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Oct 13 6 tweets 8 min read Read on X
We have all seen the email below, but what do it mean?

What are factoring facilities? And what is going on here?

1) Factoring Basics
2) Dummy Example
3) Common Factoring Structures
4) Reasons for Factoring
5) The infamous Weil email explained Image
1) Factoring Basics

Factoring is a form of financing that allows companies to convert their accounts receivable into immediate cash.

Traditionally, when a company sells goods or services, it issues an invoice to its customer, which is often not paid for thirty, sixty, or even ninety days. Instead of waiting for the cash payment, some companies opt to sell the invoice to a third party, known as a “factor”, at a discount, typically around 95 to 98% of the receivables face value (this discount represents the fee charged by the factor).

Importantly, factors often won’t advance the entire cash balance upfront. Typically, 75% to 90% of the receivable’s face value is advanced upfront, and the remaining balance is transferred, less the abovementioned discount, once customer accounts have been collected.

Therefore, once the customer has paid the invoice, the operating company will have collected the full receivables balance, less the factoring fee.

The Factor’s fee represents its earnings for providing upfront liquidity and assuming the risk that the customer may not pay on time, or at all.
2) Dummy Example

To numerically illustrate concepts, we’ll use ABC Co. as a hypothetical example.

First, imagine ABC Co. sells $100k worth of goods to a customer on sixty-day terms. Instead of waiting two months to collect, ABC Co. sells the invoice to Factor Co.

On the day of the sale, Factor Co. advances 85% of the invoice, or $85,000, to ABC Co.

When the customer eventually pays the full $100,000 on day 60, Factor Co. sends the remaining $15,000 back to ABC Co., but subtracts its $3,000 factoring fee.

In total, ABC Co. has collected $97,000, with $85,000 upfront and $12,000 later, with the $3,000 difference in cash collected and face value representing the cost of accelerating cash flow.
3) Common Factoring Structures

Although the basic idea of factoring is simple, facilities can be structured in several different ways, depending on the borrower's needs and the factor’s risk tolerance:

Notification vs. Non-Notification:
First, a factoring arrangement can be a notification or non-notification agreement. In a notification deal, the customer is explicitly informed that its invoice has been sold and is directed to pay the Factor rather than the operating entity. This makes receivable collection straightforward and reduces the risk of misdirected payments. In a non-notification deal, the customer is never told that the receivable has been factored and continues to pay the operating company as though nothing has changed.

When customers pay the operating company, cash collected from factored invoices is typically held in segregated accounts before quickly being upstreamed to the factoring company. Tight cash management controls become extremely important down the line, when considering the accounting and legal treatment of factoring facilities.

Non-notification structures are attractive to companies that want to keep their financing structures out of customer view, but they also expose the Factor to more risk since cash flows through the company before reaching them.

Each structure carries its own benefits, and both are common, with notification factoring often being utilized by middle-market companies and non-notification being utilized by large or sponsor-backed companies.

Regular vs. Spot:
Factoring can also be arranged on a regular or “spot” basis. In a spot deal, like the ABC Co. example above, the company and Factor agree on a one-off transaction, selling a single receivable or a small batch.

This might be done to address a one-off short-term liquidity pinch. Companies might also use spot arrangements when confidentiality or customer relationships are a concern. For example, a company that is limited to a notification structure might only factor receivables of select customers. On the other hand, a regular factoring deal functions more like a revolving credit facility.

The company and Factor will maintain an ongoing relationship and have an approved limit, which can be drawn and repaid. Regular factoring programs are more common among all types of companies, as they are cheaper and more easily integrated over the longer term. Conversely, spot factoring may be a viable option for small businesses that need immediate cash against specific invoices (e.g., a $100k sale to Walmart that won’t pay for 60+ days).

Recourse vs. Non-Recourse Factoring:
The last and most important distinction is whether the factoring agreement is recourse or non-recourse. In a recourse arrangement, if the customer fails to pay the factor, the Factor may demand repayment from the operating company.

Economically, that puts the customer’s credit risk back on the company, making the transaction seem more like an RCF or ABL facility. In contrast, the Factor bears this customer credit risk in a non-recourse deal, under which the Factor bears any loss from non-payment.

Due to this shift in risk, non-recourse factoring arrangements almost always feature higher fees than recourse deals. Non-recourse deals are also much more likely to qualify as a “true sale”.
4) Reasons for Factoring

To understand why companies use factoring facilities, we’ll return to ABC Co., covering two primary use cases.

