I've just wrapped a 10 days on the North Yunnan loop route, hitting Dali, Lijiang, Diqing/Shangri-la, and Nujiang. Some of the most beautiful places I've seen in China.
Lots of essay content from the trip coming soon, but here's a summary of the route first, 1 tweet per city.🧵
...oh, and I'm writing this partly as a travel report/guide for others who might like to do a similar tour in the future, and partly as a foundation for the essay content that's coming next.
So I'll try to provide both travel details and some background info for each spot...
Dali: Dali was the only city on this trip that I'd visited before. It was the last stop on my loop tour but it could have been the first too, as it has many flights from everywhere and high-speed rail from Kunming.
Dali City has just 660k people (versus the greater Dali Prefecture with 3.2m). Like most Chinese cities of its size, it has both a busy, loud, crowded old city section, but also a clean, tidy, comfortable modern city section. The modern city has skyscrapers, shopping malls, a university, some manufacturing industry, AND a flourishing tourism sector based around Erhai Lake with its great views of Cangshan and Jizushan (mountains). It also boasts several train stations, an airport, and good highway connectivity.
Dali is a T4 city in Yicai's city rankings, coming in at #179, which is actually very close to the median (169). If it werent for the lake and the tourism, it would be just another moderately-developed medium-sized city. But it has that lake...
I feel like I'm supposed to be a snob and say I don't like Dali because it's too touristy, but I actually think it's still a good vibe, especially in the evenings when the tourists go back to their hotels and stop clogging up the roads with their rented convertibles. It IS very commercialized, and I don't recommend staying near the ancient city or even on that side of Erhai Lake (the west side), but I'd still love to own a vacation home here someday, halfway up one of the mountains with a view of the lake and the rolling hills.
Lijiang. This trip started by flying into Lijiang and heading north. I've always categorized Dali and Lijiang as being the same in my head. But Lijiang, just a two hours' drive north of Dali, turned out to be a much smaller city, with only 300k in its metro area and 1.2m across the entire prefecture, and it feels like it too.
Lijiang doesn't have much industry to speak of - just tourism - so the air is cleaner and the views crisper. It's also a bit colder than Dali, thanks to its higher elevation at 2400m. Tourists will often get altitude-related headaches, nausea, and dizziness arriving directly in Lijiang. I had a bit of a dull headache for the first day, but it went away quickly.
Like Dali, its tourism is built around ancient towns (three of them actually) but unlike Dali, some of them are actually worth visiting. The downtown one is very crowded and miserable, but the other two out in the suburbs are much nicer, and not even very crowded, plus they have a lot of authentically old and non-refurbished buildings. They're good for a day of tourism before heading out to the nearby scenic areas. Yulong Mountain is substantially larger than anything you'll see in Dali, and gives you a real signal that you're on the threshhold of some REAL mountains as you're entering Tibetan Yunnan.
Lijiang is a Tier 5 city in Yicai's city rankings, about 60 ranks lower than the median, very close to Xishuangbanna (another tourist destination in souther Yunnan). I could still imagine living here too, or at least coming here for a while in the summer to escape the Shanghai heat and humidity, which is generally not going to be true for cities in the lower half of T5.
I liked Lijiang more than I expectedI would. Though I was there at the very start of my trip, overlapping with the last few days of the October holiday, it was much quieter than Dali at the end of my trip, ten days later.
Diqing/Shangri-la: Shangri-la is a grubby little city with just 186k people that has been elevated to national travel wonderland status, but IMO has fairly limited merits on its own. Shangri-la is the capital of the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, total population 391k (which includes Shangri-la).
The main thing to do in the city is visit the ancient town, which is annoying to navigate, full of repetitive shops and restaurants, and swarmed with tourists dressed up in Tibetan princess costumes doing photo shoots. Not my vibe. Like many popular tourist destinations in China, Shangri-la is developing too rapidly for its own good. I'd prefer to visit almost any part of the prefecture besides the ancient town.
