China's currency is objectively very weak, especially in inflation adjusted terms (it is down just under 20% from its 2021 high). And it is very tightly managed against the dollar --
But within that broad regime, there has been a tiny bit of appreciation over the last 6ms
1/ many
And to be sure, the movement is primarily against the dollar -- the yuan remains incredibly weak against the euro (contributing to the second China shock, China's rising share of the EU auto market & German automotive angst)
2/
There is something technically very strange about the yuan's appreciation -- it has come even though the onshore spot rate has remained weaker than the daily fix (in theory the mid point of the band). That is strange ...
3/
For all intents and purposes the strong side of the band has been lost -- it just isn't used. The fix acts as the upper limit on how far the yuan can appreciate
4/
What is more is that there has been a spike in fx settlement whenever spot has been close to the band -- indicating that the state banks are buying fx to control the pace of appreciation right at the fix (not at the strong side of the band)
5/
All in all it is a strange picture -- the yuan is more tightly managed v the dollar than in the past, the band has shrunk, and there is now a bit of market pressure for the yuan to appreciate (from its current still very week level)
6/
And a couple of big picture observations --
it has been strange that the Trump Administration (and Secretary Bessent) have shown more interest in supporting the Argentine peso than in pushing the yuan (and Asian currencies) to appreciate from v. low levels
7/
After all the administration (or least the President) ostensibly wants to reduce the US trade deficit/ China's surplus -- and the one thing that is known to slow China's export juggernaut is CNY appreciation (the 05 to 15 move did bring down China's surplus relative to its GDP)
8/
But by all accounts currency (along with other macro and big structural issues) haven't been on the agenda of the recent round of bilateral trade talks
9/
So I increasingly think it will fall to Europe -- which is getting pounded by the second China shock -- to make currency issues a priority ... the second Trump administration is focused on smaller, but more tangible issues (like selling soybeans and maybe Boeings)
10/10
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
China's goods and services data on a balance of payments basis is now effectively out for q3 (with the September monthly data) -- and on a balance of payments basis, exports jumped up a bit in q3
1/
The q2 surplus using China's (whacky) BoP methodology was well below the q2 customs surplus -- but the q3 BoP surplus is strong, and up v q2 (while the customs surplus is down)
2/
So my estimate for the q3 current account surplus is just over $200b ($800b annualized) -- or well above q2 ...
There needs to be a better consensus number for the tariff on China. The effective tariff rate (Tariff paid/ imports) was 37-38% in July and August. It should fall to under 30% with the recent deal.
As @EtraAlex notes, that is still higher than the effective tariff rate on most other countries (India is a bit of an outlier, but there should be a deal) -- the electronics exclusion lowers the effective tariff on SE Asia ...
2/
There of course is a lot of sectoral variability in the tariffs -- all sorts of 232s that knock out the reciprocal tariffs, and in some cases (electronics/ chips & pharma) that has really lowered the actual applied tariff (same for the USMCA exclusion)
3/
China, the unexpected "winner" from Trump's second term trade war?
Bringing the Trump 2 tariff on China down to 20% (10% reciprocal, 10% fentanyl) is a huge win for China; it puts the new tariffs at the same level as the new tariffs on SE Asia
1/
The new tariffs on China would also only be 5 pp higher than the tariffs on US allies like Japan and Korea (and most European countries) ... massive shift away from the campaign proposal
There is a myth that the average tariff on China is now 55%
("it would bring the average tariff on most Chinese imports—currently around 55%—to about 45%. That would put China’s average tariff rate closer to those of other trading partners")
3/
Excellent piece by @AnaSwanson on the now expected Trump-Xi trade deal/ truce/ US walk back
Agree with Mr. Czin. The most remarkable thing about the current US trade agenda with China is all the things that aren't on it. I would include currency on that list of course
1/
The best argument for the limited US agenda is that the US lacks the leverage to get China to fundamentally change, so the best the US can hope for is selling some beans and getting export licenses for rare earths
As the FT notes in a very good leader, China's leaders just doubled down on a manufacturing led growth strategy )"there is no retreat from the manufacturing-led development pursued under the current five-year plan")
China's growth has been driven by the need to make up for weak internal demand through a rising trade surplus, which is a much bigger concern than the export to GDP ratio
The unusually large contribution from net exports is undeniable. As is the fact that Chinese export volume growth has been far faster than Chinese GDP growth and world trade growth in recent years
2/
As this chart shows, China's exports have been rising v its GDP over the last 5 years (a change from the 10s) ...
While imports of manufactures continue to fall v GDP, hence the sharp rise in China's trade surplus v its GDP
The basic issue, as I saw, it was that Milei and his team wanted a stronger peso (to help contain inflation) than Argentina's economy could sustain -- hence the pressure on Argentina's fx reserves over the course of this year, and the widening current account deficit
2/
There will be temptation among Argentina's policy makers to now think that the market will reward them for their electoral success, and market inflows (+ the expected continued support of the US) will support an organically strong peso
3/