The first and more intuitive use case is working capital management. Imagine that ABC Co. is a middle-market supplier of specialty cleaning products, selling primarily into big box retail, with Walmart accounting for more than 50% of its sales. Like most large retailers, Walmart is able to leverage its scale and bargaining power to negotiate extended payment terms, often 9060+ days, leaving smaller vendors like ABC Co. waiting for months to collect cash.

On the other hand, ABC Co. must pay its own suppliers within 30 days and cover payroll every two weeks. The result is cash flowing out faster than it comes in. By factoring its receivables, ABC Co. is able to accelerate cash receipts from its invoices upfront to cover current working capital needs.

Why doesn’t ABC Co. just borrow on a revolving line of credit?

For companies like ABC Co., factoring functions as a reasonable alternative or supplement to a revolving credit facility. This is because factoring “piggybacks” on the credit quality of ABC Co.’s buyers, which in this case are large investment-grade retailers, rather than its own. This allows for quicker and easier access to capital.

The second use case relates to a company’s leverage optics. Even when a company has adequate liquidity, the accounting treatment of factoring can make it an appealing tool for managing leverage-related metrics.

The clearest example of this is net debt-to-EBITDA. In a true sale arrangement, cash is received, but there is no corresponding liability recorded, representing a dollar-for-dollar decrease in net leverage and no change in total leverage.

This creates a rare and interesting dynamic where a company can raise liquidity while simultaneously lowering reported net leverage, as the cash inflow from factoring is essentially treated as a cash flow from operations rather than financing.

On the other hand, if the company were to borrow via an RCF, cash would increase, but so would debt, leaving net debt the same and increasing total debt.

To illustrate this dynamic, imagine ABC Co. now has a balance sheet with $150mm of outstanding receivables and a covenant limiting total debt to EBITDA of 4x. The company is facing a short-term working capital squeeze following a seasonal inventory build and delayed collections from its Walmart. To fund operations, management considers two options: drawing $30mm on its revolving credit facility or factoring $30mm of receivables under a non-recourse true-sale arrangement. ABC Co.’s pre-transaction balance sheet is presented below:

With $290mm of total debt, representing 3.6x EBITDA, ABC Co. sits just below its 4.0x maximum covenant threshold. With only $20mm of cash on hand, the company expects a temporary working-capital shortfall, as payments come due before collections from its major retail customers.

Under the first option, which is detailed above, ABC Co. draws $30mm from its revolver to fund payables. While this immediately increases cash, it also raises total debt to $320mm, pushing leverage to its maximum limit of 4.0x. Any additional borrowing or decline in EBITDA would push leverage above its limit. While an RCF draw solves ABC Co.’s liquidity problem, it presents the new issue of lender scrutiny.

Under the second option, which is also detailed above, ABC Co. instead factors $30mm of payables under a non-recourse arrangement. Since the transfer qualifies as a true sale, the receivables are derecognized from the balance sheet.

Importantly, under this arrangement, total debt remains unchanged, and ABC Co. remains at 3.6x leverage, despite having raised $25mm of immediate cash.

Transactions like this highlight why factoring serves as both a viable funding and financial reporting strategy.

By accelerating the conversion of receivables into cash without recording additional debt, companies can present a stronger liquidity position and lower leverage. However, when factoring is used too aggressively, it can mask excessive underlying leverage or recurring cash shortfalls.Image
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5) The infamous Weil email explained

We have all seen the below image, but what do it mean?

In an October 2 exchange between Weil and Orrick, Weil acknowledged that they did not know whether First Brands had ever actually received the roughly $1.9bn in factoring proceeds.

Additionally, they confirmed that the segregated collection accounts contained “$0”.

To understand why this is a red flag, you must know that in a properly structured factoring program, cash management and segregation are extremely important.

Under normal circumstances, cash should flow into segregated collection accounts.

Having $0 in a segregated account presents two possibilities: the factoring proceeds were never actually funded, or the proceeds were funded but were immediately commingled along with customer payments.

I believe the latter scenario is more likely, as First Brands burned significant cash prior to filing, which must have come from some source.

This is also consistent with the other widespread breakdown of control, making the factoring proceeds and customer collections indistinguishable from other liquidity sources.

So why is this a big deal? Besides, of course, that the money is gone.

This admission reinforces the breakdown of cash management controls at First Brands, further weakening the true sale argument. If cash wasn’t properly isolated and upstreamed to the factor, First Brands' factoring facility would violate both the legal isolation and effective control principles.

The most interesting point of this case to watch for is the findings of the investigative committee. The facts they uncover, whether double-factoring, comingling, or cash-flow control, could have a material influence on how First Brands’ factored receivables are treated, influencing creditor recoveries.

In short, First Brands has become a live test for the true sale doctrine.

