1/ So, What’s Happening in Gaza?
How did we reach this agreement? And where does this ceasefire leave both sides?
Beyond the competing narratives and politically motivated spins, a complex and layered set of factors led to this ceasefire - and possibly, the end of the war.
Israel had been pressing Hamas militarily, targeting what remains its most important asset: Gaza City. Within Gaza, pressure was mounting as well - from the Palestinian population and from Hamas operatives urging their leadership to end the war. Netanyahu was constantly discussing the 'break point' of Hamas, promissing a 'total victory'. Yet at the same time, as I've written here several times, the scenario was always of Beirut 1982, when Israel led to the exile of the PLO and Arafat following a short siege.
However, Israel was facing growing international pressure and isolation, which has reached emergency proportations. The United States and President Trump aspired to bring the conflict to a close by the end of 2025. The President himself has said as much, telling Netanyahu, in essence, that Israel cannot fight with the entire world (lookd for his interview to Fox News, right after the agreement was reached).
Washington managed to enlist Qatar and Turkey to help pressure Hamas; both of these countries got substantial returns for that. This left Hamas with no real option, with all its regional allies demanding it compromised on a cease fire.
The failed Israeli assassination attempt in Qatar became a catalyst - an opportunity to turn crisis into leverage and push the process forward.
There’s another dynamic often overlooked: wars have a way of maturing. They reach a point of exhaustion, where both sides lose public support at home and recognize the need to pause, if not end, the fighting. This war, too, had reached that point. No doubt, Israel had the upper hand.
Now: What Was Achieved - and Why It Matters
2/ Let’s start with what this agreement actually achieved.
It’s inaccurate to portray this as a master plan conceived in Jerusalem and implemented through Washington’s good offices. It’s equally wrong to suggest that the same deal was always on the table and could have been reached a year ago.
Again. Two flawed narratives are circulating.
The first is that this was always Israel’s plan — a carefully choreographed “master strategy” by Netanyahu and Dermer. That is false. Israel was seeking a breaking point for Hamas, not a negotiated settlement.
The second is that this deal was always available, that it could have been secured long ago. Also false. Time, pressure, and changing realities made this agreement possible now — not before.
Here’s what’s different.
The first and perhaps most significant achievement is that all hostages were released alive and at once - rather than in a drawn-out, phased process - while the IDF still maintains control over much of the Gaza Strip.
The second achievement lies in the regional and U.S. endorsement of the principle that Hamas will be disarmed. For now, this commitment is theoretical, but it remains a valuable precedent for the future.
What’s the difference between this agreement and what might have been possible 15 or 16 months ago? Then, Hamas insisted it would only release hostages after Israel withdrew entirely from Gaza - to the last inch of Gazan territory. That would have stripped Israel of all leverage. It also rejected any discussion of disarmament, even in principle.
Today, Israel retains a military presence inside Gaza, and Hamas -at least on paper - has agreed to the notion of disarmament. That’s the delta between then and now.
But there is also a cost. The price paid over those 15 months- in lives lost, in Israel's legitimacy eroded to a point never seen before, in the devastation wrought - will be debated for years. Was it worth it? That question remains open. But This is, with no doubt, better than past agreements pitched to Israel.
As to the previous agreements, the Biden administration has told Netanyahu’s government that Israel retains the right to resume military action if Hamas violates the agreement. “Your right to self-defense will not be infringed,” officials said a clear assurance that the ceasefire does not bind Israel’s hands indefinitely.
We need to mark a clear distinction between the principle of the 'hostages freed first' and phase 2 of the deal. That phase has been in the works since the Biden administration. Much of this was done by the UAE with the two respective administrations. In all of the drafts, Hamas does not rule Gaza, there's a sort of a Palestinian-rule that isn't exactly the PA, and a measure of de-militarization.
3/ Where Things Stand Now
Israel has withdrawn to what’s known as the “yellow line.” It now controls roughly half of Gaza, including all of Rafah and most of Khan Yunis - areas that once housed over a million residents. That’s a severe blow to Hamas.
Under the agreement, Hamas must now return the bodies of hostages - people murdered on October 7 or who died in captivity. Israeli intelligence believes Hamas can deliver many more remains immediately. Yet Hamas appears to be stalling, exploiting Israel’s acute sensitivity around the hostages’ families.
Meanwhile, under Trump’s 21-point plan, Israel is expected to gradually hand over territory - even if Hamas fails to meet its obligations- to an international security force. Who will make up this force remains unclear. Talks currently involve Egypt, Turkey, possibly Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and others. One former senior U.S. official warned that such a composition should concern Israel, given the record of similar peacekeeping missions.
