Thread by @sambendett

1/ THREAD on the new "digital warfare" as seen in Ukraine, described Russia's Gen(ret) Yuri Baluyevsky, former Chief of the General Staff in 2004-2008, and Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). Main points below: globalaffairs.ru/articles/czifr…

2/ "There's every reason to believe that the "digital warfare" process will continue to expand and deepen, as the potential for escalating "drone warfare" exceeds the ability to effectively counter this type of weaponry."

3/ "The miniaturization and cost reduction of componentry, along with the development of networked solutions (specifically networked ones; the trendy artificial intelligence will likely remain a secondary factor for a long time to come) are leading to combat operations..."

4/ "...being swarms of drones of a wide variety of types, shapes, sizes, and purposes. The bulk of these drones are increasingly smaller and cheaper, but also increasingly long-range and autonomous, combining reconnaissance and engagement capabilities."

5/ "The tactical battlefield and rear areas tens of kilometers from the line of contact will essentially become a "zone of total annihilation." Naturally, the primary objective will be to counter them (the drones)."

6/ "Thus, armed conflict will primarily become a battle for "drone superiority" in the air. Accordingly, the organization of forces must align with the goals and objectives of the struggle for such superiority in the air and space."

7/ "The most important consequences of the revolution described was battlefield transparency, essentially the complete dispelling of the "fog of war." This feature will only be further exacerbated by the development of both unmanned and space-based (combat spacecraft are essentially also drones) and networked information solutions."

8/ "The improvement of surveillance equipment, sensors, computing power, information networks, data transmission and processing methods, and AI will ultimately create a unified global ground-air-space information environment ("information battlespace"), ensuring and increasingly expanding unified tactical, operational, and strategic transparency."

9/ "Today, we can already speak of the blurring of combat boundaries at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. A significant consequence of the "transparency" of the battlefield was the new face of warfare demonstrated in Ukraine. This is primarily due to the..."

10/ "...high dispersion and extremely low density of forces and their battle formations. The dramatically increased capabilities of reconnaissance, detection, target designation, and precision strikes create a significantly higher vulnerability for troops..."

11/ "...from tactical units to operational formations, as well as for individual military equipment. This makes it impossible to covertly transfer and concentrate forces and assets in areas of primary effort, fundamentally changing the very philosophy of troop deployment."

12/ "The introduction and widespread use of the Starlink internet became a key element in the information battlespace in Ukraine. For the first time in history, a publicly accessible, fast, and sufficiently secure information network and data exchange system were implemented."

13/ "This has revolutionized unmanned navigation, enabling for the first time the mass deployment of even small unmanned systems over a theoretically unlimited range. The same result, albeit with less efficiency, is achieved using commercial cellular networks to control UAVs."

14/ "The next stage of the information revolution in this area will be the integration of satellite and cellular network solutions, which will enable global satellite-based information exchange via a regular mobile phone and corresponding ultra-compact communication devices."

15/ "This will lead to an explosive expansion of military capabilities, including direct connection to every soldier on the battlefield and the ultra-miniaturization of comms systems, enabling unlimited-range troop control, including unmanned systems and precision-guided weapons. This will significantly enhance the capabilities of "remote" warfare."

16/ "Battlefield transparency and real-time target designation are eliminating the need for line-of-sight fire in favor of indirect fire. It's no longer necessary to see the enemy directly in front of you; targets can be detected at any distance and engaged by precision weapons (primarily drones) launched beyond the enemy's line of sight."

17/ "The survivability and combat stability of any remote, dispersed indirect fire weapons and their crews are far superior to any line-of-sight weapons. This is leading to a fundamental change in the planning of the entire system for engaging the enemy with fire."

18/ "This circumstance, and not insufficient protection from drones, has proven to be the main cause of the tank forces' crisis. The tank is the primary means of line-of-sight fire; in fact, it was designed as a protected platform for such fire."

19/ "It (the tank) is now an easily detectable and easily hit target with an ineffective line-of-sight weapon system. As a result, the tank has lost its once-essential role as an army's primary means of breakthrough and maneuver."