I will dive into this in a lot more details in an upcoming Pari Passu Newsletter edition.Image

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My second year as a Private Equity Associate in Large-Cap Private Equity - A Long Thread

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3) Why Private Equity is such a good model
4) Key Trends I am seeing (Retail, Returns, AI)
5) Is the grind in PE still worth it?
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1) Where I was right

What I love about writing and posting content online is that I get to crystallize my thoughts. Last year, after my first year in large-cap PE, I wrote down many thoughts which I encourage you to read before diving in this new writeup (I have not repeated myself, and this post serves as a follow-on, building on what we discussed last year).

Looking back, I was at times naive, but my opinion is largely unchanged on a variety of topics, including:

i) PE is just such a good model

Last year, I wrote: “Sometimes, the private equity model seems too good to be true. Where else can you find a model where: (a) you can screw up for years and investors cannot leave you (as capital is locked up), and (b) you mark your own portfolio companies until you sell them whenever you want them?

Everyone always talks about the illiquidity premium, but I think that the positives of illiquidity are often overlooked. There is a certain comfort of looking at a 20% market pull-back knowing that (a) you are not going to charge the multiple of your portco (because private market multiples are more stable - big surprise lol), and (b) every public target just got 20% cheaper.”

Early this year, markets crashed 20%+ and this felt so true. No one was particularly scared, our marks stayed really flat (lol), and it was much easier to make the math work on many public names. While I never experienced a long recession in private markets, no one can argue that this lock-up structure is extremely advantageous and also prevents GPs from panic-selling.

ii)The hard part is getting in

From the outside, large-cap Private Equity can seem intimidating. Everyone has an MBA from HBS/GSB, went to a top undergrad and top-tier banking program, etc. etc. - the cream of the crop

My view is that large-cap PE really attracts above-average smart, insecure, and money-driven individuals.

Maybe this is a bit harsh, but I just really want to share that the average IQ is not 160. These are (mostly!) a bunch of people who generally like investing, really want to get rich, and are not willing to take a risk (there are many fantastic individuals I work with who I consider brilliant, but these are the exception, not the norm).

What should you do with this piece of information?
Firstly, you should not be intimidated by someone just because they are a Principal at a Mega-Fund, it is really just a job.

Second, you should not despair if for some reason, you don’t get one of these firms. There is a large number of variables you cannot control when the recruiting process is so selective, so just don’t sweat it, this is not the best job in the world.

Finally, if you get a job and want to spend your career there, this can be done. I often hear complaints that all these Large-Cap PE programs are two-and-out. My view is that if you are actually smart and really want to get a promotion, there is room. It is up to you to get it (and decide this earlier than later).

iii)You are not an investor

I love when people update their LinkedIn profile to “Investor at [Insert Mega-Fund]” because it is just so cringe when you look at what the job actually looks like.

If you define investing as doing models to backsolve to a 20% IRR, make twenty-page, nicely formatted decks, and help a deal get through and manage advisors, then yes, you can call yourself an investor. But if you think about investing in a more classic way, I am sorry to break it to you, but you will not be one until you are much more senior.

This creates a lot of friction at the junior level because people get frustrated that they are still Excel monkeys and no one wants to ask you what you think about the business.

In PE, the Investment Committee makes a decision, and the Partner makes a recommendation; you are just there to help him pitch the company. Just something to understand before having your dreams crushed.
2) Where I was wrong

At the same time, I realized how some of the things I said could be corrected or at least better explained. In particular, I would like to spend some time on:

i)Fake work is not that fake after all: last year, I was particularly frustrated with the large amount of work done on deals that everyone knows are never getting done. While these suck, I was particularly shortsighted in not understanding that the work is not wasted at all.

Sure, maybe doing 15 slides to tell everyone why you are killing a deal is a bit too much, but I came to appreciate the work done to understand a business (and more broadly, an industry) even if we all knew the company was not actionable. In a few months, you might have the opportunity to invest in a very similar business, and you will then be extremely grateful that you spent a few weeks understanding the space. Very often, banker auctions are extremely rushed, and having three weeks of industry work can be a massive advantage during the process.

ii)Most people in MF are good investors, they are just afraid to speak up: if you asked me last year what I thought about my Principal / Vice-President, I would have told you he/she is a mediocre investor who is incapable of independent thinking. This is because, from my perspective, this person is the Partner’s puppy who will just push the process forward without really expressing any interesting or relevant investing insights (maybe not zero, but a lot less than what you would expect from a 30+ year old investor at a Mega-Fund).

Over this year, I realized this view should be slightly modified. These people are above-average investors, but they never get to share their views because that’s not their job and they NEVER want to annoy the Partner. So, even if they disagree, there is no point in speaking up, the risk/reward is not really not there.