A core issue remains Hamas’s disarmament. No one seriously expects full disarmament - not of rifles, not of regular arms. The discussion now focuses on heavier weapons: rockets, mortars, explosive labs, and offensive tunnels. Hamas doesn’t need more than light weapons to control Gaza.
Another major gap is the need to establish the promised technocratic government in Gaza, supported by a non-Hamas Palestinian force and backed by the ISF. In the absence of both, Hamas continues to rule.
This vacuum deters regional investment. Neither the UAE nor Saudi Arabia will pour billions into reconstruction while Hamas is poised to rebuild and rearm. These governments also fear empowering a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which remains popular in their own societies.
That’s why Vice President J.D. Vance and Jared Kushner are now traveling to the region - to prevent the agreement from collapsing and to work through its details. And everything, now, depends on those details.
The key challenges now are fourfold: ensuring Hamas actually returns the bodies of Israeli hostages, creating a functioning Palestinian technocratic government to replace Hamas’s rule, assembling and deploying an effective international security force, and managing a continued, orderly withdrawal of IDF forces.
Yet no one in the region expects any force other than the IDF to be capable of confronting Hamas militarily; if a different actor were to successfully challenge Hamas, it would come as a genuine and welcome surprise.
The Deeper Lessons:
4/ For months, critics argued that Israel’s campaign wasn’t about hostages at all - that it was about expulsion, settlements, annexation. Those accusations, though fueled by some Israeli politicians’ rhetoric, have proven false.
Once Israel secured the promise of the hostages’ release, its legitimacy to continue fighting evaporated- both internationally and domestically. The return of the hostages is seen as a profound national achievement, a testament to Israel’s military and its civilian resilience.
Meanwhile, Hamas’s own behavior has confirmed what many already knew. It has turned its guns inward, rounding up opponents, torturing them in makeshift detention centers - some inside hospitals - and reasserting control through terror.
Hamas remains a radical, genocidal organization. If it stays armed, even with 'just' rifles, it will continue shaping Gaza’s future - and not for the better. It is, in truth, the greatest threat to Palestinian self-determination, to regional stability, and to the possibility of a decent life for Palestinians themselves.
If the international community fails to grasp this - if it allows Hamas to continue to regroup- then this ceasefire may collapse far sooner than anyone imagines.
President Trump’s clarity and willingness to stay engaged have brought the parties to this point. It should not be taken for granted. His public insistence that Hamas abide by its commitments, and that the ceasefire hold, stands in stark contrast to the wishful international diplomacy of previous decades.
Unlike his predecessors, Trump is not willing a peace process into being. He is forcing one into shape. And if he stays that course, it could lead to an actual paradigm shift in the region. However, in the Middle East, nothing comes easy - not war, not peace, and not even a ceasefire.
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1/The Iran - Israel War, Day 8. We are now a week after Israel launched what it labeled its *preemptive strike* against Iran, effectively beginning the war. It’s time to assess what both sides have achieved - and where things stand.
Let’s begin with Israel.
first, Israel focused its opening move on decapitating Iran’s senior military leadership and targeting around two dozen nuclear scientists involved in Iran’s secret weapons program. It then moved to nuclear installations and surface-to-surface ballistic missile infrastructure.
The results have surpassed Israeli and international expectations.
In the first 48 hours, Israel killed the most senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian military, and the air force. It assassinated the Iranian Chief of Staff.
His replacement relocated to what Iran considered its most secret command bunker, deep in the mountains. Israel struck there too. He fled to a secondary command center in Tehran. He was killed there.
(photo I took myself in Ramat Gan, two days ago).
2/ After this initial shock-and-awe phase, focused on leadership decapitation, the IDF turned its attention to nuclear installations and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. The Natanz centrifuge facility suffered heavy damage and the AIEA assumes its centrifuges casscades are damaged beyond repair.
The Isfahan nuclear site, where Iran was working on how to convert enriched uranium into material suitable for a warhead, was also heavily struck.
Other research sites involved in Iran’s weapons group- the part of the program focused on constructing a bomb or a warhead - were destroyed.
The Fordow nuclear site, deep in the mountains, was hit only on the surface. Even without U.S. involvement, Israeli officials say they have contingencies in place for Fordow.
As for ballistic missiles:
Israel has destroyed between a third to a half of Iran’s launchers and several hundred missiles.
The Israeli Air Force now operates with real-time intelligence from rather freely flying over west Iran to Teheran - after dismantling nearly all of its effective air defenses.A senior Israeli security source put it bluntly:
“Now, with no limits on air attacks inside Iran - and given the vast military infrastructure they’ve built - it’s like a candy shop for us. Hard to choose what to hit first".
Much of Israel's success is due to the superb performance of its military intelligence branch (AMAN) and technological capabilities. This may be the first time in history that high-tech intelligence tools have produced such a deadly impact and a potential military victory.