Although I didn't like the city much at all, the nearby natural attractions are stunning. Shangri-la is a good jumping-off point for truly nice natural attractions like Potatso National Park, Haba Mountain, Tiger Leaping Gorge, and Shika Mountain. Watch out for the altitude if hiking though - 3200m is no joke for the unprepared.
Shangri-la is extremely accessible these days, with newly-built rail and national expressway connections down to Lijiang. Hopefully, that helps with Diqing's economic performance, which is overall still weak, despite the substantial tourism boost. Diqing Prefecture is at the bottom of Tier 5 according to Yicai, ranking 324/337 nationwide. It feels it. It's beautiful and nice to visit, but I wouldn't enjoy living here.
Deqen County: Is administratively part of Diqing Prefecture, but is a 3.5 hour drive to the north, placing you right on the border with Tibet and Sichuan. This is squarely within Tibetan Yunnan, and it feels it, from the altitude (3400 meters) to the landscapes (snowcapped mountains, glaciers, and gorges) to the herds of cows, yak, and goats blocking the roads.
It is only accessible from Shangri-la via the famous #214 National Road - one of the many outdoor enthusiast self-driving "meccas" of Western China.
The county seat lies within a deep mountain gorge with sheer cliffs on both sides. Due to persistent earthquake and landslide risk, the provincial authorities have begun the long-planned operation of relocating the entire county town of 70k people to another location some 100km south - an operation that is about 50% finished right now. More about this in future posts.
Deqen is remote and hard to get in and out of, but super worth visiting, with amazing scenery and accessible high-quality hiking. The centerpiece of the area is the 6740-meter Mt. Kawagarbo, (梅里雪山) the tallest mountain in Yunnan.
But... wouldn't want to live here. It's very inconvenient and there's not much for resturants except yak hot pot. Actually, soon no one will "live" there, except people in the tourism industry operating restaurants, hotels, and touring experiences.
Nujiang Prefecture:
Northern Yunnan is defined by its rivers and mountain ranges that all run north-to-south, with the main roads running north-south as well, following the river gorges between the mountains. Any time you're traveling east-west, you're going to have to cross the mountains on a sketchy, low-quality road. That's the only way to get to Nujiang...
To reach Nujiang's Gongshan County from Deqen, I had to drive west across the Hengduan Mountain range, which was a miserable 5-hour drive in the rain over the Peacock Mountain pass (孔雀山垭口) through rockslides and mudslides. It was unpleasant, to say the least.
Nujiang Prefecture borders Tibet to the north, Myanmar to the west, and the Hengduan Mountains to the east, making it highly isolated, with no airports or train stations in the whole prefecture. Its only connection to the highway system is at the capital city of Lushui in the far south of the prefecture, some 5 hours away from Gongshan. The prefecture IS served by a famous National Road: #219 aka the 丙察察.
Before the national poverty alleviation campaign, Nujiang was one of the most impoverished places in the country, with extreme poverty rates over 50% as recently as 2010. While the signs of government spending are everywhere, and the poverty alleviation campaign has been declared a success, it's still one of the least-developed places in the country. According to the Yicai tier list, Nujiang is a Tier 5, ranking even lower than Diqing - #326 out of 337.
In Nujiang, I stayed in Gongshan County and Fugong County, and drove through Lushui City on my way out to complete the loop back to Dali. The gorgeous and remote scenery and villages of Nujiang were a highlight of the trip for me and I expect to write several pieces about this region (which I also hope to revisit, considering how many places I wanted to visit and couldn't!)
Some further general comments:
Yunnan offpeak travel is incredibly affordable. A great destination - not just for someone with Shanghai or Beijing spending power, but for a median Chinese family on a median salary with median spending power. Northern Yunnan is a pretty accessible region for outdoor camping/hiking/mountaineering enthusiasts, which is a rapidly growing community in China.
Even though I departed on the 5th (which was still within the last few days of the holiday) I was able to get direct flights into Lijiang from Shanghai for just 500 CNY. The car rental cost just 100 CNY (15 USD) per day, and highway tolls were waived for the first 3 days because of the holiday.
