China's currency is objectively very weak, especially in inflation adjusted terms (it is down just under 20% from its 2021 high). And it is very tightly managed against the dollar --
But within that broad regime, there has been a tiny bit of appreciation over the last 6ms
1/ many
And to be sure, the movement is primarily against the dollar -- the yuan remains incredibly weak against the euro (contributing to the second China shock, China's rising share of the EU auto market & German automotive angst)
2/
There is something technically very strange about the yuan's appreciation -- it has come even though the onshore spot rate has remained weaker than the daily fix (in theory the mid point of the band). That is strange ...
3/
For all intents and purposes the strong side of the band has been lost -- it just isn't used. The fix acts as the upper limit on how far the yuan can appreciate
4/
What is more is that there has been a spike in fx settlement whenever spot has been close to the band -- indicating that the state banks are buying fx to control the pace of appreciation right at the fix (not at the strong side of the band)
5/
All in all it is a strange picture -- the yuan is more tightly managed v the dollar than in the past, the band has shrunk, and there is now a bit of market pressure for the yuan to appreciate (from its current still very week level)
6/
And a couple of big picture observations --
it has been strange that the Trump Administration (and Secretary Bessent) have shown more interest in supporting the Argentine peso than in pushing the yuan (and Asian currencies) to appreciate from v. low levels
7/
After all the administration (or least the President) ostensibly wants to reduce the US trade deficit/ China's surplus -- and the one thing that is known to slow China's export juggernaut is CNY appreciation (the 05 to 15 move did bring down China's surplus relative to its GDP)
8/
But by all accounts currency (along with other macro and big structural issues) haven't been on the agenda of the recent round of bilateral trade talks
9/
So I increasingly think it will fall to Europe -- which is getting pounded by the second China shock -- to make currency issues a priority ... the second Trump administration is focused on smaller, but more tangible issues (like selling soybeans and maybe Boeings)
10/10
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Bloomberg reports that China's regulators have warned China's state banks about the risk of holding too many Treasuries --
The Chinese regulators must know something that the Treasury doesn't, as the Treasury data doesn't suggest that China has been buying any Treasuries
1/
The official US data on foreign holdings doesn't show any basis for Chinese concern -- China's Treasuries in US custodianship (in theory state accounts as well as state bank accounts) are heading down not up
2/
That is of course inconsistent with the warning that the regulators provided to the state banks! They seem to be warning about nothing ...
The Treasury has indicated that it will look at the activities of China's state banks in its next assessment of China's currency policies--
It is hard to see how this doesn't become a bit of an issue ... unless of course summitry gets in the way of analysis 1/
It is quite clear that state bank purchases (and in 23/ early 24 sales) of fx have replaced PBOC purchases and sales and the core technique China uses to manage the band around the daily fx -- i.e. settlement looks like an intervention variable
2/
My latest blog looks both at how fx settlement (a measure that includes the state banks) has displaced the PBOC's own reported reserves as the best metric for Chinese intervention & lat some of SAFE's balance sheet mysteries
The blog is detailed and technical -- and thus probably best read by those with a real interest in central bank balance sheets, the balance of payments and how to assess backdoor foreign currency intervention
2/
Drawing on historical data, I propose that the gap between fx settlement and the foreign assets on the PBOC's balance sheet (fx reserves + other f. assets) is a good indicator of hidden intervention --
Obviously overshadowed by the news about a Fed nomination, but the Treasury released its delated October 2025 FX report today and it is worth reading -- not the least b/c of a clear warning to SAFE.
1/
This seems clear
"An economy that fails to publish intervention data or whose data are incomplete will not be given any benefit of the doubt in Treasury’s assessment of intervention practices."
This report only covers the period between July 24 and June 25, so it misses the bulk of the 2025 surge in fx settlement (December = $100b plus). But this chart suggests the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques than those used in past reports --
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion
2/
Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --
1/
Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings
2/
That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians