Thread Update: The China Spy Scandal - 24-Hour Developments and Government Misdirection Tactics
As always views my own, facts can and should be checked and corrected if wrong.
Drafted whilst travelling so apologies for spelling, grammar and brevity.
1/25 Here is a (hopefully) detailed update on the UK China spy case involving Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry. Over the last 24 hours (13-14 October 2025), fresh revelations have emerged, including ministerial statements in Parliament, accusations of scapegoating career civil servants, and renewed opposition pressure. I’ll try and break it down step by step, highlighting how the government is employing tactics to mislead and misdirect public attention, such as blaming deputies, denying key roles, and potentially leveraging lobby groups to shift narratives onto unrelated issues. This comes amid ongoing efforts to downplay National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell’s membership in the 48 Group Club, a pro-China network accused of grooming UK elites. Remember, these tactics persist despite potential short-term damage to Labour, as the priority seems to be containing the fallout.
Recap of the Core Case: From Arrests to Collapse
2/25 To try and set the scene, Cash (former researcher for Alicia Kearns MP) and Berry (Oxford academic with Chinese ties) were arrested in March 2023 and charged in April 2024 under the Official Secrets Act for allegedly passing sensitive info to China’s United Front Work Department, reaching Politburo member Cai Qi. MI5 called the evidence robust. But on 15 September 2025, charges were dropped due to lack of a government statement confirming China as a “threat” post a 2025 court precedent. In the last 24 hours, no new arrests or revivals, but the debate intensified in Commons, with ministers sticking to “procedural failure” lines while opposition calls it a cover-up.
Key Change in Last 24 Hours: Jarvis Blames Collins in Parliament
3/25 Yesterday (13 October), Security Minister Dan Jarvis told the Commons the case collapsed because Deputy NSA Matthew Collins provided inadequate witness statements in December 2023, February 2025, and July 2025—spanning both governments. Jarvis claimed Collins had “full freedom” without interference. This marks a shift: previously, the government broadly blamed “legacy issues”; now, it’s pinpointing a civil servant. Critics like Tom Tugendhat accuse Labour of “throwing Collins under the bus” to protect Powell and ministers.
Tactic Spotlight: Scapegoating Civil Servants to Misdirect Blame
4/25 This move exemplifies government misdirection: by isolating fault on a career bureaucrat like Collins, Labour diverts from executive responsibility. The Ministerial Code requires ministers to oversee officials and not mislead Parliament—yet Jarvis’s statement implies hands-off, despite Powell’s meeting chairing role. This tactic shields elected officials, eroding trust in civil service neutrality. In the last 24 hours, no defence from Collins, but opposition demands his testimony to clarify.
Did Dan Jarvis Break the Ministerial Code?
5/25 The Ministerial Code mandates ministers uphold “the highest standards of propriety,” including truthfulness and not misleading Parliament (Section 1.3). Jarvis’s 13 October claim of no ministerial involvement contradicts earlier admissions of Powell’s advisory input. Tugendhat argues this misleads, as the executive bears ultimate accountability. No breach ruling yet, but select committees could investigate, similar to past cases. In the last day, Jarvis faced no direct challenge in Commons, but opposition vows to pursue.
Powell’s 48 Group Membership: Attempts to Cover and Downplay
6/25 Revealed on 12 October, Powell’s fellowship in the 48 Group Club—a pro-China lobby founded by British communists, accused of grooming elites—remains a flashpoint. In the last 24 hours, ministers like Phillipson denied Powell’s spy case role, avoiding his affiliations. Government briefings to MSM emphasise “procedural” aspects, misdirecting from Powell’s potential conflicts. This cover tactic ignores how such memberships could influence policy, like the case drop.
Mandelson and Blair-Era Links to China Lobbies
7/25 Former Blair minister Peter Mandelson, sacked as US ambassador on 11 September over Epstein ties, has deep China connections: adviser to China International Capital Corporation and linked to pro-CCP networks. In the last 24 hours, Boris Johnson tied Mandelson to the spy row in a podcast, suggesting Blairite influences persist. Government misdirects by focusing on Mandelson’s Epstein scandal, not his China lobbies, protecting the “cabal” narrative.
