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Oct 14 25 tweets 8 min read Read on X
Thread Update: The China Spy Scandal - 24-Hour Developments and Government Misdirection Tactics

As always views my own, facts can and should be checked and corrected if wrong.

Drafted whilst travelling so apologies for spelling, grammar and brevity.

1/25 Here is a (hopefully) detailed update on the UK China spy case involving Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry. Over the last 24 hours (13-14 October 2025), fresh revelations have emerged, including ministerial statements in Parliament, accusations of scapegoating career civil servants, and renewed opposition pressure. I’ll try and break it down step by step, highlighting how the government is employing tactics to mislead and misdirect public attention, such as blaming deputies, denying key roles, and potentially leveraging lobby groups to shift narratives onto unrelated issues. This comes amid ongoing efforts to downplay National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell’s membership in the 48 Group Club, a pro-China network accused of grooming UK elites. Remember, these tactics persist despite potential short-term damage to Labour, as the priority seems to be containing the fallout.Image
Recap of the Core Case: From Arrests to Collapse

2/25 To try and set the scene, Cash (former researcher for Alicia Kearns MP) and Berry (Oxford academic with Chinese ties) were arrested in March 2023 and charged in April 2024 under the Official Secrets Act for allegedly passing sensitive info to China’s United Front Work Department, reaching Politburo member Cai Qi. MI5 called the evidence robust. But on 15 September 2025, charges were dropped due to lack of a government statement confirming China as a “threat” post a 2025 court precedent. In the last 24 hours, no new arrests or revivals, but the debate intensified in Commons, with ministers sticking to “procedural failure” lines while opposition calls it a cover-up.Image
Key Change in Last 24 Hours: Jarvis Blames Collins in Parliament

3/25 Yesterday (13 October), Security Minister Dan Jarvis told the Commons the case collapsed because Deputy NSA Matthew Collins provided inadequate witness statements in December 2023, February 2025, and July 2025—spanning both governments. Jarvis claimed Collins had “full freedom” without interference. This marks a shift: previously, the government broadly blamed “legacy issues”; now, it’s pinpointing a civil servant. Critics like Tom Tugendhat accuse Labour of “throwing Collins under the bus” to protect Powell and ministers.Image
Tactic Spotlight: Scapegoating Civil Servants to Misdirect Blame

4/25 This move exemplifies government misdirection: by isolating fault on a career bureaucrat like Collins, Labour diverts from executive responsibility. The Ministerial Code requires ministers to oversee officials and not mislead Parliament—yet Jarvis’s statement implies hands-off, despite Powell’s meeting chairing role. This tactic shields elected officials, eroding trust in civil service neutrality. In the last 24 hours, no defence from Collins, but opposition demands his testimony to clarify.
Did Dan Jarvis Break the Ministerial Code?

5/25 The Ministerial Code mandates ministers uphold “the highest standards of propriety,” including truthfulness and not misleading Parliament (Section 1.3). Jarvis’s 13 October claim of no ministerial involvement contradicts earlier admissions of Powell’s advisory input. Tugendhat argues this misleads, as the executive bears ultimate accountability. No breach ruling yet, but select committees could investigate, similar to past cases. In the last day, Jarvis faced no direct challenge in Commons, but opposition vows to pursue.Image
Powell’s 48 Group Membership: Attempts to Cover and Downplay

6/25 Revealed on 12 October, Powell’s fellowship in the 48 Group Club—a pro-China lobby founded by British communists, accused of grooming elites—remains a flashpoint. In the last 24 hours, ministers like Phillipson denied Powell’s spy case role, avoiding his affiliations. Government briefings to MSM emphasise “procedural” aspects, misdirecting from Powell’s potential conflicts. This cover tactic ignores how such memberships could influence policy, like the case drop.Image
Mandelson and Blair-Era Links to China Lobbies