If you are confused why, you should understand that at Mega-Funds, a Partner can like a deal, but Investment Committee can still say “No” (unless the Partner wants to put his career on the line, but most of the times this does not happen). Therefore, why should a Principal bother to push back to show his investing acumen? This will not happen, and his job remains to tell the Associate how to tweak my model to show what the Partner wants to see.

Note: while I changed my mind and now see most of my colleagues under a positive light, I still believe that there are many very mediocre professionals that are terrible investors and just good at playing the politics game. Hard to distinguish these where there is so much room to hide and you don’t call the shots until you are a Partner.
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Beyond IRR: Why is everyone talking about DPI? 🧵

The dry-up of IPO and M&A markets, combined with a 'higher for longer' interest rate outlook, has led an increasing number of LPs to rank DPI as their 'most critical' performance metric in 2025 (McKinsey). However, even this inherently cash-based metric is not a panacea and has its own natural limitations.

Let’s have a closer look at DPI’s ascendance in the PE world:

1) What is DPI – the fund’s cash-on-cash reality
2) PE Liquidity crunch: the main drivers of DPI's recent prominence
3) Liquidity management tools: a double-edged sword
4) The shortcomings of IRR
5) Demand for DPI is here to stay
6) DPI and IRR: a holistic view
1) What is DPI – the fund’s cash-on-cash reality

DPI is a straightforward metric that quantifies the total capital a private equity fund has returned to its investors relative to the total capital they have contributed. It is calculated by dividing the total cash distributions to investors by the total capital paid into the fund:

DPI=Distributed Capital / Paid–in Capital

This ratio provides a clear, tangible measure of a fund's ability to return actual cash, and is also a net metric, since it is calculated after fees and expenses. For instance, a DPI ratio of 1.5x indicates that for each dollar invested, $1.50 has been distributed back to the LP.

One of the key factors that’s responsible for DPI’s recent protagonism is the fact that, unlike IRR, it does not rely on theoretical valuations or projected gains – it aims to answer the question of “How much actual money has been returned compared to what was invested?”

Furthermore, DPI also functions as a strong indicator of a GP's execution capability and operational discipline – the direct correlation between DPI increasing as exits are achieved and capital is distributed positions this metric as a clear measure of a fund manager's effectiveness to in successfully liquidating investments.

Finally, DPI avoids IRR’s oftentimes unrealistic assumption that the funds distributed to the LP can be reinvested at the same rate of return.

DPI will largely change as the funds progress in its J-curve. Intuitively, a DPI below 1.0x is expected during the fund’s investing phase, up to the closing of the first exists of the fund, and to increase past 1.0x as the fund successfully liquidate its investments – the key aspect here being the timely exit of those positions. If funds are facing problems to exit their portfolio companies at the desired conditions, they may extend the holding period, pushing the payday for LPs (e.g. the distribution) further in time and maintaining DPI at lower levels.
2) PE Liquidity crunch: the main drivers of DPI's recent prominence

DPI’s rising prominence is a direct response to gradual, yet fundamental, shifts in the private equity landscape, primarily driven by a liquidity crunch caused by a constrained exit environment that started to take hold in 2022.

The central banks’ response to the then surging inflation (i.e., shut down of quantitative easing and aggressive rise of interest rates) raised the cost of capital, dampened M&A activity, and closed the IPO window in practice.

Exit opportunities were further restrained by a regulatory environment (antitrust, foreign investments and later tariff pressure) perceived as hostile, and geopolitical uncertainty further fueled this trend.

Finally, investments made during the low-interest-rate era were often priced aggressively, requiring elevated exit valuations to deliver the return thresholds projected by GPs and expected by LPs (thresholds that have become increasingly difficult to meet in the current market environment). All this culminated in a “two-and-a-half-year exit slowdown” that hasn’t been offset by the modest uptick in deal activity recorded more recently (Bain&Co).

As a result, GPs face growing difficulty exiting investments in a timely manner. According to Bain&Co, global buyout holding period peaked in 2023. This trend has left PE funds holding substantial unrealized capital that must eventually be distributed, with LPs increasingly pressing for returns.

LPs, especially large institutional investors like pension funds or endowments, face their own liabilities and inherent needs for stable liquidity. When distributions from PE funds are delayed, it becomes challenging for them to meet capital calls for new commitments or service their stakeholders. This liquidity crunch prompts LPs to (a) actively seek solutions to manage their current liquidity, and (b) evaluate future fund managers through a lens that overweights liquidity over return – effectively prioritizing DPI over IRR
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