Government Misdirection: Using Lobby Groups to Shift Narratives
8/25 Lobby groups like the 48 Group (and others, such as 411 Communications—a digitally native agency founded in September 2024 from Labour’s 2024 election digital team, specialising in progressive campaigns, disinformation countermeasures, and content creation) are used to direct MSM onto other subjects. 411, with 11-50 employees including alumni like Ned Milligan, focuses on social media amplification and AI tools, often for undisclosed progressive clients. In the last 24 hours, briefings pushed coverage towards “outdated laws” (BBC) or “Tory failures” (Guardian), away from Powell. These groups foster pro-engagement stories, misdirecting from security erosion to economic benefits, sustaining Labour’s narrative despite damage.
Tactic: Denials and Contradictions in Ministerial Statements
9/25 Phillipson’s 13 October Sky News claim Powell had “no role” contradicts Jarvis’s Commons admission of his advice. This inconsistency misleads Parliament and public, breaching Code transparency. Last 24 hours saw no correction, with MSM (ITV) dismissing opposition as “nonsense,” possibly influenced by lobby ties like 411’s network of journalists and influencers, who have been involved in paid, undisclosed content.
New Revelations: FCDO “Chinese Mole” and Burner Phones
10/25 Updates from 13 October: reports of a “Chinese mole” in FCDO, prompting reviews. Berry’s burner phones with Beijing-exclusive apps strengthened original evidence. Government misdirects by blaming Collins, not addressing these, shifting narrative to procedural mishaps.
US Warnings and International Fallout
11/25 White House on 13 October warned Starmer the drop risks Five Eyes sharing; Trump aides doubt UK reliability. In last 24 hours, no government response, misdirecting focus to domestic “legacy” blames, eroding sovereignty in alliances.
Opposition Pressure Ramps Up
12/25 Badenoch demanded answers on 13 October; Tugendhat accused scapegoating. Last 24 hours: calls for emergency debate, possible Code breach probe. Government tactics: dismiss as “baseless,” using MSM allies to portray as partisan attacks.
Erosion of Sovereignty: No Longer Exclusive from Security
13/25 This government views sovereignty and security as intertwined excuses for erosion. Tactics include ceding control under “security” pretexts, misleading on implications.
Example 1: Chagos Islands Cession
14/25 In October 2025, UK ceded Chagos sovereignty to Mauritius (PRC ally), retaining Diego Garcia base. Powell overruled advisors; government misdirects as “decolonisation,” but its sovereignty loss, using “security” (US base) as cover.
Chagos Misdirection Tactics
15/25 Lobby groups like 48 and 411 push “global cooperation” narratives in MSM, shifting from sovereignty erosion to “diplomatic win.” Last 24 hours: no new Chagos updates, but links to spy case via Powell highlight pattern.
Example 2: Illegal Immigration and Border Sovereignty
16/25 Labour’s policies—scrapping Rwanda scheme, increasing removals but not stemming Channel crossings—erode border sovereignty. Over 20,000 arrivals in 2025; government uses “security threats” from migrants as excuse for EU deals ceding control.
Immigration Misdirection
17/25 Using lobbies like 411—which offers disinformation training and influencer outreach—to redirect MSM to “humanitarian” angles, away from sovereignty loss. Last 24 hours: no direct spy-immigration link, but overall tactic sustains narrative of “managed migration” despite erosion.
Broader Tactics: Mislead via Selective Briefings
18/25 Government briefs MSM on “efforts made” (Guardian, 13 Oct), misleading on full involvement. Lobbies like 411 amplify, directing to “Tory failures,” with their expertise in social listening and content under NDAs helping craft undisclosed favourable posts.
Covering Powell’s 48 Group Ties
19/25 Ministers avoid mentioning; MSM (BBC, 13 Oct) focuses on “no decisions” by Powell, misdirecting from conflicts. Mandelson’s similar links ignored in briefings.