7/25 Former Blair minister Peter Mandelson, sacked as US ambassador on 11 September over Epstein ties, has deep China connections: adviser to China International Capital Corporation and linked to pro-CCP networks. In the last 24 hours, Boris Johnson tied Mandelson to the spy row in a podcast, suggesting Blairite influences persist. Government misdirects by focusing on Mandelson’s Epstein scandal, not his China lobbies, protecting the “cabal” narrative.Image
Government Misdirection: Using Lobby Groups to Shift Narratives

8/25 Lobby groups like the 48 Group (and others, such as 411 Communications—a digitally native agency founded in September 2024 from Labour’s 2024 election digital team, specialising in progressive campaigns, disinformation countermeasures, and content creation) are used to direct MSM onto other subjects. 411, with 11-50 employees including alumni like Ned Milligan, focuses on social media amplification and AI tools, often for undisclosed progressive clients. In the last 24 hours, briefings pushed coverage towards “outdated laws” (BBC) or “Tory failures” (Guardian), away from Powell. These groups foster pro-engagement stories, misdirecting from security erosion to economic benefits, sustaining Labour’s narrative despite damage.Image
Tactic: Denials and Contradictions in Ministerial Statements

9/25 Phillipson’s 13 October Sky News claim Powell had “no role” contradicts Jarvis’s Commons admission of his advice. This inconsistency misleads Parliament and public, breaching Code transparency. Last 24 hours saw no correction, with MSM (ITV) dismissing opposition as “nonsense,” possibly influenced by lobby ties like 411’s network of journalists and influencers, who have been involved in paid, undisclosed content.Image
New Revelations: FCDO “Chinese Mole” and Burner Phones

10/25 Updates from 13 October: reports of a “Chinese mole” in FCDO, prompting reviews. Berry’s burner phones with Beijing-exclusive apps strengthened original evidence. Government misdirects by blaming Collins, not addressing these, shifting narrative to procedural mishaps.
US Warnings and International Fallout

11/25 White House on 13 October warned Starmer the drop risks Five Eyes sharing; Trump aides doubt UK reliability. In last 24 hours, no government response, misdirecting focus to domestic “legacy” blames, eroding sovereignty in alliances.
Opposition Pressure Ramps Up

12/25 Badenoch demanded answers on 13 October; Tugendhat accused scapegoating. Last 24 hours: calls for emergency debate, possible Code breach probe. Government tactics: dismiss as “baseless,” using MSM allies to portray as partisan attacks.
Erosion of Sovereignty: No Longer Exclusive from Security

13/25 This government views sovereignty and security as intertwined excuses for erosion. Tactics include ceding control under “security” pretexts, misleading on implications.
Example 1: Chagos Islands Cession

14/25 In October 2025, UK ceded Chagos sovereignty to Mauritius (PRC ally), retaining Diego Garcia base. Powell overruled advisors; government misdirects as “decolonisation,” but its sovereignty loss, using “security” (US base) as cover.
Chagos Misdirection Tactics

15/25 Lobby groups like 48 and 411 push “global cooperation” narratives in MSM, shifting from sovereignty erosion to “diplomatic win.” Last 24 hours: no new Chagos updates, but links to spy case via Powell highlight pattern.
Example 2: Illegal Immigration and Border Sovereignty

16/25 Labour’s policies—scrapping Rwanda scheme, increasing removals but not stemming Channel crossings—erode border sovereignty. Over 20,000 arrivals in 2025; government uses “security threats” from migrants as excuse for EU deals ceding control.
Immigration Misdirection

17/25 Using lobbies like 411—which offers disinformation training and influencer outreach—to redirect MSM to “humanitarian” angles, away from sovereignty loss. Last 24 hours: no direct spy-immigration link, but overall tactic sustains narrative of “managed migration” despite erosion.
Broader Tactics: Mislead via Selective Briefings

18/25 Government briefs MSM on “efforts made” (Guardian, 13 Oct), misleading on full involvement. Lobbies like 411 amplify, directing to “Tory failures,” with their expertise in social listening and content under NDAs helping craft undisclosed favourable posts.
Covering Powell’s 48 Group Ties