3/ On Iran’s side: its main achievement has been the continued launch of ballistic missiles into Israel.
These have increasingly targeted civilian areas, which Israeli intelligence sources say is a deliberate strategy - ordered directly by the Supreme Leader.
While Iran has also aimed extensively at Israeli military bases and we can assume substantial damage, Israel’s success in targeting launchers has substantially reduced the daily volume of fire. Still, Iran continues to probe and study Israeli air defenses. Israel is also managing to intercept much of what Iran is launching and denies having a shortage of interceptors—though it's clear their supply is not unlimited
Just yesterday, it launched a major barrage that struck Soroka Hospital in Be'er Sheva and neighborhoods near Tel Aviv.
For Iran, hitting civilians is strategic.
First, They’ve long funded Hamas and Hezbollah and see the entire State of Israel as illegitimate, and see terror attacks against Israeli civilians as always justified. Targeting the home front is an extension of that ideology - and a deliberate focus on what they see as Israel’s “soft spot”: civilian life.
1. The Israel-Iran war: The first day.
We are now about 15 hours after Israel launched what it labels a *preventive strike* against the Islamic Republic of Iran - targeting its nuclear facilities and ballistic missile sites.
Here’s a short recap of what’s happened - and what it means.
First, this is not an *operation*. It’s not a *strike*. Israel is now **at war** with Iran. And Israel’s defense establishment understands that well.
I spoke a short while ago with a senior Israeli security official. His most important message was directed at the Israeli public:
"Prepare for Iran’s response, don't underestimate what they can do. It will be substantial and lethal".
2. Now to the war. At the beginning of 2024, while Israel was still fighting the beginning of the war in Gaza, it began receiving what security officials described as troubling signals: Iran was advancing in what’s known as the *weapons group* -the part of its nuclear program focused on the actual assembly of a nuclear bomb or warhead.
I heard details related to attempts by Iran to acquire specific equipment that would only be needed for a timed nuclear detonation. A senior Israeli security official confirmed to me that these signals were captured by Israeli intelligence. This quickly became a major headline - in Israeli newspapers, and then in the international press.
It was during that same period that the IDF’s operations branch began serious planning for a possible strike on Iran’s military, the Revolutionary Guard, and most importantly, its nuclear facilities.
What was obvious to the Israelis was that striking Iran’s nuclear sites could never be done without factoring in the Iranian response to that - which would be substantial, and likely devastating for Israel.
3. The Iranians were very encouraged by their latest missile attack on Israel in later October 2024, and they thought it proved that Israel's Arrow and other defenses have limited capacity to hold off a major barrage. Considering how small Israel is, definitely compared to Iran, they focused on building abilities to bigger strikes, seeing this a soft spot of the Israeli society.
The Islamic Republic had already crossed a major line during the Gaza war – it decided to directly attack Israel not in response to an Israeli action against Iran itself, but rather after two specific events: First, the assassination of a senior Iranian general in a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Second, an Israeli strike targeting Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
To Israeli officials, Iran’s decision to launch missiles and drones at Israel marked a crossing of the Rubicon - a shift from proxy warfare to direct military engagement. Tehran had made itself a party to the war. This strengthened the resolve to act.
סיפור ב-3 מערכות. מערכה ראשונה- מגיע לקינג'ס קולג' אמש בלונדון כדי לדבר בפורום הגיאופוליטי. לצדי מדבר עיתונאי סורי עצמאי, ראסן איברהים. בקהל יש כמה וכמה עם כאפיות שרוצים לצעוק עליי כישראלי. אך והואיל ואיברהים בא עם בטן מלאה על איראן, והאסון של האחים המוסלמים, הם מאבדים סבלנות.
2/ אחרי שאיברהים תיאר באריכות את האסון של פונדמנטליזם איזורי, מחה על כך שמחאות נגד אסד לא ממש היו,
אני מדבר על סיבות העומק ל7 באוקטובר ושואל אותם אם הם שמעו דיון מלומד, בבי.בי.סי או בכלל, מדוע החלה המלחמה. למה חמאס מסתער. דיון אחד. הקהל אומר שלא.
מערכה שלישית. הסטודנטים עם הכאפיות שולפים מצלמות ואני נשאל שאלה מהכתב אם צבא הכיבוש הישראלי עושה ג'נוסייד. אני אומר שלדעתי לא; מסביר מדוע; אומר שיש לחקור כל מקרה של חשד לפשעי מלחמה. בשלב הזה קם סטודנט וצועק עליי נאום על הישראלים רוצחי התינוקות.
1/A week later, some thoughts about the elections - and the good life.
At first glance, its a straightforward story. If prices are too high, the President seems weak, there is a border crisis, cities feel unsafe (it's not only about the data, remember?), the candidate is the Vice President, and most of the country says its on the wrong track, then the chances of incumbent victory look slim.
