With two months to go before the end of 2025, the Russian army continues to lay the groundwork for major battles in 2026.
With Pokrovsk falling, Putin will not stop his war before conquering Kramatorsk.
🧵THREAD🧵1/21 ⬇️
The capture of Pokrovsk is drawing closer, culminating a two-year offensive to first clear the outskirts of Donetsk and then assault this strategic city.
Situated on a hilltop and boasting a significant rail and road network, Pokrovsk will give the russians a major advantage.
The capture of Pokrovsk is not yet a done deal, and I estimate that the battle, particularly in the suburbs, will continue for several more months.
The Ukrainian army still holds the strongholds of Udachne and Rodynske, preventing any overrun on its flanks.
Russian units entered the city head-on, infiltrating behind enemy lines for months.
A precise front line cannot be drawn, and the situation remains highly fluid. The Russian army is now attempting to advance into Myrnohrad.
The battle for Pokrovsk, which lasted a whole year, was a significant slowdown in the Russian offensive, allowing the Ukrainians to reorganize the defense of the Kramatorsk Valley and prepare the defenses leading to Dobropilla in the north and Pavlohrad, in the west.
Unlike Avdiivka's rear which was not fortified (Russian push for 5 months, stopped at the gates of Pokrovsk in 2024), Pokrovsk's rear was prepared, just like Bakhmout's in 2023, preventing at the time a collapse all the way to Kramatorsk.
Lacking a significant foothold in the southeast, the Ukrainian army was unable to hold small rural towns, which were quickly bypassed, such as Velika Novosilka, or the smaller rivers.
Consequently, a continued Russian advance spilled out from southern Donetsk toward Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia.
The Russian army has been largely halted in the vicinity of Novopavlivka, around the confluence of the three rivers Vovotcha, Solena, and Mokri Yali.
This prevents the flooding of Mezhova and Prossiana, two small towns located on higher ground.
The Vovotcha River will slow northward movements, hence the importance of capturing Pokrovsk for any advance toward Pavlorhad.
However, the westward offensive has not been halted. The only hope lies with the Haichur River on the Pokrovsk-Hulialpole line.
While Pokrovsk'e, behind the Vovotcha River, should hold, the situation in Hulialpole is likely to be more complicated.
This will result in a Russian advance on the rear of Orikhiv, towards Zaporizhzhia. All assaults on Orikhiv have been repelled; a small, heroic city.
However, it is becoming clear that there is cause for concern regarding Zaporijia, a city of 800k inhabitants.
As a matter of urgency, the Ukrainian army has erected defensive lines facing east, in Vilniansk and in Novomykhoilivka, on the N15 Donetsk-Zaporijia highway.
The risk also comes from the south; the capture of Kamianske, the clashes in Stepnohirsk, and the infiltration of Prymorske do not bode well.
The 🇷🇺 are less than 20 km from the city; they will soon be able to use drones and FAB bombs. They will have to evacuate part of the city
How can one even imagine defending such a large city with such a shortage of infantry and knowing the critical lack of fortifications south of the city?
The city is a square measuring 16km by 16km. How can infiltrations like those at Pokrovsk be prevented?
It has become very clear that one of Russia's objectives for 2026 is also to threaten Zaporijia.
A populous, industrial city that also has a dam on the Dnipro, Zaporijia is particularly vulnerable given how much southern Ukraine is becoming a desert with the end of irrigation.
While the push to the southeast may be an opportunity for the Russian army, given the lack of defenses and cities, the primary objective remains the Donbas, and in particular the four cities in the Kramatorsk Valley.
2026 will undoubtedly be the year for this battle.
I've already explained this, but the Russian plan has been phased in since the failure of the initial offensive.
The battle for Kostiantynivka has only just begun, and the city is still far from being encircled. The battle will be easier than Pokrovsk, given that the city is at the bottom of a valley, the roads more exposed.
The key to the battle will be capturing both east and west flanks.
To the east and north, the keys to the battle will be Siversk and Lyman, two battles of fixation to protect Sloviansk, the twin city of Kramatorsk, just to the north.
Finally, the battle for the Oskil River is likely to continue even after the fall of Kupiansk. The terrain is more difficult for advances.
For the moment, it is a secondary objective, although it is suspected that the goal of reaching the Oskil River will be followed by another: reaching the Siversk Donets River.
The gradual end of the Battle of Pokrovsk paves the way for the battle for the last strongholds of the Donbas.
2026 will likely be the year the Russian army uses to advance on two strategic objectives, Kramatorsk and Zaporizhzhia, and potentially launch an assault in the winter of 2026-2027.
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Un lent génocide est en cours au Soudan 🇸🇩 et personne n'en parle
Le massacre à caractère génocidaire de milliers de Zaghawas à El Fasher n'est qu'une étape qui a débuté à la fin des années 1980.
