The cleanup is needed b/c SB 79 tells @California_HCD to "promulgate standards" by 7/1/2026 for counting SB 79 capacity toward RHNA, yet (unlike other laws conferring standard-setting authority on HCD), it doesn't exempt HCD from the Administrative Procedures Act.
/2
The Cal APA's notice-and-comment requirements are notoriously cumbersome, far worse than those of the also-very-cumbersome federal APA.
There's not a chance that HCD gets it done through the Cal APA process by the deadline.
/3
HCD could try to invoke the "emergency" exception from notice & comment, but I don't think the emergency criteria would be met.
Missing a statutory deadline does not cause "serious harm to the public peace, health, safety, or general welfare."
/4 oal.ca.gov/emergency_regu…
Also, as I explained in SB 79 Thread #4, local governments should want HCD to issue clear guidelines re: HCD review of SB 79 implementation ordinances & Eckhouse plans.
Those guidelines would also violate the Cal APA unless ratified by Leg.
/5
While the Leg is at it, here are my other suggestions for a trailer bill:
Local implementation ordinances / Eckhouse plans should be required to:
- Declare FAR/density/height allowed in each zone & waive local rules that "physically preclude" it (like SB 79 default rules).
/6
This isn't (now) an explicit requirement of SB 79. Instead, cities must show by "preponderance of the evidence" (tough!) that local dev. standards don't physically preclude allowable density/height/FAR.
I don't see how cities could make that showing as to every parcel.
/7
A legally binding commitment to grant waivers when necessary obviates the need for cities to make parcel-by-parcel showings that local dev standards don't preclude the nominally allowed density/height/FAR.
/8
- Grant SBDL waivers & extra concessions on same terms as the SB 79 default rules (GC 65912.057), i.e., no height waivers but everything else OK.
Again, this isn't (now) an explicit requirement of SB 79 w.r.t. Eckhouse plans. But I presume it's what the Leg intended.
/7
I have a few other minor suggestions, but they're so small bore as to be unworthy of a thread.
HCD, cities, & housing advocates will surely discover other things that would benefit from clarification too.
Should also have pointed to my earlier threads on legal ambiguities in SB 79. (No doubt many other ambiguities will turn up as cities & HCD begin implementing it.)
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New decision from CA Court of Appeal on the fee-shifting provisions of AB 1633 has big implications for NIMBYs' incentive to challenge housing approvals under CEQA & beyond.
Context: As part of the 1970s revolution in admin law, states & the federal gov't actively encouraged self-appointed "private attorneys general" to sue, via attorneys' fee bounties.
/2
Asymmetric fee-shifting provisions were written into scores of public laws: If a plaintiff challenging a gov't decision wins, the gov't has to pay for the plaintiff's attorney; if the plaintiff loses, they don't have to pay for the gov's attorney.
"For a typical mid-rise apartment in San José, construction costs can exceed $700k–$900k per unit."
I 💯% agree w/ @MattMahanSJ that reducing construction costs should be a top priority for 2026 -- and that this is mainly a job for the state legislature.
Reason #1. CA's fiscal constitution + local political incentives push local govs to extract "value" from development w/ impact fees, IZ & transfer taxes.
This drives up the cost of building enormously.
/2
The state leg should preempt most such fees, IZ, & taxes, ***and create a substitute source of local revenue.***
My preferred alternative: a state parcel tax assessed on the "net potential square feet" or "net potential units" created by upzoning pursuant to state law.
/3
Could L.A. really land in the Builder's Remedy penalty box, just for f'ing around with a single low-income housing project which a nonprofit developer wants to build on city-owned land?
In October, @California_HCD sent L.A. a sharply worded letter, warning that the city's housing element had relied on the Venice Dell project both as a "pipeline project" and as part of the city's strategy to "affirmatively further fair housing."
/2 hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/…
The HCD letter also flagged five "policies" and two "programs" in L.A.'s housing element that per HCD should "facilitate the project."
The city's course of action has been "inconsistent with these policies."
Cooking in San Diego: A turquoise, 23-story test of the Permit Streamlining Act's new-and-improved "deemed approved" proviso.
This could turn into a big constitutional battle.
🧵/22
Enacted in 1977, the PSA put time limits on CEQA and other agency reviews of development proposals.
If an agency violated the time limits, the project was to be "deemed approved" by operation of law. Wow!
It proved wholly ineffectual.
/2
As @TDuncheon & I explained, courts first decided that the Leg couldn't possibly have meant for a project to be approved before enviro review was complete.
- San Francisco almost certainly must approve this 25-story project on a site zoned for 4 stories
- The city's new ordinance deregulating density in "well-resourced areas" will operate as de-facto downzoning of such sites
🧵
This project's site is zoned for retail use and is currently occupied by the Marina Safeway.
The zoning classification also allows residential use at density of 1 unit per 600 sqft of lot area or density of nearest residential district, whichever is greater.
/2
The nearest residential district, RM-4, allows density of 1 unit per 200 sqft of lot area.
That translates into 567 units on site.
Developer proposes to build 790 units, which requires a 39% density bonus (790/567 = 1.39).
By describing the credible commitment problem (the need to reassure developers of new housing or energy that their project won't face price controls for a very long time) I didn't mean to imply, as some critics on the right insist, that the problem is insurmountable.
/2
I think the problem can be greatly mitigated:
1. By offering DC-style "certificates of assurance" to developers, i.e., recordable contracts for compensation if the project is subjected to price controls within a defined period of time.
/3