Guesthouses were 200-400 a night (I never booked online, just arrived and asked if they had rooms, which always yielded a discount). More basic accomodations can be had or as little as 80-120 CNY per night. Our meals were mostly 100-150 CNY for two people, but simpler meals were also available for ess.
Once again, I drove for this trip, renting a PHEV for the first time (a Fengshen L7).
The regenerative braking to recharge the battery on the mountain downgrades was a game changer and I highly recommend it if planning a mountainous trip. I couldn't believe how many daily sections of the drives concluded with the vehicle telling me I had MORE range than when I started driving earlier in the day, thanks to the regenerative charging.
I ended up spending just ~500 CNY in gas over the 10 days, plus <100 CNY on charging fees. I never had any problem finding chargers, even in very remote areas. Sinopec has done a great job of rolling out EV charger coverage to their gas stations.
That's it for now. I need to get writing now...I have much content to generate. 😅
Amazing destination though - highly recommended everyone get some northern Yunnan travel in. Especially Nujiang - which I've been trying to visit for 2 years now and was truly a sleeper hit.
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China’s coal economics are shifting from "generate electricity → get paid" to a messy stack of flexibility revenues, grid services, and capacity payments.
The age of simple coal baseload cash cows is already over. But that doesn't mean it's easy to kick out coal. 🧵
In a increasingly variable renewables-heavy system, only the coal plants that can ramp, cycle, and stay available on demand will survive. And the plants China's building these days are *tricked out*.
I'm talking lower minimum stable load (20-30%), faster ramping capability (in MW/minute), reduced hot/warm/cold start times, reduced start-up fuel burn, world-class fuel efficiency (<250g of coal/kWh), better thermal cycle stress management, modern DCS for better turbine/governor control and AGC tracking for ancillary revenues, ultra-supercritical heat rates...the works.
Older subcritical coal plants weren’t built for this new world. Those that can retrofit affordably will. But many can’t retrofit cheaply. They’ll be pushed out as the system prioritizes flexible, fast-response assets.
Ironically, building a new coal plant in 2026 gives you a competitive edge.
You'll enjoy higher efficiency, lower minimum load, better ramping, better grid-service revenue...printing a license to outlive the older fleet.
Unless there's an outright ban, building will continue.
2. For this reason, globally, about half of all primary aluminum is produced using captive onsite power plants, and roughly two‑thirds of that captive capacity is subcritical coal.
This is the core reason aluminum has such a stubborn emissions profile.
There's an emerging "acceptable" way to talk about China's cleantech push: that it's less driven by altruistic intentions on climate change, and more driven by self-interest like economics, energy security, and pollution control. 🧵
mea culpa: I contributed to this narrative in the past to make it more palatable in media interviews. It's an easy one for China-skeptical editors and readers to accept: that this "good behavior" on climate issues is driven by self-interest that happens to be socially beneficial.
So many times, to so many people, I said things like: "what does it matter what the motivation is, as long as it works?" I wanted to emphasize the positive outcomes and so I embraced a convenient narrative that helped me get there.
Of course this works, but it's only half-true. Which uncharitably means it's also half-false. Here's why...
1. Motives are multi-dimensional
Chinese policymakers DO care about combatting climate change. If they didn't, there would be no 2025 peaking coal target or 2030 peaking emissions goal. There would be no impetus to pursue thermal batteries, next-gen nuclear, advanced geothermal, or expensive and complex hydropower facilities. Coal is abundant and domestic. If they ONLY cared about economics and national security, the policy could just be "forever coal".
Chinese policymakers aren't yet willing to trade energy abundance or affordability to move faster on emissions. But that's different from not caring.
"Our average annual income is 30,000 CNY, but China has 600m people with a monthly income of just 1000 yuan. You can't even rent in a mid-sized city for that much".
That's the phrase that was widely misunderstood, with Li's unfortunate framing adding to the confusion. It got a lot of attention both within and outside of China. china.huanqiu.com/article/3yQjRY…
The main issue is: Li was citing NBS data for per-capita disposable income, not wages. It's a simple average of the disposable income by population for the bottom two quintiles (40%) in 2020, including rural elderly, children, and not-working dependents, i.e., many people outside the formal labor system - or who don't work at all. They are all part of households but their contribution to disposable income is 0 (or close to it).