Yet there’s something deeper happening, beyond Democrats or Republicans: power structures are failing, and it’s not happening only in the U.S. These structures are hollow, corrupt, or simply no longer fit for purpose. People want to upend them. In dictatorships, the solution is more authoritarianism. In democracies? They keep on changing incumbents, endlessly trying to fix the system by replacing its handlers.
With no real, thoughtful change, it will fail. It’s the system itself that’s broken.
2/ Simply reciting the successes of the Liberal order - a habbit of liberals everywhere - won’t prevent its collapse. We live in an era defined by the politics of sentiment. Seeing that is crucial for any successful nevigation of public affairs.
I have been writing about U.S. elections since 2008, observing the shifts in the country’s political landscape over the years. I’ve written a book titled REVOLT about nationalism, populism, and the demise of the liberal order, and I documented Trump’s rise before his 2016 win in a TV series. It seems to me that Americans have been asking the same question, probably since 2008, and they’re trying to answer it in different ways—choosing different people, becoming more and more desperate as time goes by.
The question: What is the American model for life in contemporary times? And I don’t mean this as an empty slogan. Really—how can you live a good life in this era? And a "good life" isn’t just about the economy. It’s also about identity and security, dignity, a sense of purpose, and human flourishing. And it is also about the consequences of automation, climate change, and a global sense of alienation.
3/ It’s a radical question that demands a radical answer. Some of the answers proposed—like trade barriers—are, in my view, potentially disastrous. But the point is understanding the question itself. This isn’t about some ideal of “justice” or crafting a utopia; it’s about stability and decency. People feel unmoored and are asking: how can we secure a stable and decent life, looking toward the future? Stability - In our neighborhoods, at work, and around the family dinner table. Because the world right now? It feels bat*hit crazy.
1/קשה להתעלם מזה, גם אחרי יום. הנ"ל אשכרה אמר "הרצי הלוי לא מתעסק במלחמה הוא מתעסק בפוליטיקה, רק בפוליטיקה". באמת?
מישהו מאמין לשקר המכוער הזה? לדיבה הפשוטה הזו?
פאנל השקר הזה מעיד על מחלה תקדימית בעולם: מנסים לחסל את הצבא, הצבא - תוך כדי מלחמה נגד אויב אכזר. לא היה דבר כזה.
2/עכשיו תראו. היה זה העיתון והאתר בהם אני כותב שפרסמו את הסיפור (המקומם) על קמ"ן פד"ם. ואני פרסמתי ועוד אפרסם סיפורים על כשלונות מערכת הביטחון. אבל מה בין זה ובין חגיגת העליצות הטמאה הזו, שמובלת בידי הליצן הציני והמלגלג הראשי, שונא ישראל ממש, ינוןמגל. והתשובה: יש להם תכנית.
3/התכלית היא מאוד פשוטה: בחסות המלחמה ולקיחת האחריות, לדחוף כעת להחלפת ראשי מערכת הביטחון כולם, אחד אחרי השני, ולמנות שורה של עושי דברם לנתניהו ושות'. וזה נראה להם קל להשגה: בר והלוי כבר לקחו אחריות. עוד דחיפה. וחבורה של אידיוטים שימושיים משרתים אותם, ובשם טהרנות דורשים מייד.
תנאי לניצחון למלחמה הוא גיוס כל המשאבים הלאומיים (פון קלאוזביץ). ישראל מפולגת וחסרת אמון לגמרי בהנהגה. הממשלה ומי שעומד בראשה בכלל לא משתדלים לגייס את האומה. ההפך; הם מעסיקים שופרות ואינטרסים כדי לזרוע שנאה בינינו, לתועלתם. מה שחשוב להם אינו הניצחון על אויב, אלא להיאחז בשלטון.
למאמינים בכיבוש צבאי בעזה: אי אפשר לשלוט בעזה בממשל צבאי ל10 שנים כאשר למעלה מחצי מהציבור חושב שראש הממשלה מושחת וחייב להתפטר, ומעדיף את האינטרסים האישיים שלו על המדינה והחטופים. למאמינים שאין מנוס ממלחמה בצפון: יש פה אמון הנחוץ לכך? אתם יודעים שלא. זה באשמת ממשלה נוראה.
אחדות ואמון אינן ססמאות בלבד, אלא תנאים נדרשים הכרחיים להישרדות במאבק גדול. יש מנהיגים שמתעלים אל הרגע. יש כאלה ששוקעים בתוכו, ודמותם האמיתית נגלית. תמונת המצב על מנהיגנו ברורה לחלוטין. הוא צ'מברליין על ספידים, המשטר הצאריסטי במלחמת העולם ה-1 בעת המלחמה. הוא מסמל רק תבוסה.