Mandelson’s China Lobbies: Pattern of Blairite Influence
20/25 Mandelson advised China International Capital; lobbies like 48 connect him. Government misdirects to Epstein, not China ties, protecting network.
Sovereignty Erosion: Security as Excuse
21/25 Government erodes sovereignty under “security” guise—Chagos for base “security,” immigration deals for “border security”—misleading on long-term loss.
Last 24 Hours: Jarvis’s Statement and Backlash
22/25 Jarvis’s 13 Oct Commons blame on Collins sparked Tugendhat’s “under the bus” accusation. Tactic: isolate blame, but opposition calls for probe.
Potential Code Breach by Jarvis
23/25 Code requires truthfulness; Jarvis’s denials may mislead. Last 24 hours: no admission, but scrutiny grows.
Lobby Role in Narrative Shift
24/25 Groups like 48 and 411—founded from Labour’s digital team, specialising in campaigns and paying journalists under NDAs—direct MSM to “semantics muddle” (Guardian, 13 Oct), away from cover-up.
Conclusion: Damage Despite Tactics
25/25 Despite misdirection, last 24 hours’ revelations—scapegoating, Code questions, US warnings—intensify damage. Sovereignty erosion continues unchecked, demanding scrutiny.
So much going on, which in itself is a tactic. You’ll have Miliband announcing the UK’s largest solar farm next….
A good day to bury bad news as someone once said
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The Troubled Odyssey of the GDLS AJAX Programme: A Chronicle of Procurement Failures
Views my own, corrections welcome.
1/25
In the annals of British defence procurement, few sagas rival the protracted and scandal-ridden journey of the AJAX armoured vehicle programme (but E-7 seems to be giving it a good run for its money). Conceived as a cornerstone of the British Army’s modernisation efforts, AJAX promised to deliver a family of cutting-edge platforms capable of revolutionising reconnaissance and combat operations in an era of networked warfare. Rooted in the late 1990s’ Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) initiative, it evolved into a £5.5 billion contract awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) in 2010 for 589 vehicles across six variants: the reconnaissance-focused AJAX, the ARES personnel carrier, the ATHENA command vehicle, the ARGUS engineer reconnaissance variant, the ATLAS recovery vehicle, and the APOLLO repair platform.
These vehicles were envisioned as digitally integrated marvels, boasting superior mobility, sensor fusion, and data-sharing capabilities to align with the Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine. Yet, what began as a beacon of innovation has devolved into a quagmire of missed milestones, manufacturing blunders, health and safety catastrophes, and institutional intransigence. Drawing on exhaustive reports like the Sheldon Review (2023), the Ajax Noise and Vibration Review (2021), parliamentary evidence sessions, whistleblower testimonies, and the latest update from Defence Secretary Luke Pollard on the 22nd January 2026, this thread attempts to unravel the programme’s timeline. It exposes how commercial pressures from GDLS-UK and the Army’s unyielding push for capability have consistently trumped the welfare of service personnel. Special emphasis is placed on the pivotal role of the Institute of Naval Medicine (INM) report, which laid bare the severe noise and vibration risks, with direct quotes (just to remind everyone) underscoring the gravity of these failures. As I go deeper into this narrative, the evidence paints a damning picture of systemic failures that have allowed AJAX to limp forward, at great human and financial cost.
Origins and Contract Award: Seeds of Controversy (Late 1990s–2010)
2/25
The AJAX story traces its roots to the post-Cold War era, when the British Army sought to replace its ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) fleet with something more agile and technologically advanced. Initiatives like the Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) and FRES laid the groundwork, but by 2010, the MoD opted for GDLS-UK’s ASCOD-based design over rivals such as BAE Systems’ CV90. This choice was not without debate: critics argued that selecting an unproven adaptation of the ASCOD—primarily to diversify suppliers and avoid a BAE monopoly—introduced unnecessary risks. The contract emphasised assembly in Merthyr Tydfil, Wales, touting economic benefits like job creation, but it also locked in a firm-priced structure where GDLS-UK shouldered cost overruns, potentially incentivising shortcuts.