20/ "It is unclear what benefit a vulnerable vehicle with limited armament capabilities, approaching the cost of a fighter aircraft, will bring. As for a tank as a carrier for UAVs or over-the-horizon precision strikes, why would a tank, which is clearly excessive in terms of protection and weight, be needed as a platform?"

21/ "The military conflict in Ukraine would seem to have restored artillery with unguided munitions to the pedestal of the "god of war." However, this raises the questionable nature of using expensive guns with high expenditures of very expensive ammunition to perform missions..."

22/ "...that could be accomplished on the "transparent" battlefield by drones and other high-precision weapons. A logical question: is it rational to use bulky artillery systems as launch platforms for such munitions?"

23/ "In this sense, the thesis that "drones will yet show themselves" seems more logical, especially in light of the further development of network and space technologies. Thus, unmanned systems are truly having a revolutionary impact on military science."

24/ "On the one hand, they affect such a key factor as the concentration of forces and assets, and on the other, they essentially make tactical maneuvering of forces and assets to ensure destruction unnecessary. These fundamental changes in both tactics and operational art should lead to a reconsideration not only of combat modes but also of the organizational structure of troops."

25/ "The war in Ukraine became the first full-scale armed conflict of the 21st century, marking the completed revolution in military affairs – the transition to "digital warfare." All the trends already clearly evident or emerging will likely continue to develop in the coming decade."

26/ "Attempts to reconcile the realities of the transition to "digital" and "drone" warfare with the conditions of mechanized warfare, for example, while maintaining the previous role of tanks and tank units, will only lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of the armed forces, their inadequacy for the new combat conditions, and unnecessary costs and losses."

27/ "Today, FPV drone procurement has reached hundreds of thousands per month for each side, comparable to (if not exceeding) the production volume of artillery rounds. FPV drones, literally attacking any visible military personnel in swarms, have become the primary weapon..."

28/ "...for destroying not only equipment but also personnel. According to Russian statistics, by early 2025, drones accounted for over 70 percent of combatant kills. In the future, we should expect a shift to group and swarm solutions..."

29/ "...including the ability to control large groups of UAVs by a single operator and the development of UAVs with hardware and software that allows for the unmanned use of lethal weapons. Three key factors in drone warfare and their impact on the organization and combat employment of troops can be identified."

30/ "First: The requirement for extreme dispersion of forces and assets with very low density of combat formations will radically alter the organization of troops and their interactions."

31/ "Second: A sharp increase in the depth of destruction of opposing sides and their assets, right down to operational depth. "Total annihilation zones" will soon reach many tens of kilometers. This makes it impossible to maneuver and concentrate troops even within their operational depth."

32/ "Third: The war has demonstrated the intractable problem of supplying troops, who are currently being supplied by vulnerable transport vehicles that are relatively easily destroyed by the enemy."

33/ "In the context of "drone warfare" and enormous "total annihilation zones" of forces and assets throughout the entire operational depth, the supply problem at the operational, tactical, and "micro-tactical" ("last mile of the front") levels is becoming colossal and will require non-trivial and revolutionary solutions."

34/ "What should a prospective troop organization and staffing structure for a "drone war" look like? It should combine assault units, unmanned systems, and firepower (down to the squad and platoon level) not only with drones, but also, for example, with fiber-optic-guided missiles..."

35/ "...as well as a variety of counter-unmanned systems and their suppression (from the individual soldier and vehicle level to specialized units). All these forces should have highly integrated network capabilities, providing fire direction for "higher levels" and aviation."

36/ "The troops' task will be to achieve "drone superiority" and then maintain it. Infantry advancement on the battlefield should be accomplished using a combination of assets depending on the situation, including dismounted infantry, motorcycles, light personnel carriers, armored vehicles, and well protected infantry fighting vehicles with high firepower."

37/ "These infantry fighting vehicles should form the core of the Ground Forces' armored armament and technical equipment. Combining high protection with moderate weight will require a lower level of tank support, engineering, and other support."

38/ "While heavy IFVs/APCs weighing as much as main battle tanks are also feasible, their excessive weight and cost, in our opinion, dictate preference for "compromise" vehicles of "medium" weight—30-40 tons—like the M2 Bradley, which has proven itself the "ideal vehicle" of the Ukrainian war."

