US China tensions are no longer contained but spreading to allies. China is placing limits - forbidding any individual or entity from doing business with five US entities of South Korea's Hanwha Ocean Co, following China levying fees on American ships docking at its ports starting today.
So what's effective today regarding Chinese port dues on US-linked vessels: 1) Owned by US enterprises, organizations or individuals
2)Operated by US enterprises, organizations or individuals 3) A US enterprise, organization or individual holds more than 25% equity, voting rights, board of the entity that owns or operates the vessel. 4) Vessel flies the U.S. flag 5) Vessel was built in the US.
Impact: 5) Near zero, not many ships were built in the US or 0.2% of shipbuilding 4) Minimal - about 80 vessels across all times
1 to 3 has very high impact as a US listed firm is also vulnerable.
Costs too high to make it profitable so huge disruption to global trade. About 15-25% of global dry bulk could be affected given dominance of US commodity traders & US listed shipping companies.
Everyone is likely to reflag to say Singapore and avoid Chinese & American related stuff.
Or to put this another way, this will lead to de-risking mode and make global shipping inefficient.
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Rare earth is in the news again. Of course it is not rare, just that you gotta dig deep and then obvs process it. That entire process is polluting, costly and the output itself doesn't yield a lot.
That's how China has captured the market. It's willing to do polluting working and basically sells more not a lot. But having cornered that market, it also sees it as leverage, which it has used since 2010 (with Japan). The weaponization of supply chain is what we call it.
The free market economics of it makes sense for people to just leave it to China to do rare earth & then focus on the more market profitable business. Until, well, dun, dun dun.
So how should a firm or government view rare earth? Should you go and pay HIGHER price than what the Chinese rare earths are going for to then secure resilience of supply chain?
Most say, well, "Nah." That is a costly move because well, others will outcompete you with cheaper Chinese inputs while you go dig and refine your rare-earth magnets. Not an economically worthwhile endeavor.
But not everyone has taken that decision. Here is a story of a company that didn't: General Motors.
Here I summarize the great reporting of the WSJ Jon Emont and Christopher Otts.
As you know, we have known this issue for a long time & Japan knew about it since 2010. So the Japanese usually have about 1 year of this stockpile, just in case. Not the Americans.
The car industry is pretty dependent on rare-earth magnets. GM decided that Covid shocks, which left it with semiconductor shortage, that it should secure non-Chinese rare earth magnets.
This sort of decision takes years to bear fruit so it is one with risks. Why? Well, your competitors can buy cheaper Chinese rare earth while you are trying to get more expensive non-Chinese.
Here we go, as I'll go on TV soon with @JoumannaTV to discuss data, let's take a look at China September trade data that just came out.
September exports rose 8.3%YoY in USD and imports increased 7.4%YoY.
Year-to-date, exports grew 6.1% while imports declined -1.1%YoY.
By destination, China exports to the US fell -16.9% but to Asia rising rapidly.
Exports to India rose 12.9% and India deficit with China is accelerating, with imports not just intermediates for production but also final consumer goods.
Shipment to ASEAN rose 14.7% with fastest growth to Thailand and Vietnam (+22.5% and 22.3%, respectively). The sharp increase of shipment reflect supply chain diversification but also rising imports for domestic demand in ASEAN that also poses challenges to domestic industries.
Exports to the EU rose 8.2% with shipment to Germany increasing +10.5%.
Interestingly, China exports to Russia has fallen this year by -11.3% as Russia puts up curbs to some Chinese exports.
China trade surplus in September:
#1 EU 22.9
#2 USA 22.8bn
#3 ASEAN 17.2bn
#4 India 10.3bn
From winning the Trump trade war, India is now the US President’s biggest target. The Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on India. To add insult to injury, Trump announced another 25% tariff, effective tomorrow, on the grounds that India imports crude oil from Russia.
Indian goods bound for the US will now face tariff rates similar to China’s if we include the Trump 1.0 tariffs, making any China+1 strategy in India less competitive for US markets, and relative to Southeast countries, which for the most part face tariff rates of about 20 per cent.
Will the additional 25% tariff stick? While Russia’s war with Ukraine isn’t going to end by Wednesday, the secondary Trump tariff is likely temporary. Therefore, the question is not whether India will be able to bring the 50% back down to at least 25%, but when.
Eight months after Trump has been inaugurated and we of course have now the EU US deal. What do we know about Trumponomics?
I would say my read is the Miran paper is a blueprint for Trump actions so far on trade. Let's see what I mean by that. And this has consequences of how Trump sees India, which I think is not just escalation to gain leverage.
First, let's talk about an important ally, the EU. The details are out and I would say this is actually rather good for the EU in the context of out of control Trump tariffs.
Why? EU tariffs are NOT stacked. They are ceilings. As in, they get 15% max, including sectoral tariffs like auto (including car parts), pharma, semiconductor, lumber etc but not steel & alum, which they are still trying to negotiate. There are some additional exemptions for EU products such as aircraft, parts, generic pharmas & ingredients etc.
Meaning, to trade for this 15%, the EU is falling closer into the US orbit via investment and trade as well as defense, which it is working on being more self sufficient with increased spending but not just yet.
Anyway, what can you say about other allies? It means South Korea and Japan can and hopefully have similar terms.
Remember that reciprocal tariffs under IEEPA aren't the only ones. Section 232s are pretty scary and more stuff being added all the time without warnings.
An example is steel where a few days ago 400 more products were added to include steel derivatives.
So if you want to have access, this is basically what the costs are and so what does that tell you about others? Here I go back to the Miran paper.