19/25 Ministers avoid mentioning; MSM (BBC, 13 Oct) focuses on “no decisions” by Powell, misdirecting from conflicts. Mandelson’s similar links ignored in briefings.Image
Mandelson’s China Lobbies: Pattern of Blairite Influence

20/25 Mandelson advised China International Capital; lobbies like 48 connect him. Government misdirects to Epstein, not China ties, protecting network.
Sovereignty Erosion: Security as Excuse

21/25 Government erodes sovereignty under “security” guise—Chagos for base “security,” immigration deals for “border security”—misleading on long-term loss.Image
Last 24 Hours: Jarvis’s Statement and Backlash

22/25 Jarvis’s 13 Oct Commons blame on Collins sparked Tugendhat’s “under the bus” accusation. Tactic: isolate blame, but opposition calls for probe.Image
Potential Code Breach by Jarvis

23/25 Code requires truthfulness; Jarvis’s denials may mislead. Last 24 hours: no admission, but scrutiny grows.
Lobby Role in Narrative Shift

24/25 Groups like 48 and 411—founded from Labour’s digital team, specialising in campaigns and paying journalists under NDAs—direct MSM to “semantics muddle” (Guardian, 13 Oct), away from cover-up.Image
Conclusion: Damage Despite Tactics

25/25 Despite misdirection, last 24 hours’ revelations—scapegoating, Code questions, US warnings—intensify damage. Sovereignty erosion continues unchecked, demanding scrutiny.

So much going on, which in itself is a tactic. You’ll have Miliband announcing the UK’s largest solar farm next….

A good day to bury bad news as someone once saidImage

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More from @MtarfaL

Oct 1
The Imperative of Data Control in the Digital Age: From Raw Inputs to Strategic Intelligence

Introduction (Part 1)

As always views are my own, facts can and should be corrected.

1/25 In an era where data flows as ceaselessly as the digital currents of the internet, the modern world operates on information derived from vast repositories of human activity. From social media interactions to financial transactions, data underpins economies, governments, and societies. Yet, the true power lies not in the accumulation of data itself, but in its control—specifically, the mastery over structured and unstructured forms. This thread explores the utilisation of data in contemporary contexts, delineating the distinctions between structured and unstructured data, and elucidating why artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) rely on these sources to convert raw data into actionable information and intelligence.Image
Introduction (Part 2)

2/25 It further examines the strategic importance of data hosting, processing, and ownership, including the economic incentives driving corporate investments. Drawing on recent developments involving Oracle, Palantir, and BlackRock’s ties to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the discussion attempt’s to highlight sovereignty challenges and the risks posed by third-party dependencies under frameworks like the U.S. Patriot Act and FISA Section 702. In particular, it scrutinises deals in the UK and Western Europe that ostensibly safeguard data while potentially undermining autonomy, including the newly announced mandatory digital ID schemes.
Introduction (Part 3)

3/25 Ultimately, it argues that true national security demands self-reliant data ecosystems, redirecting focus from traditional military deterrence to safeguarding against data exploitation. With the UK government’s recent push for a compulsory digital ID by 2029, aimed at curbing illegal migration but raising surveillance fears, these issues have never been more pressing.Image
Read 25 tweets
Sep 28
Very Low Frequency Radio: Enabling Submerged Submarine Communication in the Modern Era

Views my own, facts can be corrected.

Sunday Essay

Posted because TACAMO (E-6B) has been reported operating in the North Atlantic

1/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio constitutes a pivotal technology in military communications, particularly for maintaining contact with submerged submarines without compromising their stealth. This thread attempts to examine the principles of VLF, its operational mechanisms, and its strategic importance for select nations. It addresses the technical specifications, including antenna dimensions, power requirements, and data transmission capacities, alongside implementations by the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. Further, it discusses global utilisation, interception by amateur radio operators, transmission metrics, and resilience in nuclear scenarios, concluding with an overview of the technology’s challenges and robustness.Image
Defining Very Low Frequency Radio