The NBS clarified Li's comments two weeks later - that it's a statistical average, not a count for wage earners.
The Economist article included this example:
"Imagine a country of ten people, where the bottom four earn $1, $2, $3 and $4 a day, respectively. Their income per person is $2.50. But only two of them live on less than this amount."
The situation for China's bottom quintile is even more exaggerated than this. There are 100s of millions of children and elderly (especially rural) with zero or near-zero formal income. The minimum rural pension is just ~200 CNY/month.
China’s New Play for Mid-Duration Energy Storage: Carnot Batteries
On December 25, State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), announced its prototype “Chunuo” thermal storage system had passed expert review and met its performance targets.
What is it and why does it matter? 🧵
A Carnot battery, also called a pumped thermal energy storage (PTES), is an energy storage system that converts electricity to heat and cold, then converts it back to power when needed.
Instead of using chemical reactions like lithium-ion batteries, it relies on thermodynamics.
For a quick primer on the science: here's the basic principle of thermal energy storage technology (sorry in advance if this short description doesn't capture all the nuances):
During the charging phase, electricity is used to run a heat pump that compresses a working fluid. This compression makes the fluid very hot and that heat is transferred via heat exchangers into a “hot tank” filled with a thermal storage medium like molten salts.
After giving up its heat, the still-compressed, now-ambient temperature working fluid is fed through an expander, which makes it very cold. That cold is then transferred via heat exchanger to a "cold tank" filled with a mixture that retains cold well, like alcohol-water (a "eutectic mixture", for the nerds).
When the grid needs power, the system reverses the process: the working fluid re-absorbs heat from the hot tank, expands through a turbine, and converts thermal energy to electricity, dumping any remaining heat into the cold tank.
In recent years, it has become popular to call this thermal battery concept a Carnot battery, named after Nicolas Léonard Sadi Carnot, the French "father of thermodynamics". He laid out Carnot's Theorem - which deals with the maximum efficiency of heat engines - as early as 1824 (when he was just 28). Carnot's Theorem is today understood as a direct implication of the second law of thermodynamics which was only fully described ~30 years after Carnot.
Thanks to the second law of thermodynamics, the bigger the temperature difference between the hot and cold tanks, the more energy you can extract.
If we must go about assigning a silly label like "green superpower" (which IMO is really just vanity contest clickbait pretending to be analysis) then it's too narrow to define "green superpower" by what percentage of a country's power comes from renewables. This is immediately obvious when we look at the list of countries that lead the world in % of power from renewable energy today - see any superpowers in there? It's lovely to be blessed with abundant hydropower or geothermal resources, but that hardly drives global change.
China, at around 36% renewables (and rising of course) both installs more than the rest of the world combined, and exports the technology to green the power sectors of developing nations globally. If we must have this conversation, then it should acknowledge absolute volume and international impact, where China is clearly dominant...
2. Erroneous Analysis and Data
OP's post says "Two-thirds of electricity in China is from thermal plants...that's coal".
This is incorrect on several accounts. First, "thermal" in the monthly NBS pressers includes coal, gas, and renewables like biomass. Coal is the lion's share, but no, it's not ALL coal. So that's already a problem.
Next, the NBS monthly datasets do not report full power generation (全口径) across the whole economy, only generators "at-scale" (规模以上) which excludes small wind and solar (like rooftop solar, which is half the solar). Thus, it's impossible to calculate from this data series what percentage of power generation is coal without many assumptions. You must estimate, or wait for the quarterly data dumps or the annual statistics yearbook.
I'm not the first person to point this issue out. But OP has either ignored or dismissed everyone else who's pointed it out so far, so it must be repeated. His conduct on this point so far is a poor reflection on his integrity.
In the 2024 annual statistic yearbook published by China Electricity Council (CEC), coal comprised 54.8% of generation at the end of 2024, with gas-fired power adding another 2.6%. These numbers have been falling steadily for a decade and will fall again this year. So...the numbers don't lie, unless you're looking at the wrong numbers. 🧐