Building out capacity (including refining capacity) for rare earths/ other critical minerals should indeed by a real priority now, and the risk of weaponization of this this and other supply chains should have been taken more seriously in the past. But it won't be easy
Just as an example of how far the political debate has come -- Bob Lighthizer (no China dove) excluded rare earths and permanent magnets from the 301 tariffs back in 18 and 19 ...
3/
Pharmaceuticals from China too (why raise the price of meds ... )
For rare earths and magnets there was essentially no US supply, so the tariffs just raised costs (absent a plant o build out capacity over time)
4/
+ the US had won a WTO case against China's export controls on rare earths (controls that were were intended to encourage manufacturing of items using permanent magnets in China) and well, it viewed as bad form to tariff something that the US wanted to China to export freely 5/
Quaint concerns by today's standards, but it illustrates how far the debate has come. The Biden Administration did put in place tariffs on rare earth magnets (phased in) back in early 2024, but it was a bit of a fight (concerns about raising cost of green transition) 6/
The Biden Administration did a series of reports -- including a strong one on critical minerals/ rare earths - highlighting supply chain weakness that needed to be addressed post pandemic ...
7/
But a lot more was done on semiconductors (The CHIPS act does appear to be working in the advanced nodes, tho not without some difficulties) and even other bits of clean tech (via DOE loans office) than on pharma and rare earths
8/
And part of the problem was the hope that commercial firms, burned by the supply chain snarls of the pandemic, would do the investment largely on their own ...
9/
That though ran into a problem -- rare earth prices tanked (rare earths aren't that rare and all, the bottleneck is refining and China actually has plenty of capacity)
10/
"Analysts say these projects are at risk from price fluctuations because western efforts to support the sector remain piecemeal and flawed against China’s multi-decade lead"
Western firms looking for "super-returns" that keep up wit the tech cos (and the crypto marketing bros) aren't that keep on projects with very large upfront costs, and at best uncertain returns (China can always flood the market at the lowest price point ... )
12/
There are solutions (the DoD is offering price guarantees) -- but they have a price tag.
The fundamental problem is that projects that provide economic security don't necessarily deliver a clear commercial return
13/
The only big of good news -- for rare earths and for that matter active pharma ingredients/ key precursors -- is that the actual capital costs aren't huge. 10s of billions, may low 100s of billions would make a big difference (contrast with the AI buildout)
14/
But in my view the needed approach requires serious sustained political commitment (I would say bipartisan commitment) and a willingness to recognize that commercial firms both have to be involved and that commercial incentives on their own aren't enough ...
China -- per the excellent reporting on the WSJ/ @Lingling_Wei -- appears to be pursuing a strategy of applying maximum pressure in pursuit of maximum concessions ... full tariff rollback, rollback of export controls, relaxation of nat'l security review on Chinese investment
1/
China though may have miscalculated -- Trump's "Truth" suggested real frustration. Betting on an even bigger (and more publicly visible TACO) has its own risks
China really has put its full economic toolkit on the table -- using its control of grain and oil seed imports (COFCO) to zero out orders for beans (having a bit of a stockpile helps), and rolling out an extraordinary set of export controls ...
3/
There are rumors -- based on material reported in the Argentine press -- that suggest the US lifeline to Argentina will be funded using Special Drawing Right certificates, and that the BCRA will on lend some funds to the MoF to do bond buybacks ...
1/
The logic of using the SDRs (The Treasury technically borrows dollars from the Fed using SDR certificates as collateral) is simple: the ESF has $173b of SDRs, and only ~ $23b of dollars ...
2/
So if the US is thinking that the $20b may not be enough (and if it is financing bond buybacks as well as a peso defense it may not be enough ... ) using SDRs opens a path to an even bigger program
The real story isn't that Kenya is saving ~ 200m in debt service costs by restructuring into CNY --
It is that China has already gotten $1.5 b of the principal on the original railway loan back
1/
It is well known in sovereign debt circles (but not among the foreign policy world) that the amortization structures on Chinese policy bank loans are super steep, and that China has taken big $$$ off the table between 22 and 25 ...
2/
I am working on a piece on Ecuador that will show that IMF support (and a bond restructuring) effectively allowed Exim and CDB to dramatically reduce their exposure ...
3/
Argentina's governemtn has two pools of fx assets. The Treasury fx account -- which can be sold "inside" the band agreed with the IMF, and the BCRA's fx. The Treasury account is close to being empty
1/
The Treasury bought ~$2b in fx from the ag exporters when the ag export tax was dropped (irritating US farmers) ... but that pool of funds is about gone. The BCRA also has a bit of cash but that can only be sold at the edge of the band
2/
The BCRA's actual cash position is much lower than its reported fx reserves b/c $13b of the reported reserves is from the PBOC swap, & that cannot really be used (open question as to whether it should be counted toward gross reserves as it isn't really available to the GoA)
3/
Bessent: US Treasury wants to support Argentina's strong policies ...
The message seems a bit off. Countries with strong policies don't usually need a second bailout in a year. Argentina already blew through $14b from the IMF
Bessent's rhetoric overlooks the fact that Argentina doesn't in fact, have a strong balance sheet. The central bank has as many fx liabilities as fx reserves (fx reserves net of the PBOC swap are in the low double digits)
Japan has attracted a bit of attention after the LDP's leadership election -- yen down, stocks up, long-term JGB yields up
Two observations -- one is that the increase in JGB yields over the last 12ms hasn't had much of any impact on US yields. At least not for the 10y
1/
The yen also hasn't recently moved with at least the 10y rate differential (and there is an argument that other rates matter more of course ... but the same would be true at most tenors)
2/
The corollary is that higher Japanese rates (long-term nominal rates that is, real rates are a bit different) haven't pulled Japanese funds back home. This is a lagged chart -- but it shows how stable Japanese (private) fixed income portfolios have been after 22 ...