2/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio waves occupy the electromagnetic spectrum between 3 and 30 kilohertz (kHz). In contrast to higher-frequency signals, which are rapidly attenuated in seawater, VLF waves can penetrate to depths of approximately 40 metres. This property enables the transmission of essential directives to submarines, such as those carrying ballistic missiles (SSBNs), allowing them to remain submerged and undetected during extended patrols.Image
Principles of Submarine Communication via VLF

3/25 The efficacy of VLF for submarine communication arises from its ability to traverse conductive seawater, where shorter wavelengths are absorbed. This facilitates one-way dissemination of strategic commands, positional data, and urgent notifications. Nations with advanced submarine capabilities prioritise VLF to preserve operational secrecy, as surfacing or deploying antennas at shallower depths increases vulnerability to detection in contested maritime environments.Image
Read 25 tweets
Sep 4
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Status and UK Implications

Part of my wider series on F-35. As always, views my own - facts can and should be corrected if wrong.

This follows the GAO report.

1/25 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter remains a critical asset in modern military aviation, blending stealth, advanced sensors, and networked systems to bolster combat prowess for the United States and its allies. As outlined in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report just released (and getting lots of attention), the programme has delivered over 1,100 aircraft since production commenced in 2006. However, it continues to face substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. Total acquisition costs now surpass $485 billion, an $89.5 billion rise from the 2012 baseline, primarily due to modernisation efforts. Sustainment costs over the aircraft’s 77-year lifecycle are projected at $1.58 trillion, pushing the overall expense beyond $2 trillion.

For us (United Kingdom), a key (tier 1) partner contributing to development, production, and sustainment, these issues manifest as operational shortfalls and strategic risks. This thread tries to explore the F-35’s status, emphasising UK effects, drawing on the GAO report and other recent developments.Image
Programme Challenges: Cost Escalations and Delays

2/25 The GAO highlights modernisation as the chief culprit for inefficiencies. The Block 4 effort, a $16.5 billion initiative to enhance hardware and software for capabilities like new weapons and radar improvements, is over $6 billion above original estimates and at least five years delayed, with completion now eyed beyond 2031.
The programme is trimming Block 4 scope to prioritise deliverable elements by 2031.
A critical enabler, Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—a $1.9 billion hardware-software suite—has been a major bottleneck, but recent updates indicate completion of software upgrades in June 2025, rendering aircraft combat-capable. Despite this, TR-3 delays contributed to 72 aircraft deliveries in 2025 facing holdbacks.
Production woes persist: Contractors Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney delivered all 110 aircraft and engines late in 2024, averaging 238 days behind schedule.Image
GAO Recommendations for Improvement

3/25 The GAO critiques incentive structures, noting Lockheed Martin earned millions despite delays, as contracts permitted up to 60 days’ lateness for partial rewards. Recommendations include assessing Lockheed’s delivery capacity, revising incentives for better alignment, and broadening leading practices like iterative design and digital twins.
These systemic issues affect all users, but international partners like the UK bear heightened risks from U.S.-led timelines. The GAO observes that while partner input is sought, delays in shared upgrades impede custom capabilities, often favouring U.S. priorities.
Read 25 tweets
Aug 28
Introduction to the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor

Following the recent Red Sea “interception” of a P-8 and my thread on the system (the airframe is just the platform that gets the sensor where it needs to be) I thought it would be useful to describe what the “sensor” was clipped to the fuselage.

As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @Raytheon_UK

1/25 The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) is a state-of-the-art multifunction radar developed by Raytheon (now RTX Corporation) for the United States Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), the AAS represents a significant advancement in airborne radar technology. This thread attempts to follow its development from conceptualisation to operational deployment, elucidates its functionality, and examines its integration with the P-8A.
Furthermore, it explores opportunities for the United Kingdom and NATO allies—Canada, Norway, and Germany—to enhance their P-8 fleets, addressing capability gaps such as those left by the we retired Sentinel R1 and soon the Shadow R1, and concludes by highlighting its role as a force multiplier.Image
Conceptual Origins of the AAS

