to overhaul or upgrade 828 tanks into the T-72B3M configuration. Peak modernization also hits in 2028, with nearly 500 T-72B3M units expected between 2027 and 2029 alone. Image
11/ That said, we treat T-72 figures with caution. While modernization parts are supplied at a 1:1 ratio like the T-90, some may be spares. Due to this uncertainty, we do not include T-72s in our final production estimates, keeping our confidence lower than for T-90 numbers Image
12/ Combining all known figures for T-90M, T-90M2, and even T-72B3M, Russia’s armored modernization target reaches 2,611 tanks from 2026–2036, in addition to vehicles already produced in 2024 and 2025. That’s enough to fully refresh its tank fleet for another large-scale war
13/ Another notable and somewhat unexpected finding was the BMPT “Terminator.” Unlike the T-90M, its production remains limited, with just 86 vehicles planned for overhaul or assembly between 2027 and 2036. The vehicle appears to be somewhat sidelined Image
14/ Russia’s long-term tank production plan is ambitious: from 2026–2036, Moscow aims to fully supply its operational fleet without downsizing the wartime army. Most of these tanks are scheduled for production by 2029, well ahead of the decade’s end.
15/ Thank you for reading. If you found this insightful but still have questions, check out our free full report via the link below. Paid subscribers can download the original documents to conduct their own analysis of Russia’s modernization plans:
frontelligence.substack.com/p/exclusive-in…

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Oct 10
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Read 7 tweets
Oct 9
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”

The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.

🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
Read 5 tweets
Oct 6
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550 Image
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA Image
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable
Read 5 tweets
Oct 6
The Economist:

About 60% of the deep strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which with a smaller payload can reach targets 1,500km within Russia and have sophisticated software that has proved resistant to EW jamming.
🧵Thread: Efrem Lukatsky / AP
2/ Olena Kryzhanivska, an expert on Ukrainian weapons systems, notes that the FP-1s cost only about $55,000 each and are now being churned out at a rate more than 100 a day. Ukraine is also using the heavier and more expensive Lyutyi drone, which has a range of 2,000km
3/ There are also reports that FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missiles have begun to be used. They are much faster than the drones, flying just 50 metres above the ground, with a range of over 3,000km and packing a huge punch thanks to a 1,150kg warhead
Read 6 tweets
Oct 3
Russia is resorting to increasingly drastic measures to find recruits. The list has grown: beyond coercing detainees and conscripts, Moscow is now pressuring businesses to supply contract soldiers while further raising enlistment payments. 🧵Thread with all recent updates: Image
2/ Thanks to recent updates from @CITeam_en and iStories, we’ve learned that In Russia’s Primorsky region, officials told local business leaders they must help recruit men for the front. Employers were instructed to pressure their staff into signing contracts or contribute money Image
3/ In Voronezh oblast, officials sharply raised the bonus for signing a contract with the Defense Ministry. Governor Alexander Gusev boosted the regional payout from 505,000 rubles to 2.1 million. With federal payments added, the total now stands at 2.5 million rubles (~$27,000)
Read 10 tweets
Oct 2
Since January, 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries, facilities that process crude into fuels such as gasoline and diesel, have been hit, a new BBC Verify investigation found. The tally of successful attacks is already 48% higher than the total for all of 2024. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ BBC analysis shows reported attacks hit a record in August, when Ukrainian drones targeted 14 refineries, followed by eight more in September. Some of the strikes reached facilities deep inside Russia. Image
3/ In late September, the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat refinery in Bashkortostan was struck twice. Satellite images showed smoke rising from the facility, which sits more than 1,100 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Image
Read 6 tweets

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