Initial projections were optimistic: an in-service date around 2017, with vehicles enhancing NATO interoperability and addressing capability gaps exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the bespoke modifications—over 1,200 unique requirements—transformed ASCOD into a complex, heavy, custom beast, setting the stage for future woes.
Early Manufacturing and Timeline Slippages (2010–2014)
3/25 From the outset, production decisions sowed discord. The first 100 hulls were fabricated in Spain by GDLS-UK’s parent company, sparking concerns over quality assurance and supply chain vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in welding and hull tolerances emerged early, issues that would later manifest as debilitating vibrations. By 2014, the MoD formalised the £3.5 billion manufacture phase, aiming for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in July 2020—a squadron deployable with full support.
Yet, the programme’s timeline had already ballooned by three years, a harbinger of deeper problems. The overlap between demonstration and manufacturing phases, intended to be brief, stretched perilously, amplifying risks as prototypes informed production without full validation. These early slippages reflected an underestimation of the engineering challenges in adapting a foreign platform to (1200+ extra) British specifications.
Views my own, corrections and comments welcome - it’s about the debate.
1/25 The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has long prided itself on maintaining a capable armoured force, with the Challenger series of main battle tanks (MBTs) serving as the backbone of its heavy armour since the 1980s. The transition from the Challenger 2 to the Challenger 3 represents a critical upgrade programme aimed at extending the life of these vehicles into the 2040s. However, this endeavour has been beset by a myriad of challenges, ranging from technical hurdles such as weight management and turret integration to logistical issues like component shortages and the reactivation of stored vehicles. These problems are not isolated; they reflect broader systemic difficulties within the British Army’s armoured vehicle procurement, as evidenced by the troubled Ajax programme. In this thread, I’ll attempt to examine these challenges in detail, drawing on official reports, defence analyses, and comparative insights from other nations such as Germany and Poland. I’ll argue that while the decision to upgrade existing Challenger 2 hulls rather than procure new platforms may have seemed cost-effective, it risks leaving the UK with an outdated and insufficiently modernised fleet, potentially compromising its strategic posture in an era of renewed great-power competition.
By comparing the UK’s approach to those of its NATO allies, this analysis highlights why the upgrade path may have been a suboptimal choice, perpetuating vulnerabilities in an increasingly contested global security environment.
Background on the Challenger 2
2/25 The Challenger 2, introduced in 1998, has been a stalwart of the British Army, renowned for its robust Dorchester armour and combat-proven reliability, including in operations in Iraq. By the 2010s, obsolescence concerns prompted the MoD to initiate the Life Extension Programme, which evolved into the Challenger 3 upgrade.
The Challenger 3 Upgrade Contract
3/25 This upgrade is under a £800 million contract awarded to Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) in 2021. It involves refurbishing 148 Challenger 2 hulls with a new turret featuring a smoothbore 120mm L55A1 gun, advanced Trophy active protection system (APS), and enhanced digital systems.
The Challenges Facing the British Army: Strategic Drift, Procurement Failures, and Operational Shortcomings in the Post-Afghanistan Era
Views and thoughts my one, corrections and comments welcome.
1/25 A Christmas Day thread on the British Army’s struggles over the past 15 years. From identity crisis post-Afghanistan to procurement woes like AJAX and Challenger 3. Critical, factual analysis with NATO comparisons.
Introduction
2/25 The British Army, once a cornerstone of global military power, has grappled with profound challenges over the past 15 years, particularly since the final withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This period marks a transition from prolonged counter-insurgency operations to an era of strategic uncertainty, exacerbated by geopolitical shifts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
3/25 Unlike the Royal Navy, which maintains a clear maritime deterrence role through its carrier strike group and nuclear submarines, or the Royal Air Force (RAF), with its emphasis on air superiority and strategic airlift, the Army has struggled to articulate a coherent post-Afghanistan identity.
Canada’s Fighter Jet Crisis: Why Replacing the CF-18 Is So Much More Than Buying Planes
Views my own, comments and corrections welcome.