2/25 The AAS was conceived in the late 2000s to counter evolving threats in littoral and maritime environments, where traditional radars struggled to detect low radar cross-section (RCS) targets, such as stealthy vessels, low-flying drones, or submerged submarines. Building on the classified AN/APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), deployed on select P-3C Orion aircraft, the AAS aimed to enhance multi-function capabilities like moving target indication (MTI) and high-resolution mapping, adapting them for modern asymmetric warfare.
Defining Operational Requirements

3/25 The US Navy (USN) established rigorous requirements for the AAS, mandating all-weather, day-and-night operation independent of optical sensors. The system needed to provide near 360-degree coverage, simultaneous scanning, mapping, tracking, and target classification. It was also required to integrate with networked weapons for real-time targeting, serve as a communications relay, and support electronic warfare (EW) functions. Tailored for the P-8A Poseidon, the USN’s successor to the P-3C, the AAS was designed to operate effectively in contested environments, detecting subtle threats at extended ranges.
Read 25 tweets
Aug 27
The Boeing P-8 Poseidon: An Essential Pillar of Contemporary Maritime Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare

1/25 In this quickly put together long thread, I shall attempt examine the Boeing P-8 Poseidon. The thread will attempt traverse its developmental trajectory from initial requirements to full operational service, with a particular emphasis on its integration and utilisation within the Royal Air Force (RAF).
Given the resurgence of underwater threats in the North Atlantic, the RAF’s (and others) recent and ongoing deployment of the P-8 underscores its strategic relevance. This thread is tailored for a predominantly British audience, highlighting RAF-specific applications, whilst attempting to remain relevant for other readers. It will follow my standard format and address the aircraft’s concept of operations, its synergies with complementary assets, the geopolitical significance of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, specifically including recent multinational activities—and detailed analyses of its sensors, armaments, configurations, and comparisons to predecessors and contemporaries. It will explore the RAF’s infrastructure adaptations, procurement decisions, and the platform’s pivotal role in supporting the United Kingdom’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD).

As always, all views my own and facts can be challenged. This has been written (at pace) to give some context to the recent events other contributors (@TBrit90 @NavyLookout @pegge49 @auonsson)

For additional context I have worked on the RAF P-8 (not as an aviator) Nimrod MR2 and Nimrod MRA4 (the world’s best ASW long range fixed wing aircraft).

Apologies for grammar and any repetition.

The Boeing P-8 Poseidon demonstrates an uplift in maritime patrol capabilities, evolving from the United States Navy’s (USN) need to modernise its fleet in the face of evolving submarine technologies. For the RAF, the P-8 has restored a critical capability absent since the retirement of the Nimrod fleet, enabling robust surveillance over vast oceanic expanses. Its adoption by NATO allies, including the UK , reflects a collective commitment to countering asymmetric threats posed by advanced submarines from potential adversaries (specially Russian). In recent months, the RAF has markedly heightened its operational tempo with the P-8, deploying aircraft for extended missions in contested waters, thereby reinforcing the UK’s maritime security posture and contributing to alliance-wide deterrence efforts but also (in the RAf’s case) if nine aircraft was enough.Image
Historical Origins and Initial Requirements

2/25 The genesis of the P-8 Poseidon can be traced to the late 1980s, when the USN identified significant operational constraints in its ageing Lockheed P-3 Orion fleet. Issues such as airframe fatigue, escalating maintenance demands, and diminished range and endurance necessitated a successor capable of sustaining prolonged missions in increasingly contested maritime environments. This led to the initiation of the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) programme in 2000, which aimed to procure a platform excelling in ASW, anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), all whilst achieving substantial reductions in lifecycle costs through innovative design and manufacturing efficiencies.
Prospective designs included Lockheed Martin’s Orion 21, an evolutionary upgrade of the P-3; Boeing’s innovative proposal predicated on the commercial Boeing 737-800ERX airliner; and briefly, BAE Systems’ Nimrod MRA4, which withdrew from contention in 2002 due to the absence of a viable American industrial partner (sound familiar?)
Boeing’s selection on 14 May 2004, underpinned by a $3.89 billion system development and demonstration contract for at least 108 airframes, was predicated on the platform’s modularity, leveraging mature commercial technologies to expedite development and mitigate risks. This decision not only addressed the USN’s immediate needs but also laid the groundwork for international variants, including those adopted by the RAF to bridge a decade-long gap in long-range maritime patrol capabilities following the contentious cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.Image
Conception and Detailed Design Phase

