There needs to be a better consensus number for the tariff on China. The effective tariff rate (Tariff paid/ imports) was 37-38% in July and August. It should fall to under 30% with the recent deal.
As @EtraAlex notes, that is still higher than the effective tariff rate on most other countries (India is a bit of an outlier, but there should be a deal) -- the electronics exclusion lowers the effective tariff on SE Asia ...
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There of course is a lot of sectoral variability in the tariffs -- all sorts of 232s that knock out the reciprocal tariffs, and in some cases (electronics/ chips & pharma) that has really lowered the actual applied tariff (same for the USMCA exclusion)
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But it is should be obvious that a 57% tariff for China is a bit too high. Set aside the MFN rate (generally low) and some tariff spikes with no impact (100% on EVs, but the US isn't importing any EVs ... ) and the tariffs on China are from the 301 & term 2 --
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The term 2 base rate was 20% for fentanyl (paid even on 232 sectors like electronics) and 10% reciprocal, so 30% before the deal -- and now 20% (with a 10% rate from the remaining fentanyl tariff on electronics)
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The 18-19 301 rates were 25%, 7.5% and 0%. At the time the 25% applied to roughly $250b in trade, the 7.5% to $110-120b in trade and the 0% rate applied to ~ $150b (iphones and laptops, but not desktops) ...
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But the 25% tariff reduced trade in those products a lot -- by roughly 50%, so $250 became $125b or so (and now less with the extra term 2 tariffs) ... so the average pre term 2 applied tariff rate was around 10%
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And there is additional complexity (the tariff on de minimis goods for example, and some ADD/ CVDs and the like) + for some applications it helps to think of the impact of the tariffs relative to the pre-tariff baseline
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But for most goods the new tariff rates after the latest summit will be 45% (20% new plus 25% on the 301), 27.5% (20% + 7.5%), or 20% (with some electronics at 10% ...) so while average tariff may be close to 30% a meaningful subset of goods will enter at a 45% rate, and a big chuck at 20% or lower ...
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And while the average tariff on SE Asia will be below 20% b/c of the chips/ electronics exclusion from the reciprocals -- a large chunk of SE Asia's exports to the US now face a 20% tariff (relative to 20% or 27.5% on China setting aside the MFN rate)
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so for some but not all goods, the tariff on China and SE Asia is more or less the same, and for another subset of goods the difference is 7.5% (list 4a) or 10% (electronics)
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And if you think this is all a bit too complicated and should be simplified all I can say is that I think you are right ...
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China's currency is objectively very weak, especially in inflation adjusted terms (it is down just under 20% from its 2021 high). And it is very tightly managed against the dollar --
But within that broad regime, there has been a tiny bit of appreciation over the last 6ms
1/ many
And to be sure, the movement is primarily against the dollar -- the yuan remains incredibly weak against the euro (contributing to the second China shock, China's rising share of the EU auto market & German automotive angst)
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There is something technically very strange about the yuan's appreciation -- it has come even though the onshore spot rate has remained weaker than the daily fix (in theory the mid point of the band). That is strange ...
China, the unexpected "winner" from Trump's second term trade war?
Bringing the Trump 2 tariff on China down to 20% (10% reciprocal, 10% fentanyl) is a huge win for China; it puts the new tariffs at the same level as the new tariffs on SE Asia
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The new tariffs on China would also only be 5 pp higher than the tariffs on US allies like Japan and Korea (and most European countries) ... massive shift away from the campaign proposal
There is a myth that the average tariff on China is now 55%
("it would bring the average tariff on most Chinese imports—currently around 55%—to about 45%. That would put China’s average tariff rate closer to those of other trading partners")
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Excellent piece by @AnaSwanson on the now expected Trump-Xi trade deal/ truce/ US walk back
Agree with Mr. Czin. The most remarkable thing about the current US trade agenda with China is all the things that aren't on it. I would include currency on that list of course
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The best argument for the limited US agenda is that the US lacks the leverage to get China to fundamentally change, so the best the US can hope for is selling some beans and getting export licenses for rare earths
As the FT notes in a very good leader, China's leaders just doubled down on a manufacturing led growth strategy )"there is no retreat from the manufacturing-led development pursued under the current five-year plan")
China's growth has been driven by the need to make up for weak internal demand through a rising trade surplus, which is a much bigger concern than the export to GDP ratio
The unusually large contribution from net exports is undeniable. As is the fact that Chinese export volume growth has been far faster than Chinese GDP growth and world trade growth in recent years
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As this chart shows, China's exports have been rising v its GDP over the last 5 years (a change from the 10s) ...
While imports of manufactures continue to fall v GDP, hence the sharp rise in China's trade surplus v its GDP
The basic issue, as I saw, it was that Milei and his team wanted a stronger peso (to help contain inflation) than Argentina's economy could sustain -- hence the pressure on Argentina's fx reserves over the course of this year, and the widening current account deficit
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There will be temptation among Argentina's policy makers to now think that the market will reward them for their electoral success, and market inflows (+ the expected continued support of the US) will support an organically strong peso
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Unfortunate that Trump started his second term determined to fight trade wars with most of the world.
China's export boom (and its lack of imports) have created the material conditions for a coalition that is directed at forcing some policy shifts in China
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Folks usually think of trade as a two way street: I buy from you, you buy from me ... but it isn't clear what, if anything, Xi's China wants to import over time (other than maybe some commodities).
& Xi has made a mint by exporting over the last 5ys
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And no one is doing well selling into China. The IMF WEO data shows zero (slightly negative) import volume growth since the end of 2018, while export volume growth is up 40% ...