Un génocide par étapes dans l'ouest du Soudan :
🧵THREAD🧵1/24 ⬇️
A El Fasher, plus de 2 500 civils ont été tués dans les massacres des derniers jours après la prise de la ville.
Ce chiffre ne reflèterai cependant pas la réalité et la taille des massacres. On se rapprocherai plus d'un ordre de grandeur d'environ 10 000 morts au vu des vidéos.
Qu'est ce qui me fait venir à ce chiffre ?
Les témoignages, les images satellites, les vidéos et les données de l'arrivées des réfugiés permettent d'en douter.
Sur cette vidéo, il y a facilement plus de 1 000 hommes rassemblés avant d'être massacrés.
A El Fasher dans l'ouest du #Soudan 🇸🇩, les FSR s'emparent de la base de la 6ème division, encerclée depuis 2 ans.
Des milliers de civils, principalement des Zaghawas (noirs) réfugiés dans la ville fuient vers le désert, poursuivis par les FSR (arabes).
🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️
El Fasher, 4ème (?) plus grande ville du Soudan, capitale de l'ouest du pays était la dernière ville a résister aux forces de soutien rapide, les FSR.
A l'intérieur, en plus des habitants traditionnels, des réfugiés des guerres précédentes, environ 1.5 millions d'habitants.
Les FSR sont une milice arabe du Darfour (l'ouest du Soudan). Ils se battent depuis la fin des années 1990 contre les peuples africains du Darfour, dont les Fur, Zafgawas et Massalit.
Depuis 2023, les FSR tentent de renverser le pouvoir à Khartoum en se battant contre l'armée.
Russian 🇷🇺 soldiers have been sighted in the center of Pokrovsk, a strategic city in the east of Ukraine 🇺🇦
After months of infiltration, russian troops are threatening to capture two of the last 7 big cities of Donbas, while they started entering a 3rd one.
🧵THREAD🧵1/21 ⬇️
While ukrainians are cheering for an undeniable victory, the pushed back Dobropilla breakthrough and the liberation of Kucheriv Yar village, stopping months of threat on Kramatorsk, russian infantry was sighted in the city center of Pokrovsk.
Pokrovsk is not a random city. It is the western entrance of Donbas (a populated, mining and industrial eastern region of Ukraine).
Once a strategic railway and road hub for ukrainian forces in Donetsk direction it is now since a year the hot spot of the war.
For the first time in months, Russia 🇷🇺 launched tanks and armoured vehicles in Ukraine 🇺🇦
2 years after the large scale Avdiivka offensive, russian forces tried to storm the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka area of the frontline, losing around 30 armoured vehicles.
🧵THREAD🧵1/16 ⬇️
The main use of tanks, IFV and AFV was during the Avdiivka-Donestk offensive, mainly between october 2023 and may 2024.
Then, it was slowly abandonned. Since the first months of 2025, the use of armoured vehicles nearly disappeared.
Why ?
Because Russia was slowly lacking reserves in armoured vehicles and drone warfare was making their use more and more dangerous.
Most of them have been put away from the front during months and endured some changes.
A quoi ressemble la guerre en Ukraine en 2025, avec des photos et des vidéos ?
Sur cette vidéo, 4 drones russes 🇷🇺 frappent en 1 minute un blindé ukrainien 🇺🇦 abandonné, deux n'explosent pas.
🧵THREAD🧵1/23 ⬇️
J'ai compilé pour vous une vingtaine de vidéos et de photos, les moins sales (la plupart sont absolument horrible, avec des soldats qui agonisent) pour montrer une réalité de la guerre qu'on ne montre plus.
Ici, les drones russes qui attendent leur cible sur le côté de la route.
Un combat constant contre les drones kamikazes FPV.
Sur la vidéo, ce soldat ukrainien se bat contre plusieurs drones kamikazes russes, en détruisant plusieurs. La priorité désormais, regarder vers le ciel.
Alors que se tient le 12ème sommet de l'organisation des Etats Turciques 🇹🇷 en Azerbaïdjan, les pays centrasiatiques prouvent une fois de plus leur éloignement avec la Russie.
🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️
Depuis 2022, l’Asie centrale amorce un tournant géopolitique majeur.
Longtemps dans le giron russe, la région s’émancipe progressivement de Moscou. Cet éloignement n’est ni brutal ni uniforme, mais il est désormais irréversible.
La guerre en Ukraine a agi comme un catalyseur.
Pour les dirigeants centrasiatiques de l'ex URSS, la Russie n’est plus un garant de stabilité, mais un facteur d’incertitude.
Dès lors, la priorité devient l’autonomie stratégique et la diversification des partenariats.