3/25 At the conceptual stage, Boeing envisioned a hybrid aircraft that amalgamated the reliability and cost-effectiveness of a commercial jetliner with the specialised requirements of military maritime operations. The design philosophy centred on adaptability, incorporating structural reinforcements by Spirit AeroSystems to endure the rigours of low-altitude flight over turbulent seas, a dedicated bomb bay positioned aft of the wing for ASW munitions, and enhanced wings derived from the 737-900 model, featuring raked wingtips to improve aerodynamic efficiency and range.
Further modifications encompassed advanced electro-mechanical expulsion deicing systems to facilitate operations in adverse weather conditions prevalent in northern latitudes, such as those encountered by RAF crews in the North Atlantic. The cockpit was meticulously optimised for tactical ASW manoeuvres, permitting steeper bank angles and incorporating a responsive autothrottle system, whilst eliminating non-essential audible alerts to minimise distractions during high-stakes engagements. Propulsion was upgraded with CFM56-7B27A engines, each equipped with generators providing 180 kVA—twice the capacity of civilian counterparts—necessitating redesigned nacelles and wing mountings to accommodate the increased electrical demands of sophisticated avionics and sensor suites. This fusion of civilian and military engineering principles not only accelerated the development timeline but also ensured the P-8’s versatility, making it an attractive option for the RAF’s urgent re-establishment of
maritime patrol capability.Image
Read 25 tweets
Aug 24
The UK SPEAR Weapons Programme: From Conception to Contemporary Challenges

As always views are my own and facts can be corrected.

Introduction

1/25 The Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) programme represents the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s efforts to modernise out air-launched munitions, ensuring the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) can deliver precise, standoff strikes in an increasingly contested battlespace. Initiated in the early 2000s, SPEAR emerged as a response to evolving threats and operational lessons from conflicts such as the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, where the limitations of existing weapons in engaging time-sensitive targets became evident. The programme is structured around incremental capabilities, each addressing specific requirements for precision, range, and adaptability. Managed under the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Complex Weapons Portfolio, SPEAR collaborates with industry primes like MBDA and BAE Systems (BAES), aiming to provide scalable effects from low-collateral damage to high-impact strikes.Image
2/25 This thread tries to examine the SPEAR programme from its conceptual origins through development and production phases. It details each capability increment—SPEAR 1, 2, 3, and beyond—assessing their conception, requirements, successes, and lessons learned. Particular attention is given to SPEAR 3’s ongoing challenges, including integration issues with the UK’s F-35B Lightning II aircraft, programme slips, and financial implications. The discussion extends to the removal of Brimstone from the AH-64E Apache requirement, the programme’s impact on Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP), multinational complexities in future increments, and the roles of key stakeholders. Finally, it evaluates value for money and concludes with a balanced appraisal, emphasising SPEAR 3’s critical role in preventing the F-35B from becoming an underutilised asset.
SPEAR Capability 1: Conception, Development, and Assessment

3/25 SPEAR Capability 1 (SPEAR Cap 1) centres on the Paveway IV precision-guided bomb, a dual-mode weapon system designed to enhance the our ability to conduct accurate strikes with minimised collateral damage. Conceived in the mid-2000s as part of the broader SPEAR initiative, which itself stemmed from internal MoD studies predating 2005, SPEAR Cap 1 addressed the requirement for a versatile, all-weather precision munition capable of engaging static and semi-static targets at medium ranges. The primary drivers were lessons from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where legacy bombs like the Paveway II and III proved inadequate against urban environments and fleeting targets due to their reliance on laser guidance alone.Image
Read 25 tweets

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