China's goods and services data on a balance of payments basis is now effectively out for q3 (with the September monthly data) -- and on a balance of payments basis, exports jumped up a bit in q3
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The q2 surplus using China's (whacky) BoP methodology was well below the q2 customs surplus -- but the q3 BoP surplus is strong, and up v q2 (while the customs surplus is down)
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So my estimate for the q3 current account surplus is just over $200b ($800b annualized) -- or well above q2 ...
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That would pull the trailing 4q sum of the reported current account surplus to ~ $660b, or (gulp) $300b more than @IMFNews estimated in the External Sector Report (the IMF's current account forecasting needs some work!; look at the lagged RER!)
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@IMFNews The q3 jump is a bit fake -- my underlying tracking data suggests q2 was every bit as big. China's new methodology introduces a bit of a randomwalk into the reported data (or a not so random walk if the CA maps to visible financial outflows)
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@IMFNews Given China's $1.2 trillion customs surplus, the tourism deficit (~ $200b) and positive net int. investment position, I think the true current account surplus should be around $1 trillion. The q3 surplus may get a bit closer to that number!
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@IMFNews And that is not because the underlying data changed, but rather because the gap between the underlying customs surplus and the goods surplus reported using China's balance of payments methodology shrank
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Jason Douglass and Jonathan Cheng in the WSJ -- the Trade War Didn't Change China.
In fact, China's economy is more unbalanced and more reliant on exports for the demand than it was when section 301 case first started
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Open trade failed, spectacularly, to liberalize China's political system.
More restricted trade if anything led China to double down on its manufacturing intensive, channel capital to industry model
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I think it is fair to say that China has weaponized the chokepoints generated by its control over the supply of critical inputs (rare earths, magnets, legacy chips, processing of chips) quite effectively --
There needs to be a better consensus number for the tariff on China. The effective tariff rate (Tariff paid/ imports) was 37-38% in July and August. It should fall to under 30% with the recent deal.
As @EtraAlex notes, that is still higher than the effective tariff rate on most other countries (India is a bit of an outlier, but there should be a deal) -- the electronics exclusion lowers the effective tariff on SE Asia ...
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There of course is a lot of sectoral variability in the tariffs -- all sorts of 232s that knock out the reciprocal tariffs, and in some cases (electronics/ chips & pharma) that has really lowered the actual applied tariff (same for the USMCA exclusion)
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China's currency is objectively very weak, especially in inflation adjusted terms (it is down just under 20% from its 2021 high). And it is very tightly managed against the dollar --
But within that broad regime, there has been a tiny bit of appreciation over the last 6ms
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And to be sure, the movement is primarily against the dollar -- the yuan remains incredibly weak against the euro (contributing to the second China shock, China's rising share of the EU auto market & German automotive angst)
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There is something technically very strange about the yuan's appreciation -- it has come even though the onshore spot rate has remained weaker than the daily fix (in theory the mid point of the band). That is strange ...
China, the unexpected "winner" from Trump's second term trade war?
Bringing the Trump 2 tariff on China down to 20% (10% reciprocal, 10% fentanyl) is a huge win for China; it puts the new tariffs at the same level as the new tariffs on SE Asia
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The new tariffs on China would also only be 5 pp higher than the tariffs on US allies like Japan and Korea (and most European countries) ... massive shift away from the campaign proposal
There is a myth that the average tariff on China is now 55%
("it would bring the average tariff on most Chinese imports—currently around 55%—to about 45%. That would put China’s average tariff rate closer to those of other trading partners")
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Excellent piece by @AnaSwanson on the now expected Trump-Xi trade deal/ truce/ US walk back
Agree with Mr. Czin. The most remarkable thing about the current US trade agenda with China is all the things that aren't on it. I would include currency on that list of course
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The best argument for the limited US agenda is that the US lacks the leverage to get China to fundamentally change, so the best the US can hope for is selling some beans and getting export licenses for rare earths
As the FT notes in a very good leader, China's leaders just doubled down on a manufacturing led growth strategy )"there is no retreat from the manufacturing-led development pursued under the current five-year plan")
China's growth has been driven by the need to make up for weak internal demand through a rising trade surplus, which is a much bigger concern than the export to GDP ratio
The unusually large contribution from net exports is undeniable. As is the fact that Chinese export volume growth has been far faster than Chinese GDP growth and world trade growth in recent years
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As this chart shows, China's exports have been rising v its GDP over the last 5 years (a change from the 10s) ...
While imports of manufactures continue to fall v GDP, hence the sharp rise in China's trade surplus v its GDP