39/ "Equipping such vehicles with counter-drone capabilities, primarily active ones, combined with all-round protection and survivability enhancements (ammunition compartment, fuel stowage, etc.), will enhance their survivability on the battlefield, even in a "drone war," while maintaining their status as "expendable" components suitable for mass production."

40/ "The question of creating units of such IFVs (giving them full-fledged infantry squads or, conversely, organizing IFVs solely as "taxi groups") requires separate consideration. Instead of tanks, infantry units should be equipped with heavy engineering assault mine-clearing vehicles..."

41/ "...combat platforms with maximum protection, both structural and active anti-drone. They don't need significant armament, as this would only reduce their survivability. Troops must have adequate support (logistical, technical, etc.)."

42/ "Troops must have adequate support (logistical, technical, etc.). In modern warfare, support itself is essentially a form of combat, constantly countering enemy attacks, and it must be appropriately organized and equipped (including unmanned)."

43/ "Therefore, the military of the future should not be rigidly divided into branches, but, on the contrary, a highly unified, integrated, multifunctional force capable of operating in any modern warfare environment."

44/ "We believe everyone has noticed the recent post by the Ukrainian resource DeepState, describing the "new infantry doctrine" of the Russian Armed Forces and clearly demonstrating the adaptation of troop tactics to the needs of "drone warfare." Four key aspects of the tactical changes on the Russian side are highlighted."

45/ "First: Increased use of ground-based robotic systems, fixed-wing loitering munitions, and heavy FPVs, leading to the "robotization of some combat processes." Currently, there is an attempt to completely shift the task of assault operations and fire support to drones to prevent the detection of assault groups."

46/ "Second: Shifting to operations in large numbers of "dispersed," minimally sized groups of only 2-4 people. Third: Minimizing firefights and frontal assaults on positions and, in general, the close contact between infantry and the enemy, shifting the primary role of fire support for assault forces to drones."

47/ "Fourth: Extensive use of tactics of slow, "creeping" infiltration or outflanking of key enemy positions in small groups, including the use of camouflage (cloaks, capes, etc.), penetrating as deep into the rear as possible, searching for and neutralizing drone operators, mortar crews, etc."

48/ "Clearly, the structure, organization, and equipment of the military must undergo corresponding adaptation. The era of "large battalions" is over."

49/ "It's worth noting that the development of the most widespread unmanned systems already used in combat is based on mass-market commercial solutions, primarily from the vast domestic markets of China and the United States."

50/ "On the one hand, this ensures their high availability. On the other hand, the feasibility of truly industrializing the most widespread types of UAVs (DJI Mavics, FPV drones, small UAVs) under autarkic and purely import-substitution scenarios still appears questionable, especially in light of the rapid evolution of solutions and models."

51/ "More complex unmanned aerial, land, and maritime systems require the highest levels of development in surveillance systems, satellite capabilities, sensors, computing power, information networks, data transmission and processing methods, and AI. A country unable to meet all these requirements is doomed to lag behind in military affairs."

52/ "The transition to "digital warfare" demonstrates that in this century, the key factor in the development of military affairs and military capabilities (and the overall development of human civilization) is the improvement of computing power."

53/ "The resources of countries and alliances will depend on the development and production of computing power, not on territorial or resource control. It should also be noted that the development of computing power and the networks based on it..."

54/ "...(including space-based ones) for control, detection, targeting, and data transmission will enable the creation of global automated reconnaissance, strike, and defensive systems with colossal density and effectiveness. In particular, the ability to counter traditional nuclear missile attacks..."

55/ "...could qualitatively increase, meaning that missile defense systems will reach a new level. This, in turn, carries the risk of devaluing nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in general."

56/ "In the medium term, Russia will lag behind global leaders in computing power development (due to a lack of competencies, industrial capabilities, and domestic market capacity). This must be addressed immediately; otherwise, the gap will widen, threatening the country's strategic interests."

57/ "Russia has the resources to correct this situation, and its scientific and technological advances remain. However, the pace of global change is such that it may simply not be able to realize these opportunities. Recognizing this requires setting aside political differences and focusing on urgently addressing administrative and technological challenges."