1/25 The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is flying 40-year-old CF-18 Hornets on borrowed time. Structural cracks, obsolete avionics, and readiness rates hovering below 50 % mean the clock is ticking louder than ever. The Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) — meant to deliver 88 new jets — has become one of the most politically charged, industrially complex, and strategically fraught procurements in Canadian history. This thread attempts to explain why, from post-war history to the November 2025 standoff with the United States.
Post-War RCAF: From Empire Air Training to Cold War Interceptor
2/25 1945–1960: Canada demobilised from a 215,000-strong wartime air force to a small peacetime RCAF focused on continental defence. First jet: the Canadair-licensed F-86 Sabre (1,200 built in Montreal). Role: high-altitude interception of Soviet Tu-95 Bears over the Arctic. Industry: massive licensed production. Lesson: Canada could be a serious aerospace player when offsets were generous.
The Nuclear Era and the Controversial CF-104 Starfighter
3/25 1961–1986: The RCAF (later CAF) bought 200 CF-104 Starfighters for low-level nuclear strike in Europe under NATO. Accident rate was appalling (“Widowmaker”), and the aircraft hated Canadian winters. Political takeaway: Ottawa accepted a technically suboptimal platform because NATO political solidarity trumped operational fit.
The E-7 Wedgetail Programme: A Case Study in Strategic Procurement Failure
Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. References in post 25.
1/25 The Royal Air Force’s (RAF) acquisition of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail was intended to restore sovereign airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability post-E-3D retirement. Instead, it has become emblematic of systemic deficiencies in Ministry of Defence (MoD) major project delivery. This thread attempts to examine the requirement, procurement strategy, risk management, and international ramifications using official reporting and parliamentary evidence.
Original Requirement and Operational Concept
2/25 The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated a successor to the E-3D Sentry capable of persistent, multi-domain surveillance and command and control (C2). The E-7’s Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) provides 360° coverage, simultaneous air/maritime tracking of 2,000 contacts, and range exceeding 370 km. The Initial Gate business case specified five airframes to sustain a continuous two-aircraft orbit with appropriate maintenance float.
Role Within RAF Force Structure
3/25 The Wedgetail is designed to function as a high-endurance C2 node, integrating sensor feeds from F-35, Typhoon, P-8, satellites, and ground-based radars via Link 16 and sovereign datalinks. It enables standoff direction of offensive counter-air, strike coordination, and maritime domain awareness. Endurance: 9 hours unrefuelled, >20 hours with AAR. The platform was to be fully interoperable with NATO and Five Eyes partners while preserving UK cryptographic sovereignty (from aircraft 3).
The British Army, November 2025: A Force Asked to Do Too Much with Too Little
Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. All information comes from open source.
1/25 Five months after the June Strategic Defence Review promised a “NATO-first” land power capable of deploying a full division to Europe within ten days, the British Army is smaller, lighter, and more fragile than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. This thread attempts to examine one straightforward question: can the Army actually deliver the tasks the government has set for it, both at home and within NATO? I will try and walk through the commitments, expose the critical gaps in capability, and contrast the polished rhetoric of senior officers and politicians with the harder reality on the ground.
National Tasks – What the Government Expects at Home
2/25 The SDR 2025 and its predecessors expect the Army to defend the United Kingdom against hybrid threats such as sabotage, cyber strikes, and disinformation campaigns. It must also be able to mount rapid counter-terrorist operations anywhere in the world and evacuate British citizens from crisis zones, whether in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. All of these missions demand an agile, resilient, and rapidly deployable force. With only (circa) 73,800 regular soldiers—the smallest regular Army since 1714—true agility is in increasingly short supply.
NATO Tasks – The Real Heavy Lifting
3/25 NATO commitments are far more demanding. Britain leads the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Estonia, a formation that must be able to expand seamlessly to a full brigade on demand. In the event of a major Article 5 emergency—Russia crossing a NATO border, for example—the United Kingdom has promised to deploy an entire division, roughly 20,000 troops with armoured brigades at its core, within ten days and to sustain it in combat for months. This is the centrepiece of the government’s “NATO-first” policy, and it is not a paper commitment; allies are counting on it.