Free cash flow is a measure after capital expenditures and incorporates fluctuations in working capital.
Since founding, BYD's modus operandi has been to re-allocate every dollar of operating cashflow + as much capital as it can raise — as non-dilutively as possible — to support the needs of a rapidly growing business.
Frankly, it is financially illiterate to describe re-investment back into a growing business as "losses". Negative cashflow is a cashflow item and — especially if related to CapEx and working capital fluctuations (which I will address below) — is conceptually different from "losses" which is an income statement term.
A better approach is to consider how much long-term capital the company has raised an compare it to the scale of operating capacity that capital has enabled.
We can look at this from BYD's latest balance sheet, which I have summarized here:
To date, BYD has taken in a total of ¥340B in debt and equity funding.
This number includes ~¥82B of ST/LT borrowings and ¥258B of equity (or equity-like) funding.
The equity funding includes ¥107B of "undistributed profit" which is similar in concept to retained earnings (we'll get back to this point in a bit).
This capital (~$23B in USD, net of cash) has funded the buildout of BYD's operation today, which includes:
(i) its contract manufacturing operation (~$27B in revenue, ~1/5th the size of Foxconn)
(ii) the world's second-largest battery business (after CATL), and
(iii) the world's largest (and a highly verticalized) NEV production operation which combined with the battery business generates ~$100B in revenue @ ~22% gross margin and has ~7M in production capacity (incl. construction-in-progress)
Just to put this in perspective, Tesla's comparable figure is ~$38B (shareholders' equity minus cash and ST investments), >60% higher than BYD (~$23B).
This has funded a business that generates ~$80B in run-rate revenue (~16% gross margin) and vehicle production capacity of ~2.4M p.a.
Note: Tesla is not some inefficiently run company; I'd argue that it is the most capital-efficient and best-run advanced manufacturer outside of China today.
So the better way to look at this is not "accumulated free cash flow" but considering whether the operating business/footprint today justifies that capital that has been invested + whether business can continue compounding at a high rate of return going forward.
This is almost certainly the way Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett looked at the investment over their long ownership period starting in 2008.
OP highlights the supplier financing question. This is something I have analyzed before.
If BYD were to switch a normal payable days cycle, this would result in ¥106B in additional net working capital.
This is how that change impacts BYD's balance sheet.
Effectively, what was once funded by negative working capital is now funded by additional borrowings (or a drawdown out of the ¥175B it has in cash and equivalents).
This increases BYD's net capitalization to ~$38B, in line with Tesla's.
Note: BYD is still running a negative net working capital balance after the pro forma reduction in payables. But this new pro forma balance is in line with Tesla, which also runs a substantial net operating** working capital deficit.
** current operating assets (excl cash/equivalents) minus current operating liabilities (excl ST borrowings)
Thus for the same level of nominal $/¥ capitalization, compared to Tesla, BYD produces:
(i) ~3x the car volume
(ii) ~2x the gross profit (far more vertically integrated), and
(iii) has a large CM business to boot.
It is growing faster than Tesla on a YoY business and choosing to re-invest more heavily in the business, as evidenced by its continued rapid expansion in production capacity and R&D workforce, investing ~1.5x as much CapEx and ~2x as much in R&D (~6x the number of engineers).
This financial illiteracy has extended to comments below like this.
Referencing the aforementioned "undistributed profits" or "retained earnings", we can clearly see that BYD has generated cumulative profits of ¥107B since inception.
Per above, these profits — and more, via external capital raising at significant premiums to book value — have been reinvested back into the business, at high RoICs, especially if you take into account the long-term, highly efficient operation that has been built.
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For all the flak about "lack of a social welfare safety net", China has one of the lowest pension/retirement ages in the world.
Further, it's hard to imagine that China — a "loud and proud" socialist country — not investing significantly into its social welfare programs in the coming decades, especially as it has officially crossed the "high income" threshold.
Jonathon highlights what I thought was the most interesting point out of the recent communique.
I tend to look at things from a company/sector perspective, and for me this represented the CCP's effort to adapt the vast administrative bureaucracy to align with the operational and realities of shifting sectoral priorities.
