Here we go, as I'll go on TV soon with @JoumannaTV to discuss data, let's take a look at China September trade data that just came out.
September exports rose 8.3%YoY in USD and imports increased 7.4%YoY.
Year-to-date, exports grew 6.1% while imports declined -1.1%YoY.
By destination, China exports to the US fell -16.9% but to Asia rising rapidly.
Exports to India rose 12.9% and India deficit with China is accelerating, with imports not just intermediates for production but also final consumer goods.
Shipment to ASEAN rose 14.7% with fastest growth to Thailand and Vietnam (+22.5% and 22.3%, respectively). The sharp increase of shipment reflect supply chain diversification but also rising imports for domestic demand in ASEAN that also poses challenges to domestic industries.
Exports to the EU rose 8.2% with shipment to Germany increasing +10.5%.
Interestingly, China exports to Russia has fallen this year by -11.3% as Russia puts up curbs to some Chinese exports.
China trade surplus in September:
#1 EU 22.9
#2 USA 22.8bn
#3 ASEAN 17.2bn
#4 India 10.3bn
Imports by China year-to-date:
US -11.6% so trade relations falling both ways
ASEAN -0.5% with imports from Malaysia falling -14%
EU -3.2% with contraction across Italy, Germany, France etc.
India -2.3% and it really doesn't import much (only about 10% of what it exports to India)
Australia -10.5% (downward commodity demand)
Where is it growing in imports?
Japan +5.6% (driven by high-tech)
Taiwan +8% (driven by high-tech)
South Korea +2.2% (also chips/AI)
Oh forgot to say imports from Russia also down -7.7%YoY ytd so trade really not growing between BRICS even if geopolitics is.
So what is the bottom line looking at this? Well, listen, here is the reality.
China is GROWING its exports in every direction: labor intensive, medium skilled, and high-tech.
But China is only importing what it needs and don't have yet so basically high tech (also raw commodities but that is down trend this year) from North Asians where it can.
What is the meaning of it?
Exports remain a key engine of growth for China and one that it will push.
That will exert competitive pressure on not just Asia but also rest of the world as barriers to the US rise.
De-industrialization is happening, not just in developed markets, but also in emerging markets.
The immediate impact is GOODS DEFLATION. The secondary impact of course is job losses and deindustrialization, first with smaller players that can't cope and then also larger ones.
How will countries respond to China's great march forward of goods of exports?
Well, at the firm level, apprehension. At the national level, it depends.
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From winning the Trump trade war, India is now the US President’s biggest target. The Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on India. To add insult to injury, Trump announced another 25% tariff, effective tomorrow, on the grounds that India imports crude oil from Russia.
Indian goods bound for the US will now face tariff rates similar to China’s if we include the Trump 1.0 tariffs, making any China+1 strategy in India less competitive for US markets, and relative to Southeast countries, which for the most part face tariff rates of about 20 per cent.
Will the additional 25% tariff stick? While Russia’s war with Ukraine isn’t going to end by Wednesday, the secondary Trump tariff is likely temporary. Therefore, the question is not whether India will be able to bring the 50% back down to at least 25%, but when.
Eight months after Trump has been inaugurated and we of course have now the EU US deal. What do we know about Trumponomics?
I would say my read is the Miran paper is a blueprint for Trump actions so far on trade. Let's see what I mean by that. And this has consequences of how Trump sees India, which I think is not just escalation to gain leverage.
First, let's talk about an important ally, the EU. The details are out and I would say this is actually rather good for the EU in the context of out of control Trump tariffs.
Why? EU tariffs are NOT stacked. They are ceilings. As in, they get 15% max, including sectoral tariffs like auto (including car parts), pharma, semiconductor, lumber etc but not steel & alum, which they are still trying to negotiate. There are some additional exemptions for EU products such as aircraft, parts, generic pharmas & ingredients etc.
Meaning, to trade for this 15%, the EU is falling closer into the US orbit via investment and trade as well as defense, which it is working on being more self sufficient with increased spending but not just yet.
Anyway, what can you say about other allies? It means South Korea and Japan can and hopefully have similar terms.
Remember that reciprocal tariffs under IEEPA aren't the only ones. Section 232s are pretty scary and more stuff being added all the time without warnings.
An example is steel where a few days ago 400 more products were added to include steel derivatives.
So if you want to have access, this is basically what the costs are and so what does that tell you about others? Here I go back to the Miran paper.
Guys, let's do it. All things Trump tariffs. Here we go. First, let's talk about the basics. 10% is the floor as in everyone gets that. And these are the economies that get higher than that:
15% (EU, Japan, South Korea and 33 countries: Angola, Botswana, etc.)
18% (Nicaragua)
19% (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand)
20% (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Vietnam)
25% (Brunei, India, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tunisia)
30% (Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya, South Africa)
35% (Iraq, Serbia)
39% (Switzerland)
40% (Laos, Myanmar)
41% (Syria)
In Asia, it looks like this. Excluding China and Myanmar, Laos, India got the highest - 25% and maybe more.
China is waiting for talks on extension. Right now, it's 10% reciprocal + 20% fentanyl during extension + 25% during Trump 1.0
Southeast Asia gets 20% to 19% except Laos & Myanmar at 40%, Brunei is 25% but energy is exempt so...
India original was 26% so 25% seems bad but frankly not too far from the Southeast Asians. That being said, India was aiming closer to 15% as Vietnam got dropped from 46% to 20%.
Anyway, let's talk about details of the White House info.
It goes into effect 7th August. But if you got stuff in ports/front-loading and not yet consumed till 1 October, there are varied rates for them.
Long story short, there is still time to negotiate this down before it goes into effect basically.
Trump tariff strikes India at 25% plus Russian oil import punishment. Is it a surprise? Not exactly. I have been thinking for a week what a US India deal look like. And to be honest, I think I saw this coming. I think India can negotiate down from this threat btw. It's not final. But how much lower and what are the costs?
Why is it not a surprise that India is not getting the deal that it is working hard on?
First, let's look at the EU and Japan - they got smacked with 15% tariff & got reprieve for auto (and other sectors) but auto is key at 15%.
So 15% is the best India can get. And it won't get it. Why? Well, it has to offer a lot to Trump to get that and it won't.
Remember that this is just a threat (similar to what Trump did with Japan before they settled on a lower number) and the threat I suppose can be real or not. Irrespective, he cares about it enough to post about it.
Trump has a few agendas that he wants India or Modi's help with.
Ending that Ukraine War is one. And India is not interested in that. It's an emerging country that buys where it can cheapest.
Russian oil is cheapest & so it buys from Russia & Trump wants to starve Russia of oil revenue. India doesn't want to not buy the cheapest oil possible. Besides, Russia is neither a foe nor a friend.
Maybe the West's foe but not India. So on this point, very hard. What are the costs to India? Well, it will have to pay more for its oil if it doesn't buy the cheapest oil.