Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
4/ Reservists are required to undergo annual military training, during which their civilian jobs are retained. Employers receive compensation to offset the absence of employees called up for trainings. Currently, reservists use is authorized only during mobilization or wartime
5/ The proposed changes would allow the military to draw on the reserve “in far more cases than before,” said Alexei Zhuravlyov, first deputy head of the State Duma’s defense committee, speaking to RTVI on Sunday.
5/ “We are engaged in full-scale and very real combat operations, but officially war has not been declared,” Zhuravlyov said. “These legal nuances limited the Defense Ministry’s flexibility. Now, those restrictions have been removed”
6/ The exact number of people who signed such a contract remains speculative, and the reported figures vary from hundreds of thousands to several million. I’m currently working to verify whether that number is accurate.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable
About 60% of the deep strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which with a smaller payload can reach targets 1,500km within Russia and have sophisticated software that has proved resistant to EW jamming.
🧵Thread:
2/ Olena Kryzhanivska, an expert on Ukrainian weapons systems, notes that the FP-1s cost only about $55,000 each and are now being churned out at a rate more than 100 a day. Ukraine is also using the heavier and more expensive Lyutyi drone, which has a range of 2,000km
3/ There are also reports that FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missiles have begun to be used. They are much faster than the drones, flying just 50 metres above the ground, with a range of over 3,000km and packing a huge punch thanks to a 1,150kg warhead