Property and infrastructure development were two of the key economic development priorities from the mid-2000s to the early 2020s.
Both property and infrastructure (especially "traditional" infrastructure like highways and bridges) were highly localized in nature. Land is central to both efforts, and land use falls under the jurisdiction of local governments.
Thus, it made sense for executive power to be decentralized to the local governments: Beijing simply cannot effectively manage land development in Guizhou.
This leads to a whole other set of issues, as there is a wide variation in local government competence. The manifestation of these issues has been widely discussed (e.g. LGFVs) but that is not the scope of this thread.
The question here is now that economic development priorities have shifted, how should the bureaucracy adapt from a centralization vs. de-centralization perspective?
And to do that again we need to understand how the differentiated nature of the new priority sectors map against this question of centralized vs. de-centralized administration.
This is important because there is a group of people that insist on confusing/conflating demand with consumption in the China context.
These are meaningfully distinct terms: Consumption is just one component of demand, alongside gross capital formation. The distinction is driven by GDP accounting definitions.
To further clarify, this is what I mean about the distinction between demand (in the context of supply) and "consumption" in the context of GDP accounting-driven split between gross capital formation / "investment" and expenditures / "consumption"
I can see that folks are already starting to wildly misinterpreting what this chart says and this seems like another one of these Rorscarch tests on China.
Let's nip this in the bud: this is IP share of services exports, which comes from Balance of Payments accounting.
That China does not license IP is not an "indictment", it's a statistical quirk that requires some deeper understanding of the BoP and how it maps against real-world trade and investment realities.
This was a complex/nuanced discussion on "overcapacity". Thanks for writing it @wstv_lizzi as it is an important topic.
It presented a number of interesting ideas which make sense on their own but I struggled to tie them together under a "grand unifying narrative" related to the "China Model".
The challenge of the "overcapacity" narrative is trying to use it to summarize "China Model" into a neat, compact narrative. But trying to summarize something as complex as China's economy into a neat model is exceedingly difficult.
(as an aside, the piece read like a writer struggling to force-fit an article within pre-defined narratives/framing set by an editor)
Two key problems I've found in the "overcapacity" debate that I'll go into more detail in this 🧵:
1⃣ Unclear/conflated definition of the term "overcapacity"
2⃣ As you drill down down from the macro/national level to individual sector level, you find many sector-specific idiosyncrasies that contradict core elements of "grand unifying" theme around "overcapacity".
1⃣ Defining "overcapacity" itself
"Overcapacity" has become a loaded word, especially when described in the context of the broad "China Model" in the current geopolitical environment.
In regular industrial/manufacturing usage, overcapacity is simply a state/condition where capacity utilization is below a certain "normal" threshold. This threshold may very by sector and different operating conditions.
Standard capacity utilization is defined not only by physical capital stock, but also by an active labor force operating on a normal shift schedule (typically 2 shifts per day, 5 days per week, or 80 hours / week).
But the way that it is being used in policy/economic/geopolitical discussion is in a much more undefined/amorphous way that goes well beyond the standard industry/mfg definition.
For instance, in this passage it is implicitly defined as production beyond domestic demand. But the implication here is that Chinese companies should not be able to have free access to global markets.
IOW how the term is used/defined appears to reflect implicit policy objectives of one particular side in the ongoing trade war.
Carefully inserted vocabulary like "deluge" and "sinister" peppered throughout the piece subtly signal how "overcapacity" is being normatively framed.
If you read the official court documents (link in ALT), it is very clear that the underlying reason driving the eventual takeover of the company were the prospect of escalation in U.S. trade sanctions under the 50% rule, which was officially released on September 29th.
A detailed timeline of the events described in the legal brief clearly show that the entire series of events were instigated by the addition of Wingtech, which indirectly owned/controlled 100% of Nexperia, to the Entity List.
To characterize the primary reason for the takeover as "financial misconduct" ignoring that the the "financial misconduct" was directly linked to Wingtech's addition to the Entity List is